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As modern commercial transactions become larger and more complex, business 
professionals have resorted to various instruments or agreements aimed at regulating 
and progressing the negotiation process. Some of these instruments can even 
strongly resemble a contract, but are preliminary in form, and as such give rise to 
uncertainty as to their enforceability. The diverse range of agreements concluded prior 
to a principal contract, which may be termed pre-contractual agreements, are the focus 
of critical examination in this thesis. 
The nature and legal consequences of pre-contractual agreements are both 
uncertain and controversial. This is in large part due to the fact that the term “pre-
contractual” does not refer to a specific type of agreement with a standardised legal 
content but rather to the stage at which the agreement is concluded. In this thesis, the 
various types of pre-contractual agreements are catergorised according to their 
function so as to establish which of these agreements, if any, meet the validity 
requirements for a contract and thus give rise to legal consequences. Particular focus 
is placed on the legal nature and consequences of various types of agreements to 
negotiate. 
Due to the limited local case law and academic literature on pre-contractual 
agreements and the broader topic of pre-contractual liability, comparative 
observations can form a central component in the formulation of potential solutions to 
the obstacles presented by these agreements. With the benefit of comparative 
analysis the conclusion is reached that a sound framework to regulate the pre-
contractual phase can be established through the development of the law of contract 
to enforce specific types of agreements to negotiate. 
To analyse all the potential legal consequences arising from pre-contractual 
agreements comprehensively, the scope of the analysis extends beyond the law of 
contract to consider the potential remedies that may lie in other sources of law, such 
as the law of delict and the law of unjustified enrichment. The conclusion is reached 
that both the law of delict and the law of unjustified enrichment can serve as valuable 
sources of pre-contractual liability to rectify potential injustices that may arise during 




Namate moderne kommersiële transaksies groter en meer ingewikkeld geword het, 
het sakelui verskillende instrumente of ooreenkomste begin gebruik om die 
onderhandelingsproses te reguleer. Sommige van hierdie instrumente kan selfs sterk 
ooreenkomste met ‘n kontrak vertoon, maar weens hulle voorlopige aard heers daar 
onsekerheid oor hul afdwingbaarheid. Die fokus van hierdie tesis is die uiteenlopende 
groep ooreenkomste wat as ‘voor-kontraktuele ooreenkomste’ beskryf kan word 
omdat hulle tot stand kom voordat ‘n hoofkontrak tot stand kom.  
Die aard en regsgevolge van voor-kontraktuele ooreenkomste is onseker en 
omstrede. Die onsekerheid onstaan grootliks omdat die begrip “voor-kontraktueel” 
nie  na ‘n spesifieke tipe ooreenkoms met ‘n standaard regsinhoud verwys nie, maar 
eeder na die stadium waarop die ooreenkoms tot stand kom. In hierdie tesis word die 
verskillende tipes voor-kontraktuele ooreenkomste volgens funksie gekategoriseer om 
te bepaal watter van hierdie ooreenkomste, indien enige, aan die geldigheidsvereistes 
van ‘n kontrak voldoen en sodoende regsgevolge sal hê. Die aard en regsgevolge van 
“ooreenkomste om te onderhandel” is hier van spesifieke belang. 
Weens die beperkte omvang van plaaslike regspraak en akademiese literatuur oor 
voor-kontraktuele ooreenkomste, asook die breër onderwerp van voor kontraktuele 
aanspreeklikheid, kan regsvergelykende perspektiewe nuttig wees om ‘n raamwerk te 
skep waarbinne die regulering van die voor-kontraktuele fase hanteer kan word. Die 
kontraktereg kan sodoende uitgebrei word om sekere tipes “ooreenkomste om te 
onderhandel” afdwingbaar te maak. 
Selfs ‘n meer uitgebreide kontrakteregbedeling sal egter nie voldoende wees om al 
die moontlike regsgevolge van voor-kontraktuale ooreenkomste omvattend te ontleed 
nie. Ander regsgebiede, naamlik die deliktereg en die verrykingsreg, moet ook betrek 
word by die ondersoek. Die gevolgtrekking word bereik dat die deliktereg sowel as die 
verrykingsreg as waardevolle bronne van voor-kontraktuele aanspreeklikheid kan 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 1 The commercial use of pre-contractual agreements 
Business professionals at times conclude agreements to outline the terms and 
structure of an envisaged transaction. If one of the parties ultimately does not continue 
with concluding a deal, the question arises as to the legal consequences (if any) of 
these preliminary agreements. Preliminary agreements are often of a hybrid nature 
and consist of binding and non-binding terms. The uncertainty around these 
agreements is exacerbated by the fact that business professionals often are not 
concerned at the time of conclusion of the agreement with painstakingly distinguishing 
legal obligations from non-binding terms facilitating the negotiation; their concern is 
rather merely with using whichever instrument proves most useful in taking the 
transaction forward. 
As business transactions have become more complex, the need has increased for 
these types of instruments that outline the envisaged transaction and regulate the 
relationship between commercial parties before the principal contract is concluded.1 
At the outset it is often not possible for parties to conclude a complete contract, and 
the only option then is to enter into some form of pre-contractual arrangement, 
especially where expenses will be incurred pursuant to the proposed transaction. It is 
common practice in large and complex negotiations involving a number of parties to 
conclude a range of preliminary agreements prior to the main contract.  
These agreements are described in various ways, including a “Letter of Intent”, 
“Heads of Agreement”, “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU), “Memorandum of 
Agreement” (MOA), and “Agreement in Principle”.2 The numerous names given to 
these pre-contractual agreements are often used interchangeably. It is difficult to 
assess the legal consequences of pre-contractual agreements because their content 
and functions can differ so vastly, and no specific legal effect can be attached to the 
agreement solely on the basis of its name.3 For purposes of this thesis, a neutral term, 
 
1 C Kunze The Letter of Intent, with Special Emphasis on its Relevance in International Trade Law LLM 
thesis, Stellenbosch University (2014) 3. 
2 GC Moss “The Function of Letters of Intent and their Recognition in Modern Legal Systems” in R 





namely that of the “pre-contractual agreement”, will be used to describe the different 
preliminary agreements concluded prior to the main contract.  
Examples of a range of pre-contractual agreements can be found in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions where they are commonly used. Negotiations would usually 
commence with the conclusion of a declaration of purpose and this would be followed 
by the conclusion of further pre-contractual agreements outlining the key elements of 
the intended transaction in varying degrees of detail.4 Their use is not however limited 
to mergers and acquisitions. As will be seen in chapter 2, pre-contractual agreements 
feature in many different industries and can be utilised for a wide range of purposes. 
This only adds to the uncertainty around their legal character and consequences.  
1 2 The uncertain legal consequences of pre-contractual agreements and 
negotiations 
The traditional rules of contract formation have for the most part been structured for 
contracts whose formation is immediate and no specific legal effects have been 
attributed to the different stages of negotiation.5 Since pre-contractual agreements can 
reflect consensus on important elements of the contract, the question arises whether 
a contractual undertaking already exists. While in most circumstances no final contract 
exists because most of the clauses are yet to be created, a pre-contractual agreement 
could oblige parties not to renegotiate aspects already agreed upon, and it could even 
imply an obligation to negotiate in good faith on outstanding aspects.6 The further 
question then arises what the consequences of such a preliminary contract could be - 
how would one establish breach and calculate damages, for example.7 
South African research and case law on pre-contractual agreements is limited. Pre-
contractual agreements of the types discussed in chapter 2 often are only treated 
generally, with insufficient attention being paid to their legal consequences. Therefore 
it may be useful to conduct comparative studies to establish whether they could aid 
local legal development. American law in particular has a considerable body of case 
law concerning pre-contractual agreements, and this in turn has given rise to 
 







potentially valuable academic analyses.8 
Pre-contractual agreements are controversial because they present problems that 
relate to the existence and extent of contractual obligations.9 Farnsworth explains that 
the bulk of litigation in America regarding preliminary partial agreements raised issues 
regarding the intention to be bound or animus contrahendi, particularly in light of the 
fact that these agreements are often used for non-legal purposes.10 In contrast, some 
agreements to negotiate, while reflecting an intention to be bound, give rise to issues 
regarding certainty.11 American courts that have been called upon to decide on the 
enforceability of agreements to negotiate are of two minds regarding their 
enforceability. While some courts have been willing to give effect to the parties’ 
express intention to bind themselves to negotiations, others refuse to recognise such 
agreements on grounds of uncertainty.12 In terms of South African contract law, an 
agreement to negotiate with a view to concluding a main contract was until recently 
regarded as too uncertain to be enforceable.13  
A specific type of pre-contractual agreement, namely an agreement to negotiate in 
good faith, is also investigated in greater detail. Although there has been some South 
African case law on this issue, the validity of an agreement to negotiate remains a grey 
area.14 This type of agreement is considered in chapter 2, together with academic 
commentary on the topic.15 In particular, the discussion will engage with the view that 
the traditional common-law approach to this type of agreement, that pre-dates the 
 
8 A Hutchison “Agreements to Agree: Can There Ever be an Enforceable Duty to Negotiate in Good 
Faith?” (2011) 128 SALJ A Hutchison “Agreements to Agree: Can There Ever be an Enforceable Duty 
to Negotiate in Good Faith?” (2011) 128 SALJ 273 286.  
9 RB Lake “Letter of Intent: A Comparative Examination under English, US, French and West German 
Law” (1984) 18 Geo Wash J Intl L & Econ 331 335.  
10 EA Farnsworth “Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed 
Negotiations” (1987) 87 Colum LR 217 257-258. 
11 265. 
12 265. 
13 G Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed (2016) 47. 
14 Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) para 100; RD McKerrow “Agreements to Negotiate: 
A Contemporary Analysis” (2017) 28 Stell LR 324. 
15 See Hutchison 2011 SALJ 273; McKerrow 2017 Stell LR 308; D Bhana & N Broeders “Agreements 




Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, requires development.16 
Taking into account the different types of pre-contractual agreements that have 
become prominent in practice, this thesis will consider whether pre-contractual 
agreements can meet the requirements of certainty and animus contrahendi and thus 
give rise to contractual obligations. Suggestions, informed by comparative analysis, 
will be made regarding the types of pre-contractual agreements which should be 
afforded contractual status and the types of remedies that should be available for 
breach of such contracts.  
1 3 Balancing conflicting interests in the pre-contractual phase 
Most common-law systems regard freedom to terminate negotiations as a 
fundamental right, essential for promoting economic growth, because it provides the 
assurance that a party is not at risk of pre-contractual liability.17 The rationale behind 
the common-law approach is that if liability is readily imposed during the pre-
contractual phase it will threaten economic growth, because parties are less likely to 
enter into contractual negotiations for fear of legal sanction and as a result less 
commercial transactions will be entered into.18 
However, liability for reliance losses in certain circumstances may be appropriate 
and even necessary to promote efficient transactions.19 Economic studies have 
revealed that the absence of any form of pre-contractual liability can discourage 
parties from entering into negotiations or investing therein, for fear that their sunk costs 
will be wasted if the other party can break off negotiations at any stage and for any 
 
16 See McKerrow 2017 Stell LR 308-309; Bhana & Broeders 2014 THRHR 176. 
17 HG Beale, B Fauvarque-Cosson, J Rutgers, D Tallon & S Vogenauer Cases, Materials and Text on 
Contract Law: Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe 2 ed (2010) 381; T Irakli “The 
Principles of Freedom of Contract, Pre-Contractual Obligations Legal Review, EU and US Law” (2017) 
13 ESJ 62 63,67; EA Farnsworth Contracts 4 ed (2004) 189; Farnsworth 1987 Colum LR 221; Hutchison 
2011 SALJ 290. 
18 Beale Cases, Materials and Text 381; EC Melato “Precontractual Liability” in G De Geest (gen ed) 
Contract Law and Economics 2 ed (2011) 9 12; Farnsworth Contracts 189-190; B MacFarlane “The 
Protection of Pre-Contractual Reliance: A Way Forward” (2010) 10 OUCLJ 95 99; Irakli 2017 ESJ 67; 
A Schwartz & RE Scott “Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements” (2007) 120 Harv L Rev 
661 690; Farnsworth 1987 Colum LR 221,243. 
19 Melato “Pre-Contractual Liability” in Contract Law 12-16; MacFarlane 2010 OUCLJ 99-102; Schwartz 




reason without incurring liability.20 Early investment in negotiations (pre-contractual 
reliance) can improve both the efficiency of the transaction and increase its profitability 
for both parties.21  
This in and of itself does not justify the intervention of the law to impose legal liability 
so as to protect pre-contractual reliance, but it does indicate that regulating the pre-
contractual phase in a manner that promotes commerce rather than hinders it, requires 
the development of a very fine balance between freedom of negotiation and the 
imposition of liability to protect the interests of parties to negotiations.22 This thesis will 
address challenging questions regarding whether obligations during the pre-
contractual phase should be imposed by law or should be left to the discretion of the 
parties who can choose to deviate from the default position by concluding a contract. 
This ties in with the question of the types of agreements that are or should be 
contractually enforceable to address the risks discussed above, an issue which is 
discussed in chapter 3. It will also have to be considered whether the law of contract 
should be utilised to find this balance, or whether other sources of law should regulate 
the period prior to contract formation. 
1 4 Pre-contractual liability arising from sources other than contract 
If a pre-contractual agreement does not constitute a binding contract, then it is 
necessary to consider the possibility of non-contractual liability arising from the use of 
such an agreement. 
This thesis will investigate the different sources of pre-contractual liability in 
circumstances where no binding contract has come into existence. The absence of a 
contract does not mean that the pre-contractual agreement has no legal effect,23 and 
various sources of pre-contractual liability have to be considered.24  
“Pre-contractual liability” has until recently been an unfamiliar concept in common-
law systems and most of these systems therefore neither have a single source of pre-
contractual liability, nor have they developed a special set of rules that are generally 
 
20 MacFarlane 2010 OUCLJ 99; Melato “Pre-Contractual Liability” in Contract Law 12. 
21 MacFarlane 2010 OUCLJ 99-100. 
22 Irakli 2017 ESJ 67. 





applicable to the pre-contractual phase (such as culpa in contrahendo in Germany).25 
Pre-contractual liability in this context refers specifically to non-contractual liability 
imposed for conduct that causes loss in the course of contractual negotiations prior to 
contract formation.26 The concept of pre-contractual liability refers to a stage in 
negotiations rather than a specific source of liability and it is classified differently in 
different jurisdictions.27 
Pre-contractual expenses can take on two different forms. Firstly, a party may incur 
costs by performing work, rendering services or delivering goods.28 Such performance 
or preparation usually takes place when negotiations give rise to an expectation that 
a contract will materialise.29 Secondly, a negotiating party may expend time and 
resources in the course of negotiations, often referred to as “investment costs”30 that 
are necessary to evaluate the other party’s “commercial abilities and assess the 
profitability and feasibility of the transaction”.31 Such expenses are incurred in reliance 
that negotiations will result in the conclusion of a contract.32 If negotiations are broken 
off such expenditure will be wasted.33 While the traditional position regarding the 
allocation of risk and liability prior to contract formation suffices where both parties 
 
25 E Pannebakker Letter of Intent in International Contracting LLD thesis Eramus University Rotterdam 
(2016) 173; N Andrews Contract Law 2 ed (2015) 22; J Cartwright Contract Law: An Introduction to the 
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have conducted themselves properly, it may be inadequate where negotiations break 
down due to the blameworthy conduct of one of the parties.34 
The analysis of liability arising from non-contractual sources during the pre-
contractual phase is important for purposes of ultimately drawing an informed 
conclusion about whether the classical rules of contract formation require further 
development to extend contractual force to certain pre-contractual agreements 
(concluded prior to the principal contract), or whether liability appropriately falls to be 
dealt with by other sources of law. In the English case of Cobbes v Yeoman Row 
Management Ltd35 (“Cobbes”) for example, the court reasoned that there were “plenty 
of other ways of dealing with particular problems of unacceptable conduct occurring 
in the course of negotiations without unduly hampering the ability of the parties to 
negotiate their own bargains without the intervention of the court”.36 Imposing liability 
in the law of contract does not exclude the possibility of also imposing liability based 
on other sources of law and it may therefore be appropriate for pre-contractual 
obligations to arise from more than one source of law. 
Civil law systems and common-law systems differ vastly in their approach to 
regulating the pre-contractual phase, particularly insofar as it concerns freedom to 
break off negotiations and the imposition of a duty of good faith; this impacts whether 
there will be liability and if so the basis for such liability.37 The sources of pre-
contractual liability that will be considered in this thesis are the law of delict, and the 
law of unjustified enrichment.  
As yet, no general theory of pre-contractual liability has developed in South African 
law, but liability for certain forms of conduct during the pre-contractual phase could 
potentially be imposed by relying on the general principles of the law of delict.38 The 
law of delict as a source of liability is relevant in the context of pre-contractual reliance. 
Certain representations can be made in pre-contractual agreements which gives rise 
to a reliance by the other party that the main contract will be concluded. Parties can 
incur expenses pursuant to such representations. 
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In South Africa delictual liability is imposed for fraudulent misrepresentations in the 
pre-contractual phase, even where no contract materialises.39 The imposition of 
delictual liability for negligent misrepresentations, made in circumstances where no 
contract comes into existence, is more problematic.40 To provide a delictual action in 
these circumstances would require the extension of liability for negligent 
misrepresentations to recognise that representations made in the pre-contractual 
phase are also actionable where it forms the basis of a reliance and the envisaged 
contract fails to materialise.41 
A party that has suffered loss due to failed contractual negotiations will generally 
be claiming compensation for pure economic loss. Courts are hesitant to impose 
delictual liability for pure economic loss for fear of opening the floodgates to large 
numbers of claims. This may pose a challenge to pre-contractual liability founded in 
delict. The law of delict as a source of liability will be considered in further detail,42 this 
will include an analysis of the case of Murray v McLean43 in which the court refused to 
impose liability for pre-contractual losses suffered when no contract came into 
existence. 
It is also possible for the law of unjustified enrichment to be relevant in the pre-
contractual phase - a party to negotiations may take preparatory steps or carry out 
certain work in anticipation of concluding the envisaged contract, which benefits the 
other party.44 Restitution of benefits received during contract negotiations is one of the 
fundamental grounds for pre-contractual liability.45 A claim for unjustified enrichment 
only exists if it can be shown that a party was unjustifiably enriched in the sense that 
he received a benefit from the other party without a legal cause. The possibility and 
utility of developing these areas of law so as to provide for pre-contractual liability will 
be considered with reference to the different approaches adopted in South African, 
American, English and German law. The remedies that can be claimed under each 
source of liability will also be set out. 
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Hutchison suggests that South African law on pre-contractual liability requires 
development, particularly due to the fact that a comparative perspective reveals that 
foreign jurisdictions have dealt with pre-contractual liability differently.46 This thesis will 
address whether the rules regarding non-contractual liability in the context of pre-
contractual agreements should be developed. American courts for example have 
looked to flexible concepts, such as promissory estoppel and good faith, to provide 
recourse to parties who have relied upon non-binding pre-contractual agreements.47 
It should be noted that for purposes of this thesis, the focus will be limited to the 
legal consequences where parties voluntarily choose to impose upon themselves an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. The general role of the Constitutional value of 
good faith in the pre-contractual phase and the potential pre-contractual duties that 
may arise therefrom, even if no such obligation is imposed voluntarily, are 
consequently beyond the scope of this thesis. 
1 5 Relevance of this study  
The seminal American case of Texaco Inc v Pennzoil Co48 (Texaco) illustrates the 
commercial and legal significance of the legal uncertainty in relation to pre-contractual 
agreements, as well as the importance of clarifying their legal consequences. In this 
case the parties had entered into an agreement in principle for the sale of shares in a 
company. Although parties had reached agreement on the essential terms of the 
envisaged transaction, the parties contemplated further negotiations and the 
conclusion of a definitive agreement recording all the terms of the transaction. The jury 
reached the conclusion that the parties were bound by the contract and consequently 
awarded ten billion dollars in damages for tortious interference with a contract.49  
The Texaco case highlights the inherent risk of the uncertainty around the legal 
consequences of pre-contractual agreements and the application of the traditional “all-
or-nothing”-approach to contract formation. Courts are forced in these circumstances 
to either conclude that a fully-binding contract had been concluded or that no legal 
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consequences flow from the preliminary agreements concluded in the course of 
negotiations. This places courts in an extremely difficult position, particularly in 
circumstances where the aggrieved party should be entitled to some form of remedy 
which amounts to something less than enforcement of the principal agreement.  
It has already been highlighted that the classical rules of contract formation, which 
envisage that parties will reach agreement almost instantaneously, may not 
necessarily cater for the complexities of modern commerce that entail prolonged 
negotiations, the involvement of teams of experts and substantial investment of time 
and resources.50 As part of the analysis into the legal consequences of pre-contractual 
agreements, it will be considered whether the traditional principles of contract 
formation are out of step with modern commercial needs. In this regard it is vital to 
keep the following sentiment in mind: 
“In some moments of history doctrine lags behind social realities and discovers legal rules 
to be disconnected from their initial justifications. The result is a direct confrontation 
between the desire for predictable legal rules to fulfil the promise of the rule of law and the 
consistent nature of social progress. As a way of resolving this confrontation, legal rules 
must be innovative too…”51 
As previously mentioned, South African contract law attaches great importance to 
freedom of contract and tends, in the absence of a binding contract, to support an 
adversarial approach to contractual negotiations.52 Traditionally the law of contract 
merely regulates the parties in the adversarial pursuit of concluding a transaction. 
However, the role of contract law in the regulation of contractual relationships has 
seen a shift since the advent of the Constitution. This has laid the foundation for the 
doctrine of good faith to be developed to promote societal values and fairness in 
contractual negotiations.53 This shift is highlighted by the judgement of the 
Constitutional Court in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd,54 
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which recognised that the values of good faith and ubuntu could justify the recognition 
and enforcement of agreements to negotiate in good faith in the future.55 While the 
court did not actually go on to develop the common-law position on agreements to 
negotiate, it planted the seed for potential change and developments to the law of 
contract which merits further investigation.  
1 6 Overview of chapters and methodology 
In this thesis we shall consider the different types of pre-contractual agreements 
and the legal consequences (if any) flowing from these types of agreements in terms 
of the South African law of contract. Due to the limited South African case law and 
literature on pre-contractual agreements, it will be essential to conduct a comparative 
study of the treatment of these types of agreements in foreign jurisdictions. To this 
end, we will critically consider and analyse the legal treatment of pre-contractual 
agreements in the American, English and German legal systems in order to be better 
placed to evaluate the present approach to pre-contractual agreements in South Africa 
and to determine the scope for potential development.  
This thesis will proceed as follows. As a point of departure, in chapter 2 the various 
types of pre-contractual agreements will be set out and classified according to their 
nature and function. In chapter 3 we shall consider which types of pre-contractual 
agreements (if any) can meet the validity requirements for a contract in the different 
legal systems under consideration. This analysis shall be conducted based on the 
classification of the different types of pre-contractual agreements in chapter 2. In  
chapter 4, the legal consequences arising from pre-contractual agreements will be set 
out based on the conclusions reached in chapter 3. In light of the fact that pre-
contractual agreements are diverse instruments that do not have a standardised legal 
content, it will be necessary in the course of this study to investigate the potential legal 
consequences of pre-contractual agreements that may arise from non-contractual 
sources of law. Therefore in chapter 5 we will examine pre-contractual liability arising 
from non-contractual sources of law. More specifically we will consider whether the 
conclusion of a pre-contractual agreement can form the basis for the imposition of 
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liability in the law of delict and the law of unjustified enrichment in the respective legal 
systems under consideration. Lastly chapter 6 shall set out some concluding 
observations regarding the status of  pre-contractual agreements in South African law 
and whether the present approach to these agreements requires development, 
particularly in light of the Everfresh case and more broadly the approach adopted in 




Chapter 2: Types of pre-contractual agreements and 
their function 
2 1 Introduction 
Before considering the different types of pre-contractual agreements and their 
function, some preliminary observations must be made. Pre-contractual agreements 
are a diverse range of instruments utilised to simplify the negotiation process and to 
facilitate the conclusion of the main contract, and the type of agreement used to 
achieve these objectives is dependent upon the specific requirements of the parties 
involved.1 The term “pre-contractual” can be misleading. These agreements are pre-
contractual in the sense that they are concluded prior to an anticipated main contract. 
This terminology does not exclude the possibility that these types of agreements can 
give rise to contractual obligations related to the subject matter of the future contract 
under negotiation or to the negotiation process itself.2 
The categorisation of pre-contractual agreements into distinct legal categories is a 
challenging task. Pre-contractual agreements do not have standardised legal content. 
While some terms are common to most of these agreements, the wording and content 
of any particular agreement is ultimately left to the discretion of the specific drafters.3 
In order to consider the legal consequences of these types of agreements, it may be 
beneficial to attempt to organise the large body of diversified agreements constituting 
pre-contractual agreements into different categories. The various types of agreements 
will be categorised into two broad categories, utilising neutral names that best describe 
their nature and function. However, it is accepted that this method of classification is 
imperfect and that a single agreement can display elements of more than one type of 
pre-contractual agreement or seek to perform more than one function. 
Torsello has categorised pre-contractual agreements into three fundamental 
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categories: agreements that oblige the parties to negotiate, agreements imposing 
limited obligations regarding the negotiations, and agreements imposing an obligation 
to conclude the final contract.4 From this categorisation it is possible to deduce that 
pre-contractual agreements can ultimately be classified into agreements which relate 
to the contractual negotiation process and those which relate to the substance and 
conclusion of the envisaged main contract.5 
Clarifying the function that pre-contractual agreements are intended to fulfil may 
assist in overcoming litigious difficulties and issues that will arise when a court is 
tasked with ascertaining the parties’ intentions with regard to a pre-contractual 
agreement.6 With this in mind, the types of pre-contractual agreements and their 
potential functions will be considered by way of practical examples. 
2 2 Agreements to negotiate and agreements structuring negotiations 
Pre-contractual agreements can contain specific binding provisions relating to the 
rights and obligations of the parties in the period between entering into the pre-
contractual agreement and conclusion of the final contract.7 These types of 
agreements generally set out the ground rules regarding the process or manner in 
which negotiations should be conducted.8 They can include obligations relating to the 
performance of preliminary investigations, disclosure and non-disclosure, and dispute 
resolution.9 
Negotiating parties at times seek to impose specific obligations in the course of their 
negotiations to protect them against certain pre-contractual risks.10 There are 
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significant commercial repercussions that may ensue if contractual negotiations fail 
and a final contract does not arise; parties conclude pre-contractual agreements to 
regulate negotiations and to limit the commercial risk associated with such 
negotiations.11 The conclusion of this type of agreement to negotiate is therefore at 
times a prerequisite for the commencement or continuation of negotiations.12 The 
various obligations relating to or necessary for negotiations shall be individually 
discussed.13 This will be followed by an exposition of their practical function.14  
It should be noted that while for purposes of convenience these obligations are 
often included in pre-contractual agreements containing terms that are predominantly 
non-binding, the parties usually intend obligations regarding the negotiations to be 
contractually binding.15 
2 2 1 Confidentiality and non-disclosure 
Confidential information often has a great economic value, particularly for the person 
holding it.16 There are various circumstances that require the disclosure of valuable, 
private information and it is necessary for the holder of such information to take certain 
precautions to ensure that the use of such information is strictly limited to the purpose 
for which it was disclosed; in this way the value of the confidential information is 
maintained.17 Confidential information has various sources of protection. In most civil 
law systems, there are pre-contractual duties that may arise ex lege in the course of 
negotiations, and this can include the duty to keep certain information confidential.18 
The duty not to disclose confidential information is also provided for in the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC)19 and the Principles of 
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European Contract Law (PECL).20 By contrast, common-law systems do not recognise 
a general obligation to negotiate in good faith from which duties of confidentiality could 
potentially be derived, but the law may provide some protection for certain confidential 
information.21 It is however generally accepted that the national rules of a specific legal 
system will in many circumstances not provide adequate protection for confidential 
information. Parties who wish for certain information exchanged in the course of 
negotiations to be kept confidential will need to safeguard themselves by concluding 
a confidentiality agreement, also commonly referred to as a non-disclosure 
agreement.22 
Confidentiality or non-disclosure obligations can form part of an otherwise non-
binding pre-contractual agreement or they could be contained in a binding stand-alone 
agreement. A confidentiality agreement will generally contain a definition of 
confidential information which describes the scope of information covered by the 
agreement. 23 This will generally be accompanied by a provision limiting the disclosure 
and use of such information.24 Confidentiality agreements therefore can be said to fulfil 
two main functions. First, they could expressly prohibit the disclosure of confidential 
information exchanged during negotiations to third parties and secondly, they could 
expressly prohibit the use of such information for any purpose other than that for which 
it was disclosed.25 The functions of confidentiality agreements will now be considered 
with reference to their practical application in merger and acquisition negotiations.  
Confidentiality agreements perform a particularly important function in merger and 
acquisition negotiations, where the buyer may require disclosure of private information 
regarding the finances and trade secrets of the target company in order to evaluate 
 
20 See art 2:302. 
21 Fontaine & De Ly Drafting International Contracts 231 286; VS Foreman “Non-Binding Preliminary 
Agreements: The Duty to Negotiate in Good faith and the Award of Expectation Damages” (2014) 72 U 
Toronto Fac L Rev 15 23. 
22 Fontaine & De Ly Drafting International Contracts 231. 
23 F Adoranti The Managers Guide to Understanding Confidentiality Agreements (2006) 5-6; see 
appendix A , in this thesis, for an example of this type of agreement.  
24 RB Thompson Mergers and Acquisitions: Law and Finance (2018) 93; Adoranti Understanding 
Confidentiality Agreements 6.  




the benefit of the envisaged transaction.26 There is however an inherent risk that a 
buyer will commence negotiations for the sole purpose of gaining access to 
confidential information of the target company. The disclosure of confidential 
information is often viewed by the seller as a “necessary evil” to ensure that the 
transaction is successful.27 The parties will generally conclude a confidentiality 
agreement before proceeding to the stage of negotiations that requires the disclosure 
of confidential information.28 Provisions in a confidentiality agreement restricting the 
disclosure and use of confidential information can be utilised to provide some 
protection to the seller and limit the potential damage that could be suffered if the 
buyer discloses confidential information to a competitor.29 It is also common for 
confidentiality agreements in this context to have a clause prohibiting a party from 
using the confidential information to compete with the target company.30 
Confidentiality agreements can also indirectly prohibit certain actions during merger 
and acquisition negotiations.31 For example, a signed confidentiality agreement could 
protect the seller of the target company against the buyer trying to employ key 
personnel of the target company.32 In the course of merger and acquisition 
negotiations, the buyer will be introduced to, and become familiar with the key 
personnel of the target company.33 This allows the buyer to identify the most valuable 
employees. If negotiations fail and the intended transaction is not concluded, there is 
an inherent risk that the buyer will seek to achieve a similar result to the intended 
transaction by simply employing the key personnel of the target company and creating 
its own competing entity.34 This action would generally be indirectly connected to the 
exchange of confidential information, insofar as the buyer is informed of and 
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of confidential information and prohibition of use clauses in the confidentiality 
agreement, the agreement could arguably be interpreted to prohibit the use of such 
information if it would be to the detriment of the seller.35 It is however more common 
for an express clause prohibiting the solicitation or hiring of key personnel of the target 
company to be included in a confidentiality agreement to ensure that the seller is 
expressly protected against the risk of having employees poached.36 
Confidentiality agreements used in the context of mergers and acquisitions 
involving a public company will generally contain a standstill provision which functions 
to prevent hostile takeovers by the potential buyer.37 A standstill provision expressly 
prohibits specific conduct on the part of the buyer that involves acquiring control over 
the target company in a manner that bypasses the involvement of its board of 
directors.38 Such a provision prohibits a buyer from making an offer to shareholders to 
acquire any equity with voting rights attached to it in the target company.39 Proxy 
contests initiated by the buyer to replace some or all of the board of directors of the 
target company are also prohibited.40 
Whether non-disclosure obligations that perform the above-mentioned functions 
can be implied by an agreement imposing a general obligation to negotiate in good 
faith is both uncertain and controversial. De Ly and Fontaine suggest that a duty of 
confidentiality, even in the absence of an express confidentiality clause, could 
potentially arise from an obligation to negotiate in good faith.41 To avoid the 
complications that could arise from uncertainty surrounding the duties that arise from 
an overarching obligation to negotiate in good faith, it is advisable that parties who 
require confidentiality in their negotiations include an express clause in their 
agreement to that effect. 
2 2 2 Exclusivity  
It is generally accepted that parties should be free to conduct parallel negotiations with 
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more than one party; to hold otherwise would considerably hinder the efficiency of 
business transactions.42 However, this freedom does pose a significant practical 
problem: a negotiating party would not want to sink costs into negotiations that are 
unlikely to result in the conclusion of a final contract. If the other party is negotiating 
with third parties, there is great uncertainty as to whether that party is serious about 
negotiations or whether she is merely misusing the negotiation process as a 
bargaining tool in the negotiations with a third party. 
Negotiating parties therefore often conclude exclusivity agreements.43 An 
exclusivity provision can form part of a confidentiality agreement, but in practice it is 
more common for exclusivity provisions to be contained in a stand-alone agreement 
concluded after initial negotiations regarding the intended transaction and subsequent 
to the confidentiality agreement.44 
An exclusivity agreement prohibits one or both of the negotiating parties from 
participating in parallel negotiations during the prescribed period of exclusivity.45 It thus 
prohibits a negotiating party from soliciting other offers, providing confidential 
information to a third party, or concluding the transaction with a third party.46 An 
exclusivity agreement can oblige the parties to negotiate with a view to reaching 
consensus, but it does not require that they reach agreement regarding the terms of 
the envisaged transaction or conclude the main contract.47  
In the context of merger and acquisition negotiations, an exclusivity agreement will 
generally be concluded when negotiations have reached the stage where more 
comprehensive due diligence is required.48 Exclusivity agreements provide the 
potential buyer with the time to evaluate and finalise the intended transaction without 
having to bear the risk that the seller will enter into negotiations with a third party or 
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conclude the transaction with a third party during that period.49  
In the absence of an exclusivity provision, a buyer may be very reluctant to risk the 
substantial investment costs involved in due diligence investigations.50 This provision 
does not guarantee that the intended transaction will be concluded, but it does give 
the buyer the assurance that the seller regards him as the preferred party with whom 
to conclude the transaction.51 
Exclusivity agreements can also impose an obligation to negotiate in good faith 
during the prescribed exclusivity period.52 This will only be included in an exclusivity 
agreement if the parties have already reached consensus on key terms of the business 
transaction.53 The reason for this, lies in the fact that once consensus has been 
reached on the key terms, there is a far greater likelihood that the contract will be 
concluded and that parties will rely on the materialisation such contract, as such the 
parties are more inclined to include an obligation obliging parties to negotiate in good 
faith to provide themselves with some protection. An obligation to negotiate in good 
faith, as discussed below, can function to prevent parties from re-negotiating terms 
already agreed upon and would thus perform a useful function once key terms have 
been agreed.54 A provision in an exclusivity agreement imposing an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith may be intended to give rise to a legal obligation or a moral 
obligation.55  
Alternatively, parties may conclude a pre-contractual agreement that only imposes 
an obligation to negotiate in good faith. Whether such a clause could imply a duty of 
exclusivity and prohibit the sudden breaking-off of negotiations pursuant to parallel 
negotiations is uncertain.56 In terms of American law this conduct could constitute 
breach of an obligation to negotiate in good faith, if imposed by a valid contract to 
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negotiate.57 Whether an obligation to negotiate in good faith implies an exclusivity 
undertaking ultimately depends upon the facts of the case.58 
2 2 3 Framework for the process of negotiation 
In complex transactions, the negotiation process often requires a substantial amount 
of planning to ensure efficiency and to avoid complications.59 Pre-contractual 
agreements are often used to provide a framework for the negotiation process.60 Such 
a framework normally identifies the individuals who will be responsible for the different 
components of the negotiations, and sets out the agreements required to regulate the 
various components of the envisaged transaction.61 Such agreements can also 
establish a time framework for negotiations. In terms of a time framework agreement 
parties are obliged to make a good faith effort to comply with the time schedule set for 
the negotiation process.62 
2 2 4 Allocation of risk of loss or wasted expenditure 
Parties often engage in a variety of activities to bring them closer to concluding the 
final contract. These activities, which include conducting feasibility studies, market 
research and location analysis, could require incurring considerable expenditure.63 
While the general rule is that each negotiating party carries the risk of loss or wasted 
expenditure pursuant to failed negotiations, parties may choose to allocate risk 
differently.64 Agreements to negotiate can therefore serve to allocate responsibility for 
pre-contractual expenditure between the parties.65  
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A negotiating party who conducts preliminary investigations that are beneficial to 
the other party could require a clause to be included in an agreement to the effect that 
she will be reimbursed for expenditure incurred if negotiations are terminated without 
cause.66 In terms of American law there are some instances where a clause allocating 
expenses or shifting the risk of costs can serve as an indication that the pre-contractual 
agreement or at least a part thereof is intended to be contractually binding.67 In this 
jurisdiction, even if the allocation of risk clause is contained in an otherwise non-
binding agreement, it may still be binding with respect to reimbursement for pre-
contractual expenditure.68 
2 2 5 Limitation of liability and liquidated damages clauses 
Agreements to negotiate which impose limited contractual obligations can also contain 
a provision limiting the extent of liability arising from both the law of contract and from 
other sources of law such as the law of delict.69 A clause may for example limit the 
scope of liability for direct or consequential losses arising from the breach of 
contractual obligations, such as duties to maintain confidentiality.70  
Alternatively, parties can choose to set out the exact extent of liability for breach of 
a contractual obligation by including a liquidated damages clause which provides that 
an agreed upon sum of damages will be payable for breach.71 It is particularly common 
for parties to include a liquidated damages clause in exclusivity and confidentiality 
agreements, due to the difficulties involved in establishing the extent of loss that has 
been suffered as a result of breach.72 A liquidated damages clause removes the 
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evidentiary burden of proving the quantum of damages in the event of breach of duties 
of confidentiality or exclusivity.73 The enforceability of such a clause does give rise to 
difficulties in some common-law systems - it is possible that courts, in jurisdictions 
such as America, will refuse to enforce this provision because it is regarded as a 
penalty clause.74 English law has seen some development in this regard and will 
enforce penalty clauses provided they serve a legitimate interest.75 In terms of German 
law76 and South African law this is not an issue as penalty clauses in contracts are 
enforceable as a general rule.77 
2 2 6 Good faith  
Negotiation clauses in commercial pre-contractual agreements are an ever-increasing 
phenomenon, particularly in cases where the final contract is the product of lengthy 
negotiation.78 An agreement to negotiate seeks to place an obligation on the parties 
to commence or continue negotiations until agreement is reached on all outstanding 
aspects and a final contract can be concluded.79 Negotiation clauses may be 
contained in a pre-existing contract, in a pre-contractual agreement outlining the terms 
of the envisaged transaction or in an agreement comprised solely of the obligation to 
negotiate.80  
Agreements to negotiate will inevitably raise questions regarding the application 
and role of the obligation to negotiate in good faith, either because there is an express 
reference to such obligation in the negotiation clause, or because it arises by 
implication. At this point it is necessary to draw a distinction between good faith as an 
underlying value in the South African law of contract, which is given effect to by specific 
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rules or duties81 and the specific obligation to negotiate a contract in good faith.82 For 
purposes of this thesis the enquiry will be limited to the obligation of good faith that 
could potentially be imposed by an agreement to negotiate.  
Before considering the obligation to negotiate in good faith as derived from an 
agreement to negotiate, it may be beneficial briefly to refer to the legal position of 
different jurisdictions and to the supra-national rules regarding the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith, because it can impact on the recognition and legal effect of 
such an obligation.83 In civil law systems such as Germany and France in particular, 
the obligation to act in good faith is well developed84 and parties are expected to 
negotiate in good faith irrespective of the existence of an agreement to that effect.85 
In fact, agreements to negotiate to this effect are said to only strengthen the existing 
obligation to negotiate in good faith.86 The supra-national rules of contract law also 
seem to support the imposition of an obligation to negotiate in good faith.87 
In most common-law systems, however, there is no general rule which requires 
parties to negotiate in good faith, but specific legislation may require displaying some 
degree of good faith in the pre-contractual phase.88 The general obligation to negotiate 
in good faith has yet to enjoy recognition in England,89 although there has been case 
law suggesting that an agreement containing an express obligation to negotiate in 
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good faith may be enforceable.90 In America such an obligation has received some 
recognition, and courts have also indicated a willingness to enforce express duties to 
negotiate in good faith.91 In terms of American and English law there seems to be an 
implicit distinction between agreements to negotiate that seek to impose an express 
obligation to negotiate in good faith, and those which do not.92 It appears that in both 
jurisdictions courts will generally refuse to imply an obligation of good faith into an 
agreement to negotiate where no express obligation has been included.93  
In South African law, agreements to negotiate have traditionally been regarded as 
unenforceable due to the unfettered discretion vesting in parties to agree or 
disagree.94 More recent South African case law suggests that there are certain types 
of agreements to negotiate which may be valid and enforceable.95 There are various 
factors that affect the validity and enforceability of agreements to negotiate,96 but for 
present purposes the focus will be on the role of the obligation to negotiate in good 
faith and its application to agreements to negotiate.  
Two questions are pertinent in this context. First, is it essential for the validity of an 
agreement to negotiate that the proposed negotiations have to be conducted in good 
faith? Secondly, if the proposed negotiations have to be conducted in good faith, does 
the duty to do so arise automatically, or are parties required to agree on it? These 
questions go to the validity of agreements to negotiate in good faith and will be dealt 
with in chapter 3.97 For present purposes it is sufficient to note that there is conflicting 
South African case law on these issues.98 In Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil 
and Gas Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd,99 for example, the court concluded that 
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duties to negotiate obliged parties to negotiate in good faith and that the absence of a 
reference to good faith in an agreement to negotiate was not a material issue because 
courts could readily imply such a standard into a contract in the appropriate 
circumstances. On the other hand, in Roazar v Falls Supermarket CC (“Roazar”)100 
the court pinpointed fundamental difficulties with the notion that duties to negotiate 
have to be complied with in good faith. 
If agreements to negotiate in good faith have become common practice, 
notwithstanding their uncertain nature, then it is necessary to consider their function. 
Agreements to negotiate are often concluded to provide some assurance that both 
parties are serious about negotiations and that the resources spent pursuant to 
negotiations will not be in vain.101 This type of agreement can also serve as an “action-
forcing” tool that prevents negotiations from stagnating.102 The efficacy of negotiations 
is often affected by the actions of the parties, and agreements to negotiate may be 
concluded to discourage delaying tactics, opportunistic behaviour or non-participation 
that would unnecessarily prolong negotiations.103 Agreements to negotiate can 
perform these functions irrespective of their enforceability. In terms of English law, the 
rationale for complying with this negotiation obligation is said to be based on morality 
and trust rather than the fear of contractual liability.104  
It does not necessarily follow that an obligation to negotiate in good faith is always 
intended to be binding in honour only. It will become clear throughout the analysis in 
chapters 2105 and 3 that the obligation to negotiate in good faith can perform different 
functions, depending on the type of agreement it forms a part of. Furthermore, the 
intended function of an obligation to negotiate in good faith can also lie in legally 
binding parties to a specific standard of conduct or obligations in the course of 
negotiations. Therefore as we move on to consider other types of agreements, it is 
important to bear in mind that the obligation to negotiate can arise in various types of 
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pre-contractual agreements and perform different functions. 
2 3 Agreements outlining the terms of the envisaged main contract or 
reflecting partial agreement  
This type of pre-contractual agreement outlines the terms of the envisaged main 
contract that is the subject of negotiation.106 Unlike the previous category, it actually 
deals with the substance, and not merely with the process of negotiation. The structure 
and content of these types of agreements can vary, but they generally contain at least 
some of the key terms of the envisaged transaction.107  
In Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America v Tribune Co (“Tribune 
Co”),108 one of the leading American cases on pre-contractual agreements, Judge 
Leval classified these types of instruments into two main types of enforceable 
agreements. The type I pre-contractual agreement is a complete agreement 
containing all the essential elements of the main contract and is pre-contractual only 
in form and not in substance.109 That is to say that parties may envisage conclusion of 
a more formal contract but this is not necessary for the validity of the agreement 
because consensus has been reached on all essential terms of the contract. As such, 
parties generally regard conclusion of a final agreement as preferable, but not 
necessary.110 The type II pre-contractual agreement is an incomplete or partial 
agreement, often referred to as a contract to negotiate. This type of agreement does 
not bind the parties to their future intended contractual objective but does oblige 
parties to negotiate the remaining terms in good faith with a view to achieving that 
contractual objective.111 This categorisation is theoretically useful, but in practice it is 
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difficult to predict with certainty how courts will classify a specific pre-contractual 
agreement.112 
The function of a pre-contractual agreement depends on the intention with which 
the parties concluded the agreement.113 Its function could for example lie in its full 
enforceability as a final contract recorded in an informal or abbreviated format, or in 
its non-binding nature as an interim agreement, indicating that parties are both serious 
and optimistic regarding the conclusion of the final contract.114 A pre-contractual 
agreement could, however, also be no more than a gesture indicating interest in the 
envisaged transaction.115 Alternatively, this type of pre-contractual agreement may 
function to oblige parties to negotiate in good faith with a view to concluding the final 
contract.116 The different types of pre-contractual agreements dealing with the 
substance of the envisaged main contract and their functions are set out below. 
2 3 1 Agreements with clauses negating legal liability 
2 3 1 1 Introduction 
A pre-contractual agreement can outline all the terms of the envisaged main contract, 
but fail to give rise to binding contractual obligations because the requisite animus 
contrahendi is absent. A pre-contractual agreement of this nature will generally contain 
clauses to the effect that the agreement “will not give rise to any contractual 
obligations,”117 does not “constitute the final contract between the parties,”118 “is 
subject to contract,”119 or “is subject to condition precedents.”120  
If parties clearly indicate that their pre-contractual agreement is not intended to be 
contractually binding then it can give rise to no more than a moral obligation, binding 
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in honour only.121 In terms of the laws of the United States and English law, a clause 
clearly stipulating the non-binding nature of a pre-contractual agreement will generally 
operate to prevent any contractual obligations from coming into existence.122 
2 3 1 2 Agreements made subject to a condition precedent  
Pre-contractual agreements made subject to condition precedents require further 
attention due to the fact that these types of qualifications may operate to prevent legal 
obligations from coming into existence, but are not treated in the same manner in 
every jurisdiction. In contract law the term “condition” can have a number of different 
meanings, and it is necessary to establish the meaning within the specific context and 
jurisdiction.123  
A pre-contractual agreement may outline all the terms of the envisaged main 
contract, but could be made subject to the occurrence of an uncertain event referred 
to as a condition precedent.124 Pre-contractual agreements subject to condition 
precedents must be distinguished from valid conditional contracts that are binding, but 
not yet enforceable.125  
The meaning and effect of a “condition precedent” as used in the specific pre-
contractual agreement must be analysed to establish whether legally, the agreement 
is in fact distinguishable from a valid conditional contract. In this regard, it is worth 
noting that the name given to an agreement is not determinative of its legal nature;126 
consequently, labelling an agreement subject to a condition precedent a “pre-
contractual agreement” may not prevent a finding that the agreement is in fact a valid 
conditional contract. Furthermore, there is often is a great disparity between the actual 
legal nature and consequences of an agreement, compared to what business 
professionals seek to achieve by concluding such agreements. 
In terms of South African law, conditions qualify the operation and consequences 
of contractual obligations.127 As a general rule the inclusion of a suspensive condition 
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in an agreement does not prevent contractual obligations from coming into 
existence.128 South African courts have, however, recognised an exception to this 
rule.129 Where a contract for the sale of land is made subject to a suspensive condition, 
a contractual relationship will come into existence but no contractual obligations will 
arise until the condition has been fulfilled.130 This construction has been criticised and 
it is accepted that the general rule is to be preferred.131 Therefore, business 
professionals who utilise conditions in pre-contractual agreements with the intention 
of negating all legal liability, may well find themselves bound by a conditional contract. 
Practically, however, it does not seem to make a difference whether the fulfilment of 
the condition brings enforceable contractual obligations into existence or renders 
existing contractual obligations enforceable. The outcome will be the same, unless of 
course it is argued that a condition in a pre-contractual agreement operates to prevent 
a contract from coming into existence (irrespective of whether the condition is fulfilled). 
In terms of English law and American law, a condition precedent can operate to 
prevent contractual obligations from arising until the condition has been fulfilled.132 
Furmston, in the context of English law, discusses how parties often seek to delay the 
legal effect of a pre-contractual agreement by incorporating the condition of “obtaining 
board approval”. It can be unclear what effect fulfilment of a condition will have on the 
legal character of a pre-contractual agreement and a number of American cases have 
addressed this issue.133 The question arises whether approval of the board will give 
full contractual effect to the pre-contractual agreement as a final contract or whether it 
merely authorises the relevant negotiating party to continue negotiations towards the 
final definitive contract.134 If the agreement amounts to a valid conditional contract, 
fulfilment of the condition would bring contractual obligations into existence.  
Although a pre-contractual agreement may appear to be a valid conditional 
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contract, it may not be treated that way in practice. For example, in the construction 
industry, a contractor may agree to appoint a particular sub-contractor on condition 
that he secures the principal contract.135 This appears to be a valid conditional 
contract. It is, however, accepted that most contractors do not treat it as such, and the 
parties will generally not resort to legal recourse if one of the parties decides not to 
continue with the agreement, even after the main contract has been awarded and the 
condition thus was fulfilled.136 
Even if a condition can operate to prevent or delay a final contract from prematurely 
coming into existence, as it does in American law, it does not follow that the pre-
contractual agreement fails to give rise to binding obligations before fulfilment of the 
condition itself.137 A conditional pre-contractual agreement may still, for example, give 
rise to an obligation to negotiate the remaining terms in good faith.138 In the American 
case of A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v I.M.C Chemical 
Group,139 the court found that a letter of intent made subject to the approval of the 
board of directors could not give rise to a final contract for the envisaged transaction, 
but that it nonetheless imposed an obligation on parties to negotiate in good faith.140 
In establishing the function of a condition in a pre-contractual agreement it is 
necessary to examine whether the condition applies only to the provisional terms of 
the final contract as outlined in the pre-contractual agreement or to the entire pre-
contractual agreement itself.141 As is evident from the Apothekernes case, a condition 
will not necessarily deprive the entire pre-contractual agreement of legal force, even if 
it prevents the envisaged legal obligations from coming into existence pending 
fulfilment of the condition. 
2 3 1 3 Agreements made subject to contract 
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It is not uncommon for pre-contractual agreements to contain “subject to contract” 
clauses which may also prevent contractual obligations from coming into existence. 
This type of clause indicates that parties agree that neither of them shall be bound by 
the substantive agreement until it has been reduced to writing and signed by both the 
parties.142 An informal agreement made subject to contract may be oral or recorded in 
a letter or memorandum which is not valid until signed by both the parties.143 The 
phrase “subject to contract” is often used indiscriminately. A subject to contract clause 
may firstly indicate that an agreement is only intended to be binding once signed by 
both of the parties.144 It is also possible that the agreement is merely an interim 
agreement that is not intended to be binding at all.145 Lastly, such a phrase may merely 
indicate that some form of further approval is necessary.146 A subject to contract 
clause is thus a broad and neutral term which can be used by the parties to specify 
the absence of contractual intent in relation to the business terms included in the pre-
contractual agreement.147 
In terms of English and American law, pre-contractual agreements subject to the 
execution of a formal contract are generally informal agreements outlining the key 
terms of the envisaged transaction; the precise contractual terms are generally left to 
be formulated by the parties’ attorneys who will draft a final contract.148 Where these 
types of pre-contractual agreements contain all the material terms, legal issues can 
arise.149 Do parties intend to be immediately bound, the final written contract being 
preferable, but not a prerequisite, or do the parties only intend to be bound once that 
contract is concluded150 There is an inherent risk that a court may in cases of ambiguity 
find that a binding final contract has come into existence.151 Parties should still be 
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aware that even if a pre-contractual agreement “subject to contract” does not give rise 
to a final contract, in terms of American law it may nonetheless be found to constitute 
a contract to negotiate in good faith.152  
2 3 1 4 General functions of non-binding pre-contractual agreements  
The analysis thus far indicates that while there are circumstances in which pre-
contractual agreements with clauses negating liability can give rise to contractual 
obligations, they are generally non-binding in relation to the terms of the envisaged 
transaction.153 This type of agreement is commonly referred to as a letter of intent, a 
memorandum of understanding or a term sheet.154 These labels are generally used 
interchangeably. However, it should be noted that letters of intent and memoranda of 
understanding typically take on a narrative form, with less detail regarding the specific 
terms of the envisaged transaction, whereas term sheets tend to contain more specific 
details regarding the terms of the transaction.155  
At first glance, non-binding agreements outlining the terms of the envisaged 
transaction seem somewhat contradictory because they outline all the terms of the 
envisaged transaction while containing a clause negating legal liability.156 This 
apparent contradiction seems less pronounced if it is accepted that these types of pre-
contractual agreements, despite their apparent similarities to a binding contract, are 
conceptually and functionally distinguishable. Bearing this in mind their various 
functions will now be considered. 
(i) Organisation, framework and third party approval  
An important function of non-binding pre-contractual agreements is to record 
consensus and establish the terms upon which parties are willing to proceed with 
negotiations.157 It enables parties to communicate their intentions and make proposals 
without fear of creating unintended contractual obligations.158 Pre-contractual 
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agreements can also prevent misunderstandings or selective recollections regarding 
what has been agreed to, and can facilitate the negotiation and drafting of the final 
contract.159 Perillo explains that a pre-contractual agreement, if properly utilised, 
serves as a “road-map” that could potentially lead to a final contract.160 
Negotiations often take place between business professionals who will need to seek 
the advice of various experts before concluding a final contract. A pre-contractual 
agreement is useful because it records in a single document the key terms of the 
envisaged transaction. Each negotiating party can submit the agreement to their team 
of experts, such as accountants and lawyers, who will refine the terms and draft the 
final contract.161 Pre-contractual agreements can also serve a very important function 
in obtaining third party finance, since lenders or investors may only be willing to 
provide a loan or investment if they are provided with some evidence that a contract 
is likely to be concluded.162 A signed pre-contractual agreement is often a prerequisite 
for an approval of a loan necessary to finance the envisaged transaction.163 
(ii) Commitment to negotiations, building trust and establishing moral obligations 
A further potential function of non-binding pre-contractual agreements is to assist one 
party to establish the level of commitment and seriousness of the other party before 
investing a large amount of resources into negotiations.164 If negotiating parties are 
able to reach consensus on the essential business terms of the envisaged transaction 
promptly, a negotiating party can be more assured that the other party is serious about 
negotiations and committed to resolving outstanding issues with a view to concluding 
a final contract.165 In addition to conveying a commitment to negotiations, the 
conclusion and compliance with a series of non-binding pre-contractual agreements 
can build a relationship of trust between the parties and increase the likelihood of a 
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final contract being concluded.166 
Pre-contractual agreements also exert a certain level of moral pressure.167 Parties 
often feel a moral obligation to comply with pre-contractual agreements.168 The 
importance that many parties attach to upholding a reputation of conducting business 
with integrity often allows pre-contractual agreements to exert sufficient moral 
pressure for parties to abide by their terms.169 
2 3 1 5 Fields of practical application  
With the benefit of a theoretical classification of the different types of non-binding pre-
contractual agreements that set out the terms of the envisaged contract, their practical 
application can now be considered. The focus will be on their use in the construction 
industry, and in mergers and acquisitions.  
(i) Construction industry  
Pre-contractual agreements, often referred to as letters of intent, are commonly used 
in the construction industry to fast-track the construction process.170 These letters of 
intent generally do not have a set content or format, but will usually contain some term 
to the effect that the one party intends to conclude a contract for the envisaged 
transaction with the other party as soon as outstanding matters have been negotiated 
and the detailed contractual terms have been agreed upon.171  
It is also possible that the letter of intent will include a clause instructing the other 
party to commence with the work envisaged by the future contract.172 These types of 
agreements, in terms of English law, are generally phrased in a manner that ensures 
that no contractual obligations will arise.173 If, however, the letter of intent contains a 
clause inviting a party to commence work, it may give rise to an obligation to provide 
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remuneration for that work.174 
The functions of these types of agreements are not always easy to identify because 
they do not have a standard content and can take on many different forms.175 It can, 
however, be accepted that drafting a formal construction contract can be a lengthy 
and complex process, which will not necessarily meet the immediate needs of 
negotiating parties who wish for construction to commence as soon as possible.176 
Often, construction projects will have deadlines, requiring work to commence before 
negotiations are complete.177 Parties may therefore resort to letters of intent as an 
interim measure prior to conclusion of the final contract to allow work to commence.178  
Gilbreath, in his discussion of letters of intent in the context of American law, issued 
a warning against the use of these agreements, stating that they have limited value 
because they are often relied upon to delay the conclusion of a final contract and the 
resolution of outstanding matters.179 Such delay is often due to a deadlock in 
negotiations, or difficulties in reaching consensus on outstanding terms, which 
prolongs the negotiation process and delays the commencement of work. Instead of 
resolving the deadlock on outstanding terms prior to the commencement of work 
parties use these agreements to avoid the deadlock and allow work to commence, 
despite the possibility that parties will not necessarily reach consensus on those 
outstanding terms. In the English case of RTS Flexible Systems v Milkerei Alois Muller 
Gmbh180 Lord Clarke also emphasised the risks involved in commencing work 
pursuant to a letter of intent, and suggested that parties would be wiser to settle the 
terms of the construction contract first and start work later.  
(ii) Mergers and acquisitions 
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, term sheets or letters of intent are intended 
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to provide a summary of the envisaged merger transaction so that there is consensus 
between the parties regarding the general outline of the transaction before they 
proceed with more detailed transaction documents.181 These agreements are brief and 
generally outline a few material business terms such as the subject matter of the 
transaction and the price.182 This agreement can be unsigned or signed.183 Term 
sheets or letters of intent in the context of American mergers and acquisitions are 
generally non-binding and serve as no more than a summary of the negotiating parties’ 
position and as a guideline for drafting a more formal merger and acquisition 
contract.184  
Term sheets and letters of intent perform an important function in the merger and 
acquisition negotiation process, but the potential limitations of these types of 
agreements cannot be ignored. In complex negotiations requiring great attention to 
detail, term sheets or letters of intent can be less efficient, because they only outline 
the transaction in broad terms and build up momentum towards the envisaged 
transaction, even though the more nuanced details of the contractual relationship have 
not been negotiated. 185 If a term sheet only deals with the envisaged transaction in a 
superficial manner and overlooks complex details that are material to the conclusion 
of the envisaged transaction, unresolvable disputes can arise at a late stage in the 
negotiation process.186 This leads us to consider partial or incomplete agreements that 
only outline some of the terms of the contract with various levels of detail.  
2 3 2 Partial (inchoate) or incomplete agreements  
In many cases, negotiations and contract formation occur almost instantaneously, 
because the former are straightforward and very limited.187 Traditional contract law 
rules are well developed to cater for these types of transactions. However, as modern 
commerce continues to grow and develop, transactions are becoming larger and 
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increasingly complex.188 Negotiations can persist over many years and may require 
the involvement of numerous teams of experts for each of the negotiating parties.189 
As a result, it is often necessary for different stages of negotiations to be dealt with 
individually.190 Partial or provisional agreements are utilised to perform this function 
and record consensus reached at a specific stage of negotiations.191 They enable 
parties to record and set aside the specific terms of the transaction that have been 
successfully negotiated and facilitate negotiations on the outstanding, potentially 
problematic terms.192 Furthermore, they are useful memoranda for parties to refer 
back to in lengthy negotiations where they do not necessarily recall what was agreed 
upon early in the negotiation process. Against this background we shall now turn our 
attention to a more detailed analysis of the function of these types of agreements.  
2 3 2 1 The formalisation of agreed-upon terms and the imposition of an 
obligation to negotiate remaining terms in good faith 
In American law, a partial agreement serves a vital function in practice because it 
allows negotiating parties to formalise aspects already negotiated, while retaining the 
freedom not to conclude a final contract until all elements of the intended transaction 
have been negotiated and the economic benefit of the transaction has been 
evaluated.193 Parties are not bound to conclude the final contract, but if it is concluded 
the pre-contractual agreement is highly beneficial in preventing negotiations being re-
opened on terms already agreed upon.194 On this understanding, parties to a partial 
agreement agree that if the final contract is concluded, the terms already negotiated 
and agreed upon in the partial agreement should be incorporated into the final 
contract.195  
Writing in the context of American law, Moss has argued that a party will be liable 
for breach of contract if such a party insists on concluding the final contract without 
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incorporating the terms already agreed upon.196 Other scholars like Draetta and Lake 
argue that an agreement must be evaluated as a whole - if the terms agreed upon in 
the partial agreement cannot be enforced as a final contract, then the enforceability of 
those agreed upon terms depends upon further negotiation on the outstanding 
aspects.197 There is American case law however that supports the proposition that a 
partial agreement imposes an obligation on parties not to reopen negotiations on those 
aspects already agreed upon.198 Irrespective of the prevailing legal position, 
negotiating parties can easily circumvent an obligation not to reopen negotiations on 
aspects previously agreed upon by simply failing to reach final agreement on the 
outstanding aspects, and in doing so avoid any obligation altogether.199  
In light of the ease with which the above-mentioned obligations can be 
circumvented it is necessary to consider other potential functions that can be served 
by an agreement of this nature. It has been suggested that the function of a partial 
agreement in American law may be to impose a standard of behaviour upon parties in 
the course of negotiating the outstanding terms of the envisaged transaction. Some 
partial agreements, for example, contain an express or implied obligation to negotiate 
the remaining terms in good faith.200 While this may very well be the intended function 
of a partial agreement, its efficacy in regulating the behaviour of the parties may 
depend on the enforceability of an agreement to negotiate in good faith.201 
2 3 2 2 A non-binding “road map” towards the conclusion of the final contract  
In terms of South African law, even if consensus has been reached on some of the 
essential terms of the contract, a valid contract will not come into existence if the 
parties only intend to be bound once all material terms have been agreed upon.202 
Even if contractual obligations do not arise, a partial agreement may nonetheless 
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assist parties towards a final contract. For example, in Titaco v AA Alloy Foundry203 
the parties had recorded the framework for the envisaged settlement transaction but 
there were a number of material aspects that required further negotiation. In this case 
the agreement functioned to set out, in a non-binding document, terms already agreed 
upon so that the parties could focus discussions on the outstanding material terms 
which required negotiation.204 In Pitout v North Cape Livestock Co-operative Ltd205 the 
court explained that a non-binding agreement may be concluded, in the course of 
negotiations, as the parties are “feeling their way towards a more precise and 
comprehensive agreement”.206 
2 3 2 3 An agreement that is intended to be immediately binding 
In terms of South African law, it is also possible for a so-called “partial” agreement to 
give rise to contractual obligations. Parties may intend for their partial agreement to 
constitute a binding preliminary contract for the envisaged transaction, 
notwithstanding the fact that they contemplate the conclusion of a subsequent contract 
or have left outstanding matters regarding the envisaged transaction to future 
negotiation.207 In CGEE Alsthom Equipments et Enterprises Electriques, South African 
Division v GN Sankey (Pty) Ltd208 Corbett JA stated the following:  
“The existence of such outstanding matters does not, however, necessarily deprive an 
agreement of contractual force. The parties may well intend by their agreement to conclude 
a binding contract, while agreeing, either expressly or by implication, to leave the 
outstanding matters to future negotiation with a view to a comprehensive contract”.209 
If the parties fail to reach consensus regarding the outstanding terms of the contract 
then the original interim contract will prevail.210 It is therefore clear that in terms of 
South African law there are circumstances where a partial agreement may acquire 
contractual force.  
 
203 1996 3 SA 320 (W) 331, 333, 334-335. 
204 Sharrock Business Transactions Law 84.  
205 1977 4 SA 842 (A) 850D-G. 
206 850D. 
207 Sharrock Business Transactions Law 85.  
208 1987 1 SA 81 (A). 
209 92C-D. 




In terms of American law, a partial agreement could be recognised as a so-called 
agreement with “open terms”.211 Farnsworth explains that this type of agreement 
imposes an obligation to negotiate the remaining terms in good faith and conclude the 
final contract.212 If parties fail to reach agreement on outstanding terms, the court will 
supply them.213  
It is clear from this comparative assessment that a partial agreement could 
potentially be a non-binding agreement, a binding contract for the envisaged 
transaction (if it has sufficient contractual content) or an agreement imposing an 
obligation to negotiate the remaining terms in good faith.214 How courts interpret this 
type of agreement will depend upon the specific jurisdiction in question. In terms of 
American law, courts are much more hesitant to enforce a pre-contractual agreement 
as a final contract than to enforce a pre-contractual agreement as a contract to 
negotiate. 215 In terms of South African law, whether a partial agreement is a binding 
contract or merely a non-binding instrument through which parties work their way 
towards a final agreement will depend upon their intention.216 
2 3 3 Preliminary contracts outlining the envisaged terms  
A pre-contractual agreement may have been concluded in circumstances where 
parties have reached consensus on all outstanding matters and, as far as the parties 
are concerned, negotiations have been exhausted.217 This distinguishes this type of 
agreement from a partial preliminary contract.218 Parties may have reached complete 
agreement regarding all the essential terms requiring negotiation and while the 
conclusion of more formal final contract may have been provided for in their original 
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agreement, it is not necessary that this should occur.219 Judge Leval, in the American 
case of Tribune Co 220 described this agreement as the type I pre-contractual 
agreement,221 which is treated as a complete and final contract. Often these types of 
preliminary contracts are erroneously labelled as a letter of intent because they 
contemplate the conclusion of a more formal contract containing the so-called 
“boilerplate” provisions.222 
2 3 4 Form agreements  
Pre-contractual agreements can serve to unify the negotiation process by providing a 
framework for all future contracts that the negotiating parties intend to conclude in the 
course of their business relationship.223 This type of pre-contractual agreement is 
known as a “form agreement” and it is generally concluded by parties who foresee that 
their business relationship will require the conclusion of a substantial volume of similar 
contracts, each of which will require individual negotiation with terms that do not 
necessarily coincide.224 As the business relationship progresses and business 
operations become larger and the performance more complex, the negotiating parties 
will realise the need for standardisation in relation to the various contracts 
concluded.225 The type of contracts being dealt with are usually for the large scale sale 
of goods and services. Both the buyer and seller will have “general conditions” of 
purchase and sale respectively which may be different or even conflicting.226 In light 
of the fact the parties envisage a long term business relationship, a substantial amount 
of time and resources will be spent, in the duration of their relationship, on individually 
negotiating each contract and harmonising their general conditions.227  
In this type of scenario, negotiating parties may choose to meet and settle all the 
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general terms of the numerous future contracts in a form agreement which will impose 
the agreed upon framework on all future contracts.228 Form agreements establish the 
rules for the negotiation of future agreements and standardise the subject matter 
(goods or services) of future contracts.229 In the context of a supply contract, a form 
agreement may impose conditions regarding the organisation of transport, deliveries, 
payment and insurance, which are to be included in the supply contract.230 The general 
function of form agreements is thus to create obligations in relation to the method of 
concluding future contracts and the general terms of performance that will be included 
in such contract.231 
2 3 5 Academic debate regarding the true function of pre-contractual agreements  
From our analysis thus far, it is clear that pre-contractual agreements can be intended 
to be non-binding in relation to the terms of the envisaged transaction. Various clauses 
negating legal liability are included to indicate this, and parties often go to great lengths 
to emphasise their wish not to be bound.232 This raises the following question: why do 
sophisticated business parties choose to go to the time and legal expense of 
concluding pre-contractual agreements if they are generally not legally enforceable? 
The general functions of non-binding agreements have been briefly discussed above 
with reference to specific practical applications.233 Further analysis, however, 
highlights the existence of alternative explanations for the use of pre-contractual 
agreements. This is important, particularly in light of the recent trend in prominent 
jurisdictions to assign some contractual consequences to pre-contractual agreements 
on the basis that enforcement is necessary for their function to be fulfilled. 
Some of the existing academic literature on pre-contractual agreements proceeds 
from the assumption that a pre-contractual agreement must be a type of enforceable 
contract in order to perform its various functions.234 We must there consider the 
functions of enforceable pre-contractual agreements, as put forward by academics 
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who argue in favour of their enforceability. However, before proceeding with this 
section it must be acknowledged that there is an overlap between the above 
discussion of the practical functions of pre-contractual agreements as analysed from 
a commercial perspective and the academic proposals which will now be 
considered.235 It will be observed that academic proposals around the functions of 
these agreements will go further than merely identifying functions that are immediately 
apparent and will look at the more nuanced aspects of pre-contractual agreements. 
There are two main theories regarding the function of pre-contractual agreements 
and both regard judicial enforcement as a central component.236 The first theory is that 
pre-contractual agreements resolve uncertainty regarding the transaction.237 The 
second theory is that pre-contractual agreements resolve transaction complexity.238 
Schwartz and Scott argue that pre-contractual agreements resolve transaction 
uncertainty.239 In the course of early negotiations there is uncertainty regarding the 
cost and benefit of the envisaged transaction for the respective parties.240 Complex 
negotiations often require relationship-specific investments to resolve uncertainty and 
to determine the profitability of the envisaged transaction.241 A negotiating party is 
often hesitant to make such investments for fear that these may be in vain if the other 
party behaves opportunistically or arbitrarily terminates negotiations.242 For this 
reason, parties formalise their relationship by concluding an agreement to negotiate 
which outlines the key terms of the transaction at a time where uncertainty prevents 
the conclusion of a final contract.243 If such an agreement is enforceable as a contract 
to negotiate in good faith it can function as the security necessary to give a negotiating 
party the peace of mind to make the necessary investments to resolve uncertainty.244 
Enforceable contracts to negotiate in good faith can protect reliance investments and 
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discourage strategic behaviour and the termination of negotiations without cause.245  
Choi and Triantis support the second theory of the reduction in transaction 
complexity, arguing that the function of pre-contractual agreements is to assist parties 
who are engaged in complex negotiations that require the negotiation of multiple 
issues between a number of different parties.246 Dividing the negotiation process into 
more manageable stages simplifies an otherwise complex transaction and allows both 
parties to involve experts in the process.247 Choi and Triantis, like Schwartz and Scott, 
believe that pre-contractual agreements must at least be enforceable to some extent, 
otherwise parties will not be incentivised to comply and the intended function will not 
be achieved.248  
Hwang, in her study of pre-contractual agreements in the deal-making process, puts 
forward an alternative explanation for the function of pre-contractual agreements 
which does not require enforceability for their efficacy.249 She argues that while the 
two main theories regarding the functions and enforceability of pre-contractual 
agreements seem convincing, they fail to explain why parties often choose to conclude 
non-binding agreements that explicitly exclude judicial involvement.250 Furthermore 
these explanations fail to explain why, in practice, parties generally comply with non-
binding pre-contractual agreements by concluding a final contract on substantially the 
same terms. 251  
Hwang proceeds on the assumption that sophisticated parties involved in merger 
and acquisition negotiations have access to the skills and resources necessary to 
conclude a main contract, but consciously elect to utilise a pre-contractual 
instrument.252 Pre-contractual agreements must therefore perform a function distinct 
from a contract, otherwise parties would not go to the time and expense of concluding 
both in order to conclude the intended transaction. Hwang puts forward the proposition 
that pre-contractual agreements are not actually concluded to resolve uncertainty or 
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complexity; and that they are in fact concluded at a time when most of the uncertainty 
and complexity regarding the transaction has been resolved through due diligence.253 
Existing academic literature assumes, sometimes erroneously, that all pre-contractual 
agreements are concluded very early on in the negotiation process; however, in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions, a pre-contractual agreement is generally only 
concluded once most of the transactional uncertainty has been resolved.254 
On this understanding, it can be argued that pre-contractual agreements could also 
be concluded to serve as an indicator that the intended transaction is likely to be 
concluded and to organise the transaction.255 Hwang describes pre-contractual 
agreements as a “sign post” for the accumulation of deal momentum.256 If pre-
contractual agreements are regarded as an indicator of the progression of negotiations 
to a stage where the contract is likely to be concluded, it explains why parties choose 
to adhere to the pre-contractual agreement and are willing to conclude the final 
contract on substantially the same terms.257 Hwang proceeds to explain that in addition 
to performing this signalling function, pre-contractual agreements also perform other 
distinct formal functions that provide much needed structure to the negotiation phase, 
namely organisation, building trust and the imposition of moral obligations.258 These 
functions have already been discussed above and do not require further 
elaboration.259 The formal functions of pre-contractual agreements are potentially 
more valuable than their supposed “substantive function” (their resemblance to a 
contract and their enforcement as such).260  
Most of the existing academic literature seems to rely on the similarities between a 
pre-contractual agreement and a contract when trying to ascertain the function of the 
former. This may well contribute to a growing misconception regarding the true 
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prefer to comply voluntarily with non-binding agreements even in the absence of a fear 
of judicial enforcement, then the desire to categorise certain pre-contractual 
agreements as a type of contract merely because they resemble a contract needs to 
be re-evaluated.262 It also becomes necessary to focus on the alternative explanations 
for the use of pre-contractual agreements that do not involve judicial enforcement. 
Holten is another scholar who, like Hwang, looks to an alternative explanation for 
the use of pre-contractual agreements, conceding that most of these agreements 
exclude the involvement of the legal system.263 However, he argues that none of the 
formal functions discussed thus far adequately explain the utility of pre-contractual 
agreements.264 These agreements are notoriously vague and ambiguous because 
they are unavoidably incomplete regarding the envisaged transaction.265 Holten 
suggests that the functions of these type of agreements lie in their inherent vagueness 
and ambiguity.266 At the time when a pre-contractual agreement is concluded, parties 
are often unsure what they wish the outcome of negotiations to be.267 At this stage it 
is impractical for parties to try and reach a compromise on concrete terms.268 The 
vagueness of this agreement allows the negotiating parties to avoid direct 
confrontation or deadlock while they are still deciding on the terms upon which they 
would be willing to proceed with the envisaged transaction.269  
Pre-contractual agreements, due to their vagueness and ambiguity, can also be 
utilised as a form of “economic hostage exchange”.270 This is a term used to describe 
a situation where both parties place themselves in a position of exposure and in doing 
so establish a relationship of mutual reliance.271 The legal nature of pre-contractual 
agreements are uncertain, and by concluding such an agreement, parties expose 
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themselves to the uncertain legal consequences that may flow from non-
compliance.272 This creates a state of mutual reliance where each party is potentially 
equipped to cause harm to the other party if that party does not comply with the 
agreement.273 If pre-contractual agreements are employed to manipulate the 
uncertainty regarding their legal nature so as to elicit compliance, then their function 
is to act as a form of economic hostage exchange.274 On this understanding of a pre-
contractual agreement, it can be regarded as a bargaining tool. In this regard it should 
also be noted that pre-contractual agreements can also be manipulated in a similar 
manner by one party to exert moral pressure on the other party to abide by the 
agreement. 
According to Holten, pre-contractual agreements may not give rise to a binding 
contract but they do create a higher level of commitment in negotiations.275 Parties are 
generally unable to calculate the exact cost of terminating negotiations due to 
uncertainty regarding the legal consequences of pre-contractual agreements and the 
wide range of possible damages that may be awarded for breach if such agreement 
is recognised as a contract in the specific legal system.276 As a result, it is challenging 
for the parties to evaluate whether pursuing an alternative to a final contract would be 
preferable.277 Non-compliance with a pre-contractual agreement is therefore a risky 
action for either of the parties to take.278 On the assumption that negotiating parties 
are risk averse, there is an increased likelihood that parties will rather choose to 
comply with the pre-contractual agreement.279  
It can be argued that the uncertain legal character of pre-contractual agreements 
discourage parties from behaving opportunistically or strategically and ultimately make 
the envisaged transaction more likely to occur.280 Thus, Holten’s argument also  














intended to be a type of contract, they can still perform functions that are highly valued 
in practice.  
2 4 Pre-contractual agreements and pacta de contrahendo  
A pactum de contrahendo can be defined as a contract “aimed at the conclusion of 
another contract”.281 Pre-contractual agreements can be regarded as conceptually 
similar to pacta de contrahendo in the sense that they are agreements made between 
negotiating parties in an attempt to navigate their way towards a final contract.282 
These types of agreements, as seen above, can give rise to obligations regarding 
negotiations, but most are clearly distinguishable from pacta de contrahendo. Pre-
contractual agreements and pacta de contrahendo are generally regarded as distinct 
legal concepts, but there can nonetheless be an overlap.283 This will be discussed in 
chapter 3. Whether a pre-contractual agreement constitutes an enforceable 
agreement to contract depends upon the manner in which the specific jurisdiction 
defines and interprets the pactum de contrahendo concept.284 
In terms of German law, when the basic terms regarding the main contract have 
been agreed upon, a bilateral pre-contract (Vorvertrag) can be entered into, 
notwithstanding the fact that certain issues require further negotiation or 
elaboration.285 For such a valid pre-contract to come into existence, it must either 
contain all the essential elements of the main contract or a mechanism that renders 
those elements determinable.286 A pre-contract constitutes a binding contract and 
imposes upon the parties an obligation to enter into the final contract.287 A pre-contract 
is therefore a legally binding contract to enter into the main contract.288 
 
281 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 70. 
282 H Peter & JC Liebeskind “Letters of Intent in the M & A Context” in G Kaufmann-Kohler & A Johnson 
(eds) Arbitration of Merger and Acquisition Disputes: Swiss Arbitration Association Conference in Zurich 
of January 21, 2005 (2005) 265 268.  
283 269.  
284 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 70-71. 
285 Tremml “The Acquisition of Companies” in Key Aspects of German Business Law 44; T Naudé The 
Legal Nature of Preference Contracts LLD thesis Stellenbosch University (2003) 1 8. 
286 79.  
287 44. 




South African law, by contrast, only categorises two types of contracts as 
enforceable pacta de contrahendo, namely preference contracts and option 
contracts.289 Naudé explains that option and preference contracts can be described 
as “unilaterally binding”290 and this makes them clearly distinguishable from the typical 
pre-contractual agreements above which are “bilaterally binding”, whether 
contractually or otherwise. Furthermore, the problem with option and preference 
contracts is not whether they give rise to liability, but rather to determine some very 
specific remedial consequences; these consequences have been the subject of 
extensive commentary,291 and need not be considered in this thesis. 
It is clear from the consideration of the Vorvertrag, in the context of German law, 
that agreements binding both parties to conclude a contract in the future are 
recognised in some foreign legal systems as enforceable pacta de contrahendo.292 In 
South African law, these types of agreements would generally constitute 
unenforceable agreements to agree. While concepts akin to the German pre-contract 
are not unknown to South African contract law, their application and validity are 
considerably limited by the certainty requirement.293 When conducting comparative 
analysis, it is necessary to understand and interpret the pactum de contrahendo 
concept with reference to the specific context in which it is used. Ultimately, some 
jurisdictions would interpret the pactum de contrahendo concept so broadly that it 
includes types of pre-contractual agreements which other jurisdictions will treat as 
unenforceable agreements to agree.294 
2 5 Conclusion  
Pre-contractual agreements are often used when parties do not wish to enter into a 
final contract, but nonetheless want to explore the possibility of concluding the 
envisaged transaction.295 The term “pre-contractual agreement” describes a vast 
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variety of agreements with different legal content and functions, and it is not possible 
to describe every possible type of pre-contractual agreement. In fact a Working Group 
on International Contracts identified 26 variations of pre-contractual agreements 
collectively referred to as “letters of intent” in their study.296 This chapter sought to 
derive from the mass of agreements referred to as “pre-contractual”, two overarching 
categories that would allow a structured analysis of the functions and legal 
consequences of these agreements.  
While the preceding discussion of the classification of pre-contractual agreements 
distinguished between agreements which gave rise to binding obligations in the course 
of negotiation and those which dealt with the envisaged transaction itself, in practice 
pre-contractual agreements usually contain a combination of binding and non-binding 
provisions.297 Provisions intended to impose confidentiality, exclusivity or good faith 
obligations may therefore be contained in an otherwise non-binding document 
outlining the terms of the envisaged transaction.298 This makes it more difficult to 
determine whether a particular pre-contractual agreement gives rise to contractual 
liability.299 Agreements outlining the envisaged terms of the transaction can contain 
various clauses which indicate that they are non-binding in respect of the envisaged 
transaction but this will not necessarily exclude the possibility that such an agreement 
will impose an obligation to negotiate in good faith, at least in terms of American law.300 
It is therefore necessary to study each type of pre-contractual agreement to determine 
if it can give rise to contractual liability and if so what the nature of such contractual 
liability is. 
The different types of pre-contractual agreements perform very distinct functions. 
The functions sought to be performed by conclusion of a pre-contractual agreement 
has a significant impact on whether a pre-contractual agreement requires contractual 
enforcement. For example, agreements imposing limited obligations regarding the 
negotiations301 are generally binding contracts and require enforcement for their 
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function to be performed. Agreements outlining the terms of the envisaged transaction, 
by contrast, perform a number of formal functions which do not require contractual 
enforcement for their efficacy. The type of pre-contractual agreement and its intended 
function weighs heavily in determining whether such agreement should constitute a 
valid contract. With the benefit of an insight into the classification and functions of the 
different types of pre-contractual agreements, the question whether they can give rise 




Chapter 3: Pre-contractual agreements and the 
requirements for contractual liability 
3 1 Introduction 
The terminology “pre-contractual” suggests that the types of agreements examined in 
this thesis constitute something less than a contract. However, it cannot be assumed, 
without more, that the diverse range of instruments constituting “pre-contractual 
agreements” fail to give rise to contractual obligations. While these instruments are 
often called “pre-contractual”, the label given to them by the parties is not conclusive. 
The types of pre-contractual agreements described in the previous chapter will 
therefore be individually examined to determine whether they meet the requirements 
for a valid contract, and consequently give rise to contractual liability. 
Before engaging in this analysis, it is necessary to make some preliminary 
observations regarding the classical rules of contract formation. Offer and acceptance, 
the traditional mechanism regulating contract formation, is not an effective means of 
establishing the legal consequences of pre-contractual agreements. Farnsworth, in his 
discussion of pre-contractual agreements in the context of American law, explains that 
complex commercial contracts are generally a product of protracted negotiations, and 
that consensus is reached in a piecemeal fashion through the conclusion of several 
successive agreements.1 In this type of situation, the agreement in question often does 
not record an identifiable offer and acceptance.2 In South African contract law, it is 
recognised that the offer-and-acceptance mechanism is merely a tool for establishing 
that there is a meeting of the minds, as opposed to a prerequisite for determining 
whether a contract has come into existence.3 It is accepted that there are many 
examples of contract formation that cannot be properly analysed by way of offer and 
acceptance.4  
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It has been suggested that a more precise analysis of pre-contractual agreements 
can be achieved with reference to two requirements.5 The first is that the agreement 
must be sufficiently certain and the second is that it must reflect the intention of the 
parties to be bound (i.e. an animus contrahendi).6 In this chapter, these two 
requirements will be considered before proceeding in the next chapter to evaluate the 
contractual consequences (if any) of pre-contractual agreements. There is a close 
connection between the two requirements, however, because uncertainty can indicate 
an absence of animus contrahendi.7 The two requirements are applied separately 
below, because even if an agreement is certain, parties may nonetheless manifest an 
intention not to be bound until a final contract is concluded.8 Alternatively an 
agreement may give rise to a binding contract, notwithstanding some uncertainty or 
incompleteness, because the parties have expressed an intention to be bound.9 
In applying these validity requirements to pre-contractual agreements, some 
systems adopt an “all or nothing” approach.10 According to this approach, courts will 
often be forced to categorise pre-contractual agreements either as principal contracts 
or as agreements that do not give rise to contractual obligations at all, even in 
circumstances where these agreements do not fit properly into either of these 
categories in the sense that they may not constitute final contracts but are 
nevertheless intended to be binding.11 This line of thinking will be expanded upon 
throughout this chapter. It is noted that these types of agreements may support the 
imposition of pre-contractual liability from other sources, such as the law of delict and 
the law of unjustified enrichment,12 but that this may not meet the commercial 
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expectations of the parties.13 Knapp supports the recognition of what he describes as 
an “intermediate stage” of contract formation, which occurs between negotiations and 
conclusion of a final contract.14 This intermediate stage of contracting would require 
the recognition and enforcement of contracts to negotiate.15 
Courts could concede that the specific pre-contractual agreement constitutes 
something less than the final contract, but avoid potentially inequitable results by 
concluding that the agreement nonetheless gives rise to intermediate obligations 
regarding negotiation of the envisaged principal contract.16 Furthermore, this 
construction would allow courts to give effect to the true intention of the parties.17 The 
possibility of recognising such an intermediate phase in South African contract law will 
be evaluated here. 
Lastly, it is important once again to draw attention to the distinction between the 
types of pre-contractual agreements outlined in the previous chapter.18 Pre-
contractual agreements seeking to impose limited obligations such as confidentiality 
or exclusivity are relatively unproblematic and are generally regarded as binding 
contracts in most jurisdictions.19 The application of the requirements for contractual 
liability to these agreements will therefore be brief. In contrast, agreements to 
negotiate, agreements subject to contract, and partial or inchoate agreements are 
more problematic insofar as the question of contractual liability is concerned; these 
agreements will form the main focus of this chapter.  
3 2 Certainty  
For an agreement to give rise to a contract, it must be sufficiently certain regarding its 
content and legal consequences.20 In American law “definiteness” requires that a 
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contract must provide “the basis for determining the existence of a breach and giving 
an appropriate remedy”.21 It will be observed that in terms of South African law the 
validity of pre-contractual agreements of the types described above is considerably 
limited by this requirement.22  
In South African contract law, an agreement will be certain if vagueness or 
incompleteness can be resolved with reference to a mechanism set out in the contract, 
admissible extrinsic evidence, the naturalia of the agreement or tacit terms.23 The 
general test is whether, objectively, the agreement “renders the obligations capable of 
being enforced by the courts”.24 South Africans courts adopt a liberal approach to 
contract formation, so as to accord contractual status to agreements that are seriously 
intended, and courts will not lightly deprive such agreement of legal effect for 
uncertainty.25 In Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd26 the 
court explained that “[b]usinessmen are often content to conduct their affairs with only 
vague or incomplete agreements in hand”27 and that courts “should strive to uphold – 
and not destroy – bargains.”28 The same sentiments are expressed in the English case 
of Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd.29 The American author Perillo also warns that courts 
should not “jump too readily” to the conclusion that an agreement is not a contract due 
to apparent uncertainty.30 Courts have nonetheless emphatically stated their 
unwillingness and inability to displace party autonomy by determining, for the parties, 
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the legal content of their agreement.31 
Writing in the context of English law, Furmston explains that when analysing the 
enforceability of pre-contractual agreements, the fundamental issue involves 
establishing the level of uncertainty that will prevent the formation of a contract.32 In 
terms of South African, American and English law, the criterion for contract validity is 
that of reasonable certainty.33 It must merely be possible to ascertain the parties’ 
intention with reasonable certainty; it is not necessary that an agreement be 
meticulously precise.34 The requirement of certainty will now be applied to various pre-
contractual agreements identified in the previous chapter. 
3 2 1 Agreements imposing limited obligations  
Pre-contractual agreements often contain provisions that are intended to impose 
specific obligations on the parties in the course of negotiations. Confidentiality and 
exclusivity will be considered as common examples. For these obligations to be 
contractually enforceable they must be reasonably certain in their content and legal 
consequences. These types of provisions in pre-contractual agreements are 
enforceable in civil-law systems, either as part of the final contract or as a contract to 
negotiate.35 In common-law systems their enforceability can be more problematic, 
particularly if the obligations are contained in otherwise non-binding pre-contractual 
agreements that are not certain and complete.36 American and English courts have 
however indicated a willingness to enforce confidentiality and exclusivity provisions 
included in pre-contractual agreements if parties manifest an intention to be bound.37 
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Binding provisions are distinguished and enforced separately from the non-binding 
provisions.38 
3 2 1 1 Exclusivity 
Issues regarding certainty generally relate to the duration of the obligation.39 In order 
for an agreement imposing obligations of exclusivity to give rise to a valid contract, the 
agreement must stipulate the time period for which such obligations must be 
performed.40 In Walford v Miles41 the court confirmed the English legal position that an 
agreement to negotiate exclusively will give rise to a valid contract if it stipulates the 
time period of exclusivity;42 in the absence of such time period, the agreement would 
imply an obligation to negotiate in good faith, which is unenforceable.43 There has also 
been American case law that accords with this legal position.44 Some American courts 
are however, willing to imply a reasonable duration.45 Beatson, Burrows and 
Cartwright criticise the reasoning in Walford, and argue that an exclusivity agreement 
does not imply an obligation to negotiate in good faith, and where there is no stipulated 
time period the court can impose one based on reasonableness.46 In English law 
exclusivity agreements or “lock-out” agreements are sufficiently certain insofar as they 
impose a negative obligation not to negotiate with other parties; a so-called “lock-in” 
agreement imposing a positive obligation to negotiate with each other, is too uncertain 
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to be enforceable.47 
There does not appear to be South African case law on the validity of an obligation 
to negotiate exclusively. From comparative observations it is possible to propose that 
should such an agreement come before a South African court it should be enforceable 
if the duration of exclusivity has expressly been provided or a reasonable duration can 
be inferred based on the nature and complexity of the transaction. 
3 2 1 2 Confidentiality  
Confidentiality agreements are concluded in various contractual and pre-contractual 
contexts including between employer and employee,48 in national transactions such 
as mergers and acquisitions, and in international commercial negotiations.49 
Confidentiality agreements will have a number of common provisions irrespective of 
whether they apply to employees or to parties to commercial transactions.50 
Confidentiality agreements, like restraint of trade agreements, will be carefully 
analysed by courts, particularly in the context of employment relationships. This 
analysis will be much narrower in the context of commercial negotiations.51  
Confidentiality clauses must be carefully drafted to avoid unenforceability.52 This is 
vital because an invalid confidentiality agreement can cause the subject matter of such 
agreement to lose its “confidential status”.53 Dadpey, an American author, explains 
that the validity of confidentiality agreements will depend on the “language of its 
specific terms”.54 In the American legal system and the European legal systems 
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studied by the Working Group on International Contracts,55 confidentiality agreements 
generally contain standard provisions such as a clause defining the subject matter 
covered by the confidentiality agreement, the obligations of the party receiving 
confidential information, the restriction on use, the duration of such obligation, and the 
sanctions for breach.56  
In America, issues regarding enforceability generally concern the definition of 
confidential information, the duration of confidentiality and the geographic application 
of the agreement.57 A confidentiality agreement must be reasonable, that is to say that 
it should not be too broad in its formulation and the terms should not be vague or 
ambiguous.58 Otherwise the confidentiality agreement may be void for uncertainty or 
for being too restrictive. If the definition of confidential information is formulated too 
broadly, particularly in the context of employment confidentiality agreements, it may 
also be unenforceable.59 Some American courts require confidentiality agreements to 
have reasonable time and reasonable geographic limitations to be enforceable.60 In 
both English and American legal systems it is also possible for confidentiality 
obligations to persist after the termination of negotiations or contract conclusion.61 
In South Africa, confidentiality provisions are commonly included or implied into 
restraint of trade of agreements. In Traka Afrika (Pty) Ltd v Amaya Industries62 the 
court explained that “[a]greements in restraint of trade, and by implication 
confidentiality agreements, voluntarily entered into pursuant to one’s right to freedom 
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of contract, are … valid and enforceable” as long as they are not unreasonable.63 
Although there does not appear to be South African case law specifically dealing with 
the certainty requirement in the context of confidentiality agreements, the general 
principles of the South African law of contract dictate that agreements should be 
sufficiently certain and thus not be vague or ambiguous. It is therefore argued that as 
in American law, South African law will also require that the definition of confidential 
information not be formulated over broadly, and that the time periods and geographic 
application be clearly stipulated so that the agreement is sufficiently certain to be 
enforced. 
3 2 2 Agreements to negotiate  
The enforceability of agreements to negotiate are generally determined with reference 
to the principles regulating certainty.64 As mentioned in chapter 2, there are different 
types of agreements to negotiate. Negotiation clauses can for example be included in 
pre-existing contracts,65 intended to be binding irrespective of the outcome of 
negotiations66 thus, an agreement of lease could contain a negotiation agreement on 
changes in the rental. Secondly, otherwise non-binding pre-contractual agreements 
could outline the term(s) of the envisaged contract.67 And thirdly, parties could 
conclude agreements that do not purport to outline the terms of the envisaged 
contract, but solely indicate an arrangement to negotiate the principal contract.68 The 
latter two types of agreements to negotiate can be described as “independent”69 or 
“bare” agreements to negotiate, because they do not form part of an existing contract 
 
63 See para 46-49 for the test to determine whether the restraint is reasonable and thus not contrary to 
public policy. 
64 M Furmston & GJ Tolhurst Contract Formation: Law and Practice 2 ed (2016) 316-317. 
65 LE Trakman and K Sharma “The Binding Force of Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith” (2014) 73 
CLJ 598 617-619; Furmston & Tolhurst Contract Formation 316-317; H Hoskins “Contractual 
Obligations to Negotiate in Good Faith: Faithfulness to the Agreed Common Purpose” (2014) 130 LQR 
131 131.  
66 Hoskins 2014 LQR 131. 
67 Trakman & Sharma 2014 CLJ 604; Hoskins 2014 LQR 131; Teachers Insurance v Tribune Co (1987) 
670 F Supp 491 (S D N Y) 499. 
68 Perillo Corbin on Contracts 142; Hoskins 2014 LQR 131. 




and are concluded prior to the main contract that the parties intend to negotiate.70 
Independent agreements to negotiate will not bind the parties to conclude the final 
contract, but merely impose an obligation to negotiate in good faith.71  
Contractual obligations to negotiate must be distinguished from a legal duty to 
negotiate in good faith, imposed ex lege.72 We already noted in chapter 2 that the 
scope of this thesis will be limited to the obligation to negotiate in good faith arising in 
contract. In this regard, a contract may contain an express obligation to negotiate “in 
good faith” or simply contain an obligation to negotiate. Whether such an express 
reference to good faith is necessary in terms of South African law is questionable, 
“since it could hardly be intended that negotiations be conducted in any other 
manner”.73 Whether the nature of the agreement to negotiate and express reference 
to good faith has an impact on validity will be examined with reference to the legal 
position in South Africa, England, America and Germany. 
3 2 2 1 Foreign law  
(i) English law  
As a general point of departure, English law recognises that an agreement to negotiate 
is enforceable if there is a deadlock-breaking mechanism rendering the obligation 
sufficiently certain.74 In Cable & Wireless Plc v IBM United Kingdom Ltd75 the court 
had to consider the validity of a clause that required parties to negotiate in good faith 
to resolve any disputes in relation to their agreement, failing which their dispute was 
to be resolved through an alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) procedure. The court 
found that the clause was enforceable because it went further than merely imposing 
an obligation to negotiate but actually prescribed the steps to taken by the parties 
which included the ADR procedure. The latter procedure was sufficiently certain for a 
court to evaluate whether parties have complied. 
In absence of such ADR clauses, the English common-law traditionally regards 
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agreements to negotiate as invalid and unenforceable.76 Courts generally tend to 
conclude that such agreements are uncertain in content and contrary to public policy 
because they bind parties to obligations that could not be intended to be legally 
binding.77 These agreements are unenforceable primarily due the difficulties involved 
in identifying the appropriate criteria to give content to the obligation to negotiate.78 
According to Trakman and Sharma the reference to good faith does little to render 
agreements to negotiate certain or at least ascertainable; in fact, it often contributes 
to uncertainty because it is difficult to determine the standard of conduct required by 
such an obligation.79 However, on further investigation, it becomes apparent that 
reference to good faith may in fact be useful in giving content to an obligation to 
negotiate. 
To understand the current law, it may be beneficial to consider the history of 
negotiation clauses in England and the courts’ rationale for the traditional legal 
position. An early and famous case dealing with the enforceability of negotiation 
clauses is Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd.80 In this case Lord Wright recognised that 
according to the traditional theory of contract formation an agreement to negotiate can 
give rise to an enforceable contract if consideration is given.81 Lord Wright explained 
that “there is then no bargain except to negotiate”82 and that negotiations may come 
to an end without the final contract being concluded.83  
However, Lord Denning in Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd v Tolani Brothers (Hotels Ltd)84 
rejected the views of Lord Wright and concluded that an agreement to negotiate is too 
uncertain to give rise to a contract. He stated as follows: 
“If the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (when there is a 
fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recognise a contract to 
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negotiate. The reason is because it is too uncertain to have any binding force. No court 
could estimate damages because no one could tell whether negotiations would be 
successful or fall through: or if successful what the result would be.”85 
He concluded that for this reason that agreements to negotiate, like agreements to 
enter into an agreement, are unknown to English law.  
In a further seminal case, Walford v Miles86 (“Walford”) the House of Lords preferred 
the view of Lord Denning. In this case the parties concluded an oral agreement, 
subject to contract, for the sale of a business. The parties also agreed that Mr and Mrs 
Miles would negotiate exclusively with the Walfords if they obtained a comfort letter 
from the bank confirming the bank’s willingness to fund the envisaged purchase. Mr 
and Mrs Miles nevertheless negotiated with and sold the business to a third party. 
In this case the parties had not expressly agreed to negotiate in good faith. The 
agreement in question was a lock-out agreement, which was found to be 
unenforceable because it failed to stipulate the time period of exclusivity.87 The 
Walfords argued that the lock-out agreement was “unworkable”, unless it was 
interpreted as imposing an implied obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
Lord Ackner found that a lock-out agreement need not impose a positive obligation 
to negotiate to be effective as its utility lay in imposing a negative obligation not to 
negotiate with third parties.88 However, he took the matter further by explaining that 
the main reason such a term could not be implied was because agreements to 
negotiate, like agreements to agree, are unenforceable because they are inherently 
uncertain.89 Uncertainty in this regard relates to the content of the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith. Lord Ackner posed two main questions that describe the nature 
of this uncertainty: 
“[H]ow is a vendor ever to know that he is entitled to withdraw from further negotiations? 
How is the court to police such an ‘agreement’?” 90 
On this basis, Lord Ackner concluded that a bare obligation to negotiate in good faith 
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is without legal content.91 
However, the current legal position may not be quite as clear cut as it seems and 
needs to be examined in light of developments regarding the obligation to perform 
contracts in good faith, the obligation to negotiate tender contracts in good faith and 
negotiation obligations arising from pre-existing contracts. This will be followed by 
suggestions regarding future legal development so as to enforce independent 
agreements to negotiate in good faith.  
(a) Obligation of good faith in the context of performance and collateral tender 
agreements  
The uncertainty of the obligation to negotiate in good faith needs to be considered in 
light of the approach to uncertainty in general92 and the  progression in case law 
towards attaching a legal meaning to good faith in specific practical contexts.93 
Particularly important developments have taken place in the context of good faith 
performance obligations and tendering agreements.94 Chen explains that while good 
faith has been regarded as an “elusive concept”, recent case law in these areas has 
provided useful clarification.95  
In the two decades since the Walford decision, which dismissed the concept of good 
faith as inherently uncertain, English law has seen some development. For example, 
English courts have encountered little difficulty in recognising and legally defining the 
obligation to perform or act in good faith.96 Courts have even been willing to imply such 
an obligation where one party is given the power in terms of a contract to affect the 
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interests of the other party.97 Chen argues that courts will be able, in similar manner, 
to give content to the obligation to negotiate in good faith.98 In fact, an obligation to 
perform a contract in good faith can sometimes even require parties to negotiate in 
good faith.99 This development challenges the principles enunciated in the Walford 
decision and its authority for the unenforceability of agreements to negotiate in 
present-day English law.  
Further support for the conclusion that good faith obligations can be defined with 
sufficient certainty is found in cases involving collateral contracts entered into in the 
course of tender procedures.100 These contracts regulate contract formation by 
imposing standards of “good faith and fairness”.101 There is uncertainty regarding 
whether this obligation is imposed by law or is contractual in nature,102 but irrespective 
of the source of such obligation, its enforcement in this context can be instructive in 
how certainty can be imparted to a contractual obligation to negotiate.  
Hoskins argues that the judicial approach to good faith performance clauses and 
collateral tendering contracts illustrates how uncertainty regarding the content of a 
good faith obligation can be resolved by accepting that good faith entails “faithfulness 
to an agreed common purpose” and by adopting a contextual, purposive approach to 
determine the content of such obligation.103 He concludes that courts can adopt this 
approach to enforce negotiation obligations in circumstances where the agreement, 
interpreted in light of the specific context, manifests a clear common purpose 
comprising of a “sufficiently certain framework for negotiation.” 104 Defining the scope 
of the obligation allows courts to “police” whether there has been compliance 
 
97 14. 
98 Chen 2017 BLR 19.  
99 Chen 2017 BLR 20 provides as an example the case of Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading 
Ltd [2010] EWHC 1632 (TCC) paras 3,4,13,88. This case dealt with a clause for the renegotiation of 
price and an obligation to act in good faith. One of the issues raised was whether there had been breach 
of the obligation to act in good faith due to a failure to renegotiate the price.  
100 Hoskins 2014 LQR 148. 
101 Hoskins 2014 LQR 147-148; see Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council [1990] 
1 WLR 1195 1204 and Fairclough Building Ltd v Port Talbot Borough Council (1992) 62 BLR 82. 
102 Hoskins 2014 LQR 147-148. 
103 2014 LQR 150-151. 




(addressing concerns raised in Walford).105 
(b) Negotiation clauses in pre-existing contracts  
It also appears that English courts may be willing to recognise obligations to negotiate 
in good faith arising from pre-existing contracts.106 Lord Ackner in the Walford case, 
concluded that a “bare agreement to negotiate is without legal content.”107 It can be 
argued that this formulation by implication allows or does not preclude negotiation 
clauses in pre-existing contracts. 108 This distinction enables courts to recognise the 
validity of the latter contracts.109 A pre-existing contract generally provides an 
“objective framework” to give content to the negotiation obligation, limit its scope, and 
allow courts to enforce it.110 Two recent cases illustrate this.  
In Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras111 (“Petromec”) the negotiation 
clause was express and formed part of a complex contract. The court explained that 
Walford was distinguishable because in that case there was no pre-existing contract 
(the agreement was subject to contract).112 In the present case, the negotiation clause 
required parties to negotiate in good faith about the reasonable costs of extra work to 
be done pursuant to the alteration of specifications in the initial contract. Establishing 
whether there was bad faith in negotiations may be difficult, but is not impossible. If 
the parties’ negotiations were unsuccessful, the court could ascertain such 
“reasonable costs” for the parties.113 The scope of the obligation was sufficiently 
limited, and the agreement included objective criteria that could be applied by the 
court.114 The court, based on these distinctions, recognised the enforceability of an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith.115  
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In Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime Mineral Exports Private Ltd116 (“Emirates”) 
the court had to decide on the enforceability of a clause in a contract that required 
parties “to resolve the dispute or claim by friendly discussion” before proceeding to 
arbitration. The contract in question did not require the negotiation of outstanding 
terms; the issue rather concerned the enforceability of an agreement to negotiate 
claims or disputes.117 Teare J considered various cases and reached the conclusion 
that there was no binding authority that required him to conclude that such an 
obligation is unenforceable.118 An obligation in a pre-existing contract to endeavour to 
resolve disputes “by friendly discussions in good faith and within a limited period of 
time” is enforceable.119 Teare J explained that this obligation was sufficiently certain 
because it imposed recognisable standards of fairness, honesty and sincerity in the 
discussion of disputes.120  
The recognition that an obligation to negotiate in good faith in a pre-existing contract 
is enforceable has important implications despite the existence of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism. The effect of enforceability of a negotiation clause is that parties will first 
have to comply with the obligation to negotiate before invoking the arbitration clause. 
Chen suggests that the two above mentioned cases demonstrate the viability of 
imposing such an obligation even though they do not explicitly recognise independent 
agreements to negotiate.121 
(c) Independent agreements to negotiate 
While English academics such as Peel appear to support the outcome of the Walford 
decision,122 it has received considerable criticism from other English academics and 
in some common-law quarters.123 The New South Wales case of United Group Rail 
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Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales124 which, as we will see, so 
strongly influenced the judgement of Blignault J in the Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd case,125 serves as an 
example. Here the court found Walford unpersuasive, insofar as it establishes 
“sweeping generalised rules” of unenforceability that are unsustainable and of little 
practical value in the commercial context.126. The court emphasises that it is possible 
for negotiation obligations to have a legal content.127 Contractual negotiations are 
generally a “self interested commercial activity.” Given this context, it is possible to 
conclude that an obligation to negotiate in good faith requires honesty, seriousness 
and genuineness.128  
Rejecting generalised rules allows courts to give effect to freedom of contract and 
to decide each individual case on its own merits.129 It is for example possible that an 
independent agreement to negotiate will be sufficiently certain if the parties provide a 
detailed framework for negotiations.130 Beatson, Burrow and Cartwright argue that 
Lord Ackner’s reasoning in Walford is problematic, because it does not give effect to 
the “reasonable expectations of business people” and “appears to require a higher 
degree of certainty and less willingness to use the standards of reasonableness to 
resolve ambiguity.”131 They also express disappointment that the Hillas case, which 
recognised agreements to negotiate, was rejected.132  
In Petromec133 Longmore LJ cautioned against courts establishing a “blanket 
unenforceability” of agreements to negotiate. In this regard the following statement 
was made: 
“It would be a strong thing to declare unenforceable a clause into which the parties have 
deliberately and expressly entered. …To decide that it has no ‘legal content’ to use Lord 
Ackner’s phrase would be for the law deliberately to defeat the reasonable expectations of 
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This obiter statement suggested that courts may be willing to develop the law on 
agreements to negotiate further. However, in the subsequent case of Barbudev v 
Eurocom Cable Management Bulgaria Eood135, the court refused to enforce an 
obligation in a side letter that required parties to negotiate the principal contract in 
good faith. In Charles Shaker v Vistajet Group Holding SA,136 Teare J stressed that 
Petromec was an exception to the general rule and did not set a precedent for the 
enforceability of all obligations to negotiate in good faith. Unlike Petromec, the 
agreement in this case contained no objective criteria for courts to assess the terms 
of the principal contract and the obligation was therefore unenforceable.137 A 
negotiation clause will not render an otherwise enforceable agreement unenforceable, 
but the negotiation clause is not of itself enforceable. Such a clause may be 
enforceable where parties have provided, “objective criteria, or machinery for resolving 
any disagreement”.138  
It appears that English law does not distinguish between agreements to agree and 
agreements to negotiate, and that it determines the enforceability of an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith with reference to whether the outstanding terms of the 
envisaged transaction can be determined.139 Leggatt explains that the analogy to an 
agreement to agree is a bad one – “parties who agree to negotiate do not agree to 
agree”.140 Rather they are agreeing to a process of negotiations with view to reaching 
a final agreement.141 
In Donwin Productions v EMI films Ltd142 the court was willing to imply an obligation 
to negotiate in good faith into a contract with minor outstanding terms. There is no full 
report for this case, but Hoskins provides an interesting analysis.143 He explains that 
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in contrast with the Petromec case, there was no objective framework that courts could 
use to determine outstanding terms if negotiations were unsuccessful.144 It appears 
that the parties did not intend for the court to perform this function145. He argues that 
this does not necessarily render the negotiation clause uncertain. The agreement may 
still contain a “framework for negotiations” (which does not “dictate any single 
outcome”)146 that courts may apply to evaluate whether parties have complied with 
their obligations.147 Such a framework can include “negotiating agenda” or set out the 
requisite steps that must be complied with during negotiations.148 
Hoskins concludes that the certainty of a negotiation clause should not be 
determined by whether a court has been equipped with a means (perhaps a deadlock-
breaking mechanism) to determine outstanding terms if negotiations fail, but rather 
whether the negotiation obligation interpreted in the context of the wider agreement is 
so vague that it gives a broad discretion to the parties which courts are incapable of 
policing.149 Leggatt argues that “it is not reason to hold a clause void for uncertainty 
that the parties have chosen to express the clause in broad evaluative language”.150 
In fact, judges are often called upon to determine what such standards require in a 
particular case. 151 
English courts nevertheless remain extremely conservative in their approach to the 
enforceability of express agreements to negotiate and consequently will seldom be 
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In conclusion, Leggatt J in Astor Management AG v Atalaya Mining Plc153 validly 
points out that: 
“The role of the court in a commercial dispute is to give legal effect to what the parties have 
agreed, not to throw its hands in the air and refuse to do so because the parties have not 
made its task easy”. 
If commercial law and courts are to properly perform their function, English contract 
law will have to be sufficiently flexible to give legal meaning to obligations to negotiate, 
which will likely become more common in the future.154 That English law may require 
development to meet modern commercial needs is bolstered by the fact that, as we 
will presently see, their approach is not uniformly adopted in the common-law tradition. 
(ii) American law 
The investigation of American law on agreements to negotiate, which is far more 
developed than other common-law counterparts, will be conducted in three parts. First 
the traditional legal position will be set out. This will be followed by a brief examination 
of the suggestions put forward by American academics. Lastly, developments in 
American case law will be analysed. 
American courts traditionally refused to recognise agreements to negotiate as valid 
contracts due to concerns over uncertainty.155 Whether the agreement referred to an 
obligation to negotiate in “good faith” did not affect this legal position.156 There is 
American case law that accords with the English law position that independent 
agreements to negotiate are unenforceable.157 In Candid Products v International 
Skating Union,158 the claimants argued that the court could render the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith certain by implying specific duties.159 The court rejected this 
argument on the basis that it would require the court to “make a contract for the parties 
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rather than enforce any bargain that the parties may themselves have reached.” 160 
American academics developed various theories regarding the enforceability of 
agreements to negotiate.161 Farnsworth argues that in the “intermediate regime” 
(between negotiation and principal contract formation) there are two types of 
enforceable pre-contractual agreements, namely agreements with open terms and 
agreements to negotiate, and that both impose an obligation to negotiate in good 
faith.162 Agreements with open terms record most of the terms of the envisaged 
contract and, in contrast with agreements to negotiate, bind parties to the principal 
contract irrespective of the outcome of negotiations.163 If parties fail to negotiate in 
good faith, a court may conclude that the original agreement is binding and fill in 
outstanding terms.164 The category the agreement falls into depends upon the 
intention of the parties.165 
Burton and Andersen suggest that there are various contractual duties that can be 
imposed by agreements to negotiate.166 Such agreements can impose “procedural 
duties” or a specific standard of behaviour in the course of negotiations.167 They can 
also commit parties to certain terms exclusively for purposes of negotiation (meaning 
that the terms are non-binding) or bind parties to the final contract, irrespective of the 
outcome of negotiations.168  
Sanders criticises the enforcement of agreements with open terms, explaining that 
they are difficult to distinguish from agreements to negotiate and are indistinguishable 
from unenforceable agreements to agree.169 He argues in favour of the recognition of 
a “good faith reliance contract” that does not bind parties to conclude the final contract, 
but requires parties to refrain from bad faith conduct in the course of negotiations.170  
 
160 1335. 
161 Knapp 1969 NYU L Rev 673 674; Sanders 2006 UC Davis Bus LJ 208. 
162 Farnsworth 1987 Colum LR 253,263; NE Nedzel “A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing 
and Precontractual Liability” (1997) 12 Tul Eur & Civ LF 97 119. 
163 Farnsworth 1987 Colum LR 249-253; see also 3 2 3. 
164 Nedzel 1997 Tul Eur & Civ LF 119. 
165 Farnsworth 1987 Colum LR 253. 
166 Contractual Good Faith: Formation, Performance, Breach, Enforcement (1995) 334. 
167 334. 
168 334.  





These scholarly suggestions enjoy various levels of support in different American 
states. Some courts, while recognising the distinction between pre-contractual 
agreements and ultimate contracts, are unwilling to enforce agreements in the 
“intermediary stage”.171 It will be observed that courts in Delaware, New York, 
California, Illinois and Washington, DC are more inclined to enforce agreements to 
negotiate in good faith.172 By contrast, courts in Virginia173 and Texas174 are generally 
unwilling to enforce these agreements. 
(a) Development of the law to enforce certain agreements to negotiate  
In Itek Corporation v Chicago Aerial Industries,175 the court concluded that a 
negotiation clause in a letter of intent that required the parties to make every 
“reasonable effort” to agree upon and conclude the envisaged contract could be 
enforceable.176 The court explained that parties were obliged to negotiate in good faith 
in an attempt to reach a final agreement. This paved the way for the recognition of 
good faith negotiation obligations in pre-contractual agreements.177 
In Siga Technologies Inc v PharmAthene Inc178 the court reaffirmed the contractual 
enforceability of an express obligation to negotiate in good faith. In this case the parties 
had concluded a license term sheet and a merger term sheet which left some terms 
for future negotiation.179 In both the merger term sheet and a separate bridge loan 
agreement the parties agreed to negotiate the outstanding terms of the license term 
sheet in good faith.180 The court concluded that such an obligation is enforceable. 181 
There were a number of significant factors that favoured such a conclusion. The term 
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sheet set out the time period for negotiation.182 Both term sheets contained an express 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. The court emphasised the “express contractual 
language” of the obligation to negotiate in good faith.183 It was also significant that the 
preliminary agreement was relatively comprehensive and contained some material 
terms.184 It will be seen that this will also influence the remedy available.185 
In Copeland v Baskin Robbins USA186 the court also enforced an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith in a pre-contractual agreement and distinguished agreements 
to negotiate from unenforceable agreements to agree.187 Obligations will have been 
discharged if parties have negotiated in good faith, even though there is no obligation 
to conclude the final contract.188 The court dismissed the proposition that such an 
obligation is uncertain, explaining that “ordinary citizens applying their experience and 
common sense are well equipped to determine whether the parties negotiated with 
each other in good faith”.189  
It is clear that parties can potentially conclude letters of intent or other pre-
contractual agreements which impose an express contractual obligation to negotiate 
in good faith.190 Whether such an obligation can be implied is a more complex matter. 
Courts in states that are willing to recognise the intermediary stage are not in 
agreement regarding an implied obligation to negotiate in good faith.191 Some courts 
will only enforce such an obligation in an otherwise non-binding pre-contractual 
agreement if parties have expressly manifested an intention to be bound by such 
obligation.192 Other courts accept that an obligation to negotiate in good faith may be 
implied where the facts are strong enough to support it.193 Some states thus recognise 
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that a pre-contractual agreement “as such gives rise to an obligation to negotiate the 
ultimate agreement in good faith”, even if the pre-contractual agreement is otherwise 
non-binding.194 These respective legal positions are illustrated by cases such as 
Channel Home Centers, Div of Grace Retail Corp v Grossman195, which dealt with a 
letter of intent that outlined the most important terms of a lease and imposed an 
obligation of exclusivity. The court concluded that the letter of intent and surrounding 
circumstances indicated that the parties intended to be bound by an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith, which was sufficiently certain, because the agreement set out 
the steps required to comply with such obligation.  
Cases like these are significant because they essentially alter the traditional rules 
of contract law that agreements to agree and by implication agreements to negotiate 
in good faith are unenforceable.196 Furthermore, courts have departed from the 
traditional all or nothing approach to contract formation by recognising that pre-
contractual agreements can give rise to intermediate obligations.197  
There is still a presumption that pre-contractual agreements are not intended to be 
binding in respect of the final contract, but a new rule appears to have been developed 
by precedent that parties are obliged to negotiate regarding outstanding terms with a 
view to reaching a final contract.198 The courts in some of these cases specifically 
chose to paraphrase the obligation as one to negotiate in good faith rather than to use 
the literal wording of the parties which may simply have been to agree to negotiate. 
This could be because of the rule that all contracts must be performed in good faith. 
Alternatively, it can be argued that the only way to make sense of an obligation to 
negotiate is to interpret it as imposing an obligation to negotiate in good faith.199 
In Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v Tribune CO200 (“Tribune 
Co”), Judge Leval gave a comprehensive analysis of the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith and departed from prior precedent by implying such an obligation into a 
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preliminary agreement. This seminal case completely altered the way in which 
American law deals with agreements to agree and incomplete agreements.201 The 
court recognised two types of enforceable preliminary agreements. Type I preliminary 
agreements are complete agreements, but parties merely desire the conclusion of a 
formal contract that memorialises their agreement.202 These types of agreements, 
which are preliminary only in form, will be considered in more detail below.203 Type II 
preliminary agreements outline the major terms of the transaction, but leave certain 
terms open for future negotiation.204 
Judge Leval explained that parties “can bind themselves to a seemingly incomplete 
agreement in the sense that they accept a mutual commitment to negotiate in good 
faith in an effort to reach final agreement within the scope that has been settled in the 
preliminary agreement.”205 
Applying these principles to the facts, he concluded from the surrounding 
circumstances and the express terms of the loan commitment letter in question that 
the parties intended to conclude an agreement to negotiate in good faith.206  
Generally, however, it appears to be easier for courts to enforce express obligations 
to negotiate in good faith.207 It also cannot be ignored that some American courts are 
less progressive and remain unwilling to enforce agreements to negotiate at all.208 In 
Feldman v Allegheny Int’l209 for example, the court found that the agreement to 
negotiate was too uncertain to be enforceable. According to the court, “[g]ood faith is 
no guide,” because both parties will and are entitled to pursue the best deal, even if 
that entails unreasonable demands.210 It is interesting that in this case, the agreement 
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in question had been concluded at a very early stage in negotiations and “nearly all 
the details remained open”.211 There was also no express obligation to negotiate in 
good faith.  
(b) The content of an obligation to negotiate in good faith and the importance of its 
enforcement 
From the above analysis, it is clear that some American courts are willing to enforce 
express or even implied obligations to negotiate in good faith in pre-contractual 
agreements and are more inclined to do so where “major terms” of the principal 
contract have been recorded.212 This in turn gives rise to a very difficult question, 
namely what does an obligation to negotiate in good faith actually entail?  
In Tribune Co213 Judge Leval explained that this obligation prevents a party from 
“renouncing the deal, abandoning negotiations, or insisting on conditions that do not 
conform to the preliminary agreement”.214 This obligation does not prevent a party 
from pursuing her own interests in a business transaction; it merely requires her to 
negotiate seriously and genuinely in an attempt to reach consensus and if she has 
complied, her obligation will be discharged even if no contract materialises.215 It is 
entirely possible that negotiations will break down because of a reasonable 
disagreement regarding open terms or final negotiations detect hidden problems with 
the terms of the earlier agreement that are unresolvable. 216 
Summers defines good faith by excluding bad faith conduct.217 Eisenberg suggests 
that in most cases it will be clear whether the party acted in bad faith, by for example, 
conducting parallel negotiations with third parties or simply breaking off negotiations 
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without any reason.218 Bad faith may often be subtle and a party will sometimes 
escape liability as a result, but this does not justify the unenforceability of agreements 
to negotiate.219 American courts that were willing to accept that the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith is enforceable had little difficulty giving content to the obligation 
and ultimately the scope and content will become more certain through judicial 
development.220  
Given some of the difficulties that can arise in the enforcement of an obligation to 
negotiate, the question arises why some American courts are altering traditional 
contract law rules to enforce these agreements? According to Creed, the purpose of 
these agreements is to manage the allocation of risk between parties in the course of 
negotiations.221 Agreements such as memoranda of understanding, letters of intent 
and term sheets are concluded at a time when parties have progressed in contractual 
negotiations and reached a stage that requires one or both of them to make substantial 
relationship-specific investments and potentially forgo other commercial opportunities 
without assurance regarding the materialisation of the final contract.222 It appears that 
courts gradually moved towards the recognition of this intermediate stage of 
contracting to remedy the inadequacy of pre-contractual liability from other sources of 
law. “Embedding” this intermediate contractual obligation in pre-contractual 
agreements gives a contracting party the assurance that his pre-contractual 
investments are protected in the sense that the other party is no longer free to break 
off negotiations in bad faith at any time and for any reason without liability.223 On this 
understanding, an obligation to negotiate protects a party’s investment during the pre-
contractual phase against the other party’s bad faith conduct, which may include, 
delaying negotiations, proposing unreasonable terms and holding out until the other 
party accepts prejudicial terms to avoid losing substantial investments made into 
negotiations.224 
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The enforceability of agreements to negotiate in some American states and the 
proposed rationale for their enforcement provides valuable insight into addressing the 
issue of agreements to agree and pre-contractual liability in South Africa. This enables 
some informed conclusions regarding future legal development to be made.  
(c) The possibility of courts filling in outstanding terms 
Although the issue of an obligation to negotiate in good faith and the issue of 
incomplete agreements or preliminary agreements subject to contract are 
conceptually distinct, there is often an overlap, as incomplete agreements may have 
an express or implied obligation to negotiate outstanding terms in good faith.225 The 
question of enforceability of an incomplete agreement will depend on the intention to 
be bound or the animus contrahendi, which will be considered in further detail below. 
However, for now it should be acknowledged that American law is extremely receptive 
to filling in outstanding terms in order to give effect to the intention of the parties. 
(iii) German Law  
The legal position in civil-law systems differs vastly from that of the common-law 
systems considered thus far. In civil-law systems, the overarching obligation to 
negotiate in good faith is recognised.226 It has already been highlighted that this 
obligation generally arises from the application of principles of both the laws of delict 
and contract.227 German law for example, developed the doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo (fault in negotiating) which imposes liability inter alia for a party’s 
blameworthy conduct in the course of negotiations that prevents the final contract from 
being concluded.228 Obviously this is conceptually distinct from the contractual 
obligations potentially arising from an agreement to negotiate discussed above. In 
Germany the obligation to negotiate in good faith and the accompanying remedy are 
generally not of a contractual nature,229 but imposed ex lege upon commencement of 
 
225 Eisenberg Principles of Contract Law 504.  
226 Trakman & Sharma 2014 CLJ 606. 
227 Trakman & Sharma 2014 CLJ 606; Hutchison 2011 SALJ 283.  
228 RB Lake “Letter of Intent: A Comparative Examination under English, U.S., French and West 
German Law” (1984) 18 Geo Wash J Int’l L & Econ 331 352.  




negotiations and requires parties to consider each other’s interest.230 The legal 
position in Germany provides important insights into duties arising from contractual 
undertakings to negotiate, and how these duties differ from those relating to how 
parties should negotiate in general.231  
German law recognises the validity of two types of “pre-contractual” agreements 
that are not found in common-law jurisdictions. The so-called Vorvertrag which has 
already been discussed in chapter 2232 and a Vorfeldvertrag.233 The latter agreement 
imposes specific pre-contractual obligations that regulate the manner in which 
negotiations are conducted. The fact that parties have concluded such agreements 
may be relevant for purposes of the application of the pre-contractual duties set out in 
the German Civil code, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”) which incorporates the 
theory of culpa in contrahendo.234 These duties and their practical application will 
analysed in chapter 5 as the existence of a contract is not a prerequisite to their 
application. 
For now it is sufficient to note that if parties have concluded a pre-contractual 
agreement it is more likely that a court will find that negotiations have “commenced” 
for purposes of section 311(2) BGB which provides that the pre-contractual duties set 
out in section 241(2) will apply to negotiating parties.235 Whether a pre-contractual 
agreement does so will depend on the nature of the agreement.236 If the agreement 
for example contains contractual obligations, section 311(2)(1) BGB dictates that the 
duties set out in section 311(2) BGB will arise.237 If parties conclude a non-binding pre-
contractual agreement regarding an envisaged transaction section 311(2)(3) BGB, a 
“catch-all”, provision allows for the obligations set out in section 241(2) BGB to arise.238 
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Section 241(2) imposes a legal obligation on parties to negotiate in good faith, which 
is conceptually distinct from a contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith because 
it goes further than merely precluding bad faith conduct, by requiring of a party to take 
into account “the rights, legal interest and interests of the other party” in the course of 
negotiating.239  
In conclusion German law recognises that pre-contractual agreements may amount 
to pre-contracts (Vorvertrag)240 that impose contractual obligations or negotiation 
agreements which do not impose contractual obligations to conclude the final contract. 
However, both of these agreements can give rise to the imposition of the pre-
contractual duties set out in section 242(1) BGB.241 Babusiaux suggests that because 
civil-law systems recognise the obligation to negotiate in good faith, even in the 
absence of an agreement, agreements to negotiate should in principle be 
enforceable.242 In this regard the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo can be applied to 
interpret and give content to the pre-contractual agreement and establish whether it 
merely reiterates the legal duty to negotiate in good faith.243 Ultimately, there is less 
reason for doctrinal debates regarding the nature of these pre-contractual agreements 
in civil-law systems, such as Germany, since the law of pre-contractual liability is so 
well developed.244  
3 2 2 2 International instruments  
International instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (“PICC”)245 and Principles of European Contract law 
(“PECL”)246 make provision for liability for negotiating in bad faith (or contrary to good 
faith) even in the absence of an agreement to that effect.  
It is odd that the PICC, which was formulated to regulate contracts, contains article 
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2.1.15, which essentially deals with pre-contractual liability where negotiations do not 
give rise to a contract. The existence of a contract is a prerequisite for the application 
of the PICC, because for such law to apply parties must either have concluded a 
contract where they did not select any law to govern such contract or expressly 
provided in their contract that the PICC will govern such contract. This gives rise to 
the problem that article 2.1.15 can only apply if parties have concluded a valid contract 
to negotiate or are renegotiating terms of an existing contract. Therefore, these 
principles are not directly applicable to negotiations broken off prior to the conclusion 
of some form of contract. 
Nevertheless, as Rios points out, this provision can inform the development of 
international instruments and national rules in its regulation of pre-contractual liability. 
For example, an arbitral tribunal applied the PICC in support of the conclusion that an 
agreement to negotiate in good faith is enforceable in terms of the law of the state of 
New York (which was found by the tribunal to be the applicable law). It is argued here 
that like the PICC, the PECL which contains very similar provisions can also influence 
the development of national law in the similar manner. 
Article 2.1.15 of the PICC read with comment 3 thereto also gives guidance as to 
the obligation imposed by an enforceable agreement to negotiate – parties will at the 
very least be obliged to negotiate seriously towards conclusion of a final contract. It 
does not however impose an obligation on parties to conclude the final contract.247 
This can aid in providing certainty as to the content of the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith and support the development of national law to recognise the enforceability 
of agreements to negotiate. 
3 2 2 3 South African law  
In terms of South African law, agreements to agree or to reach consensus are 
regarded as void for uncertainty because neither party can be compelled to reach 
consensus.248 In a similar vein, agreements to negotiate a future contract, but without 
necessarily having to reach consensus, have also traditionally been treated as too 
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vague to give rise to an enforceable contract.249 
In Premier, Free State v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd250 the court explained that 
“an agreement that the parties will negotiate to conclude another agreement is not 
enforceable, because of the absolute discretion vested in the parties to either agree 
or disagree.”251 There is no guarantee that parties to the agreement to agree will 
actually reach consensus and conclude the final contract.252 It is herein that the 
uncertainty lies. 
The failure to draw a proper distinction between agreements to agree and 
agreements to negotiate contributes to a growing misconception regarding the nature 
and purpose of an agreement to negotiate. As Sharrock explains, an agreement to 
negotiate a future contract is functionally distinct from an agreement to agree; the 
former agreement does not oblige the parties to conclude the final contract, but rather 
binds them to negotiate towards such conclusion.253 The agreement to negotiate does 
not seek to regulate the end result of negotiations, but rather the negotiation process 
itself.254 
The traditional legal position regarding agreements to negotiate has recently 
undergone some development.255 This is of particular significance in light of the 
suggestion internationally that these agreements may constitute a suitable middle 
ground between the realm of no contract (pre-contractual phase) and a final contract 
(contractual liability in respect of the envisaged transaction). The types of agreements 
to negotiate that currently meet the certainty requirement and the prospects of further 
development will be examined to determine whether the recognition of such a middle 
ground is possible in South Africa. 
(i) Agreements to negotiate that contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism 
Negotiation clauses can form part of a wide variety of agreements to negotiate and as 
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this analysis proceeds, it will become clear that the type of agreement being dealt with 
has a determinative impact on the enforceability of such agreement. In this section we 
shall consider the first type of agreement, namely the agreement to negotiate that 
contains a deadlock-breaking mechanism. 
In Letaba Sawmills (Pty) Ltd v Majovi (Pty) Ltd 256 (Letaba) parties had concluded 
a lease with an option to renew upon expiry of such lease. The renewal option 
contained a negotiation clause, which required parties to negotiate regarding the rental 
payable “subject to the rental being fixed within the limits of market related prices, the 
timber on the leased property and the rental payable in respect thereof”. In the event 
that they were unable to agree an arbitration provision provided for such rental to be 
determined by an arbitrator.257 The question was whether this negotiation obligation 
was too vague and uncertain and thus rendered the renewal option clause 
unenforceable.  
As a point of departure, the court acknowledged that in the absence of the 
arbitration clause the negotiation clause would be unenforceable. They explained that 
“an agreement to negotiate and to agree on the rent is unenforceable”. The fact that 
parties had set limits within which such rental was to be determined would not affect 
the unenforceability of the agreement to negotiate.258 However, the existence of the 
arbitration clause accompanying the negotiation clause rendered the renewal option 
sufficiently certain to be enforced because it provided a mechanism by which rental 
could be determined if parties could not reach agreement on such rental through 
negotiation.259 
Further clarification regarding agreements to negotiate was provided in the leading 
case of Southernport Development (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd260 (“Southernport”). In this 
case the court confirmed that the legal principles enunciated in the Australian case of 
Coal Cliff Collieries (Pty) Ltd v Sijehama,261 and the three possible types of 
agreements to negotiate identified there, accords with South African law.262 The three 
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types can be summarised as follows. First, there are agreements to negotiate that are 
intended to be binding and therefore contain some deadlock-breaking mechanism to 
resolve disputes.263 Secondly we have agreements that are of such a nature that 
uncertainty or vagueness may be resolved by the court with reference to a “readily 
ascertainable external standard”.264 Lastly there are agreements to negotiate in good 
faith which occur “in the context of an arrangement (to use a neutral term) which, by 
its nature, purpose, context, other provisions or otherwise makes it clear that the 
promise is too illusory or too vague and uncertain to be enforceable.”265  
In Southernport266, Ponnan AJA regarded Premier, Free State v Firechem Free 
State (Pty) Ltd267 as an example of the third type of agreement and explained that the 
agreement to negotiate in that case did not contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism, 
and as such was too uncertain to be enforceable. In Southernport268 the agreement to 
negotiate was held to be certain and thus enforceable due to the presence of an 
arbitration clause that “prescribes what further steps should be followed in the event 
of a deadlock between the parties”.269 In the absence of some deadlock-breaking 
mechanism a court cannot compel parties to agree on outstanding terms of the 
envisaged transaction.270 
In Southernport271 the court emphasises the importance of the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith being linked to a deadlock-breaking provision. This suggests 
that express reference to an obligation to negotiate in good faith is not of itself sufficient 
to render the agreement certain. Enforcing open-ended standards such as good faith 
is difficult if not impossible in the absence of an ascertainable objective standard to 
measure the parties’ conduct.272  
The Southernport principles were confirmed by the Constitutional Court in the more 
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recent decision of Makate v Vodacom.273 In this case the court recognised the validity 
of an agreement to negotiate the compensation payable for Makate’s “please call me 
idea”. The court found that the agreement was valid and enforceable because it 
provided for the CEO of Vodacom to determine the compensation payable if the 
parties were unable to agree.274 The court concluded that price determination by the 
CEO constituted a valid deadlock-breaking mechanism.275 
These cases confirm the position in common-law that agreements to negotiate are 
enforceable if they contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism that can be applied in the 
event that negotiating parties are unable to reach agreement.276 This development 
raises the following question: why does the presence of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism render an otherwise unenforceable agreement to negotiate enforceable? 
It is argued here that the presence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism attaches 
consequences to the failure to negotiate and provides an incentive for the parties to 
comply with their negotiation obligations.277  
There is an important qualification to the enforceability of these types of agreements 
to negotiate. In Southernport, the court explains that a deadlock-breaking mechanism, 
in this case the arbitrator, cannot make the entire contract for the parties “which they 
themselves have not put into words”; “the arbitrator was entrusted with putting flesh 
onto the bones of a contract already concluded by the parties”.278 Therefore we are in 
fact dealing with a specific type of agreement to negotiate that outlines most of the 
terms of the final contract but contains some outstanding terms that have been left to 
future negotiation. This therefore excludes the enforceability of agreements solely 
recording an arrangement to negotiate a second contract in the future and even 
agreements traditionally labelled as MOU’s or term sheets that outline the terms of the 
envisaged transaction in a non-binding manner. 
Hutchison, for purposes of his analysis of agreements to negotiate, assumes that a 
negotiation clause must form part of a preliminary agreement “which is binding and 
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imposes on them [the parties] a set of contractual obligations”, but leaves certain open 
terms to future negotiations in good faith; otherwise the negotiation clause would fall 
into the third category set out in Southernport, which is unenforceable.279 He explains 
with reference to the case of CGEE Alsthom Equipments et Enterprises Electriques, 
South African Division v GKN Sankey (Pty) Ltd280 (“CGEE”) that an agreement can be 
binding notwithstanding the existence of outstanding matters left to further 
negotiation.281 He goes on to indicate that the grey area lies in the enforceability of 
binding preliminary agreements with open terms to be negotiated in good faith where 
there is no deadlock-breaking mechanism.282 In this regard, Jafta J in Makate v 
Vodacom (Pty) Ltd283 explains that: 
“[w]hether an agreement to negotiate in good faith is enforceable where there is no 
deadlock-breaking mechanism remains a grey area of our law. This is because Firechem 
suggests that it is not enforceable, while Everfresh suggests otherwise.”284 
The core issue that we therefore need to address in this chapter is whether South 
African law can and should be developed to enforce agreements to negotiate even in 
the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. This requires the consideration of 
different issues. Firstly, can an agreement to negotiate outstanding terms in good faith 
and an agreement solely recording an arrangement to negotiate a second contract in 
the future be enforceable even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism? 
Secondly what would the content and consequences of the respective agreements to 
negotiate be? Thirdly what would the obligation to negotiate in good faith entail? South 
African courts have thus far used the presence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism to 
determine the validity of a negotiation clause, but have given limited guidance on the 
content of the obligation to negotiate in good faith. Should the law be further developed 
to accord with the legal position in common-law systems such as America and civil-
law systems such as Germany? It is to these questions that our discussion now turns. 
(ii) Pre-contractual agreements that do not contain a deadlock-breaking 
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The effect of the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism on the contractual 
enforceability of negotiation clauses will be considered in the context of agreements 
that outline most of the terms of the principal contract and are intended to be binding. 
It will also be considered in the context of so-called independent agreements to 
negotiate that are entered into prior to the main contract and outline at least some of 
the terms of the principal contract in a non-binding manner or exclusively record an 
arrangement to negotiate the principal contract in the future. Whether the fact that the 
negotiation obligation is expressly stated to be in good faith has an impact on 
enforceability will also be considered.  
In Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd285 the court had to establish whether to grant an interim interdict to the 
applicant. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that their prima facie right in this 
instance arose from an agreement to negotiate a future contract, albeit that it was not 
expressly argued that the negotiations had to be conducted in good faith.286 This 
naturally brought into question the validity of such an agreement to negotiate.287  
In considering this question, Blignault J referred to the Australian case of United 
Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales288 (decided after 
Coal Cliff). He first noted that in United Group there was an express reference to 
“genuine and good faith negotiations” and that the agreement contained an arbitration 
clause,289 but to him this did not constitute a material difference between the two 
cases. According to Blignault J, in terms of South African law it was in principle 
possible to imply standards of reasonableness and good faith into an agreement. He 
then proceeded to give the practical example of the implied standard of arbitrium boni 
viri being applied to validate contract provisions, which would otherwise be too vague 
to enforce.290 Crucially, according to Blignault J, this standard could potentially be 
implied into agreements to negotiate: 
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“In principle it seems to me that a standard such as the arbitrium boni viri could be applied 
to the conduct of a contracting party who undertakes an obligation to negotiate a further 
agreement. Such a party would be obliged to act honestly and reasonably in the conduct 
of the negotiations and a court would be able to determine whether it complied with such 
standards.”291  
After considering and settling the insignificance of the first distinction relating to the 
wording of the clauses, Blignault J considered a second distinction between the cases, 
namely the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism (more specifically an 
arbitration clause) in the preliminary agreement he was faced with. He then reached 
the following conclusion: 
“In my view, however, the absence of an agreed reference of a dispute to an arbitrator is 
not a vital point of distinction. The arbitrator would in such a case be expected to apply 
standards of reasonableness and good faith to the conduct of the negotiating parties … 
[T]he process of the application of such standards by a court would not in principle differ 
from that to be applied by an arbitrator.”292 
This represents an important development. It is argued that even in the absence of a 
deadlock-breaking mechanism, an agreement to negotiate can be enforceable 
because it imposes upon the parties an implied obligation to negotiate honestly and 
reasonably, and compliance can be objectively determined by the courts.293 This 
renders the duty sufficiently certain to be enforced.294 The obiter dictum statements of 
Moseneke DCJ and the minority judgment of Yacoob J in Everfresh Market Virginia 
(Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd295 (“Everfresh”) also seem to support this 
proposition.296  
McKerrow297 highlights that the court a quo’s judgment in Brink v The Premier of 
the State Province (“Brink”)298 is also of potential interest as far as agreements to 
negotiate without a deadlock-breaking mechanism are concerned. This case dealt with 
a clause in a lease granting an option of renewal on the same terms or new terms as 
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agreed upon.299 The court in effect found that this clause imposed an obligation to 
negotiate new terms where necessary, and the parties could not refuse to comply with 
such obligation.300 This decision stands in strong contrast to preceding case law such 
as Southernport and Letaba Sawmills where the necessity of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism was confirmed.301 The court302 referred to a dictum in Biloden Properties 
(Pty) Ltd v Wilson303 explaining that where negotiations fail, there will be no contract, 
but parties would still have been obliged to negotiate in an attempt to reach 
agreement.304 Once this obligation has been discharged there will be no further 
obligations if negotiations fail to produce a contract.305 Again, it bears pointing out that 
an agreement to negotiate is not an agreement to agree. It is unfortunate, though, that 
when the matter came before the Supreme Court of Appeal, this aspect was not 
addressed.306 The high court decision regarding the enforceability of a negotiation 
clause has therefore yet to be scrutinised.307 
The enforceability of agreements to negotiate even in the absence of a deadlock-
breaking mechanism came before the Constitutional Court for the first time in the 
Everfresh308 case. This case dealt with the validity and enforceability of a clause in a 
lease which gave a right of renewal on the same terms and conditions, save the rental 
which was to be agreed upon by the parties.309 The court a quo reached the conclusion 
that agreements to agree are unenforceable, and even if such a clause imposed an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith, it would still be unenforceable due to 
vagueness.310 Everfresh, seeking leave to appeal in the Constitutional Court, raised a 
new argument that the common-law on agreements to negotiate requires development 
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to accord with public policy and constitutional values.311 The majority refused to grant 
leave to appeal on the basis of Everfresh’s failure to raise this argument in the court a 
quo.312  
The court, nonetheless, went on to consider whether Everfresh’s argument had any 
prospects of success. Some important observations were made in this regard, which 
may in the future inform the development of the South African legal position regarding 
agreements to negotiate. 
Moseneke DCJ recognised that the common-law may require parties to an 
agreement to negotiate, to “try and reach agreement” on the outstanding terms of their 
agreement.313 He concluded that: 
“If that were so, then the parties’ bargain was that they would try to agree, and the age-old 
contractual doctrine that agreements solemnly made should be honoured and enforced 
(pacta sunt servanda) would bolster Everfresh’s case that the law should be developed to 
make an agreement of this kind enforceable.” 314 
It is of fundamental significance that the court did not regard the presence of a 
deadlock-breaking mechanism as a prerequisite to the enforceability of the agreement 
to negotiate.315  
In light of Indwe and Everfresh it is somewhat surprising that in the case of Roazar 
v Falls Supermarket CC316 (“Roazar”) the court again confirmed the principles as set 
forth in the Southernport case, making no reference to the case of Indwe. The court 
found that the presence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism is a prerequisite for 
validity.317 The court went on to consider whether the common-law in this regard 
requires development.318 The observations of Lewis319 regarding the problems with 
developing the common-law were noted by the court.320 These included determining 
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how to develop the common-law to enforce agreements to negotiate, what a duty to 
negotiate in good faith entails, how it would be enforced and how courts would handle 
disputes regarding outstanding terms.321  
The court concluded that these complications were illustrated by the present case. 
The contract did not provide the length of time for which the parties were obliged to 
negotiate, or the criteria to determine whether parties negotiated in good faith. It is 
unclear how a court should resolve this.322 Roazar no longer wished to enter into the 
lease agreement and in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism, disputes 
could not be resolved.323 The court did not want to impose upon the parties a contract 
that they did not intend.324 
The Roazar decision as well as the line of supporting preceding case law was 
confirmed in the most recent case of Sheperd Real Estate Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Roux Le Roux Motors CC.325 The Supreme Court of Appeal once again concluded 
that an agreement to negotiate is unenforceable in the absence of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism and relied on both local and English case law (discussed in this thesis) to 
justify its position.326 In doing so however, the court failed to refer to the Everfresh 
decision at all and only referred to the Indwe decision in passing. It is unclear why the 
courts failed to consider these cases, or to explain why the reasoning in these cases 
should not be applied.  
These more recent judgments, seem inconsistent with the obiter views expressed 
by the Constitutional Court in Everfresh, which suggested that the common-law could 
be developed to enforce such an agreement to negotiate. Furthermore, some of the 
complications to the development of the common-law, as highlighted in Roazar, may 
have been overstated, particularly in light of the solutions provided by Indwe. The 
merits of the arguments made by Lewis, which were relied upon in Roazar, will be 
considered in light of contrasting arguments and potential solutions provided by other 
academics.  
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The two aspects to address are potential solutions to uncertainty regarding the 
absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism and the content of the obligation to 
negotiate, which presumably has to be in good faith.  
(a) Solutions to the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism  
Academics have proposed various solutions to resolve this uncertainty. Hutchison 
draws an analogy between pre-emption contracts and agreements to negotiate 
outstanding terms in good faith.327 Pre-emption contracts give rise to similar 
conceptual issues regarding the requirement of certainty but are nevertheless 
enforceable. This analogy is insightful because it reveals that courts by recognising 
pre-emption contracts are willing to enforce “a duty to negotiate an agreement at a 
future date.”328 Furthermore this obligation has been interpreted by the courts to 
require a “bone fide” offer to be made by the grantor.329 This is significant, because 
the pre-emption contract is enforceable in principle, even in the absence of a deadlock-
breaking mechanism, and it appears to require parties to act in good faith.330 Bhana 
similarly suggests that the “legal reasoning used to justify the validity of the pre-
emption contract” may also be used to recognise the validity of agreements to 
negotiate.331 
Hutchison and Bhana also draw a further analogy between agreements to negotiate 
outstanding terms and contracts granting a “unilateral power” to one of the parties to 
vary or determine the outstanding term(s) of a contract.332 Courts have recognised the 
validity of such a power, if it is exercised with the arbitrium bono viri.333 Hutchison 
expresses the view that this principle could be extended to allow a court or tribunal to 
determine outstanding terms in a binding preliminary agreement that essentially 
confers a bilateral discretion upon the parties.334 He argues that if consensus has been 
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reached on the majority of the terms of the contract, it would not be “too big a stretch” 
for the court to determine an outstanding term such as the purchase price or rental 
based on what is objectively reasonable.335 Good faith (as an underlying value of 
contract law) and public policy could constitute an appropriate means of limiting such 
a power.336 This power could be available as an optional remedy for courts faced with 
breach of an obligation to negotiate in good faith.337 Hutchison concludes that “good 
faith or some other standard of objective reasonableness or fairness” could be utilised 
as an underlying basis for the development of the law to enforce agreements to 
negotiate even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism.338 
At this point it is necessary to draw attention to the distinction between subjective 
good faith and objective good faith. Subjective good faith is a subjective state of mind 
requiring honesty and the absence of bad faith.339 Objective good faith in contrast is 
an objective standard which encompasses a duty of reciprocity, fair dealing and 
“having regard for the legitimate interests of the other party”.340  
McKerrow suggests that the common-law should be developed so that good faith, 
as an objective standard, is applied to impart certainty on the obligations imposed by 
an agreement to negotiate.341 He argues that this standard of objective 
reasonableness can also be utilised by courts to fulfil the function of “deadlock 
breaker” and thus remedy the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism in the event 
of breach of certain agreements to negotiate.342 The possibility of good faith, as an 
objective standard, being applied to enforce agreements to negotiate will be 
considered in more detail below.343 
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mechanism in order to evaluate whether it is essential to the validity of the agreement 
to negotiate. If parties intended to be bound by the agreement notwithstanding 
outstanding terms but failed to include a deadlock-breaking mechanism, then it should 
in theory be possible for the court to remedy that failure by fulfilling a deadlock-
breaking function. This proposal is qualified insofar as it would require that the court 
merely be adding “flesh to the bones of a contract already concluded”, or those terms 
should be readily ascertainable. There are strict requirements that must be met for this 
type of agreement to come into existence. Firstly, it must be clear from the agreement 
that parties intend to be bound by the contract irrespective of the outcome of 
negotiations and that they did not merely intend to impose an obligation to negotiate. 
Secondly, it must be possible for the court to derive a guiding standard or framework 
which can be applied to determine the outstanding terms. In the absence of such a 
framework the courts would be displacing party autonomy and imposing contractual 
terms on the parties which they neither agreed to nor intended. 
The absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism, however could well indicate the 
absence of an intention to be bound by the substantive terms of the contract 
irrespective of the outcome of negotiations. If for example, the intention of parties to 
be bound by the terms of the agreement is dependent upon reaching consensus on 
open terms, then a failure to agree would result in an absence of an intention to be 
bound. If parties cannot reach agreement on outstanding terms, they may not wish to 
be bound by the agreement at all, even if outstanding terms could be determined by 
the application of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. In this situation it is necessary to 
ask what parties intended by including an obligation to negotiate. Did they intend to 
bind themselves to a legal obligation to conclude the envisaged contract, to negotiate 
in good faith in an attempt to reach agreement, or were they merely concluding an 
agreement akin to a gentleman’s agreement that is not binding.  
The concerns raised by Lewis and the court in Roazar regarding the uncertainty of 
agreements to negotiate in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism conflate 
agreements to agree and agreements to negotiate.344 Scholars criticising the 
traditional legal position have been particularly vocal regarding the courts’ 
 





interpretation of all agreements to negotiate as providing a guarantee that the 
envisaged main contract will be concluded, whereas an agreement to negotiate only 
increases the likelihood of the principal contract being concluded.345 In Schwartz NO 
v Pike,346 the court alludes to the difference between an agreement to negotiate and 
an unenforceable agreement to agree.347 In this regard a comparison can also be 
drawn between agreements to negotiate and pre-emption contracts.348 A pre-emption 
contract also does not guarantee the conclusion of the envisaged transaction.349 
In Everfresh,350 for example, it was clear that the parties did not contemplate that 
the agreement to negotiate would oblige them to conclude the substantive 
agreement.351 In fact, clause 3 of the agreement set out the consequences in the event 
that consensus was not reached. While the High Court’s conclusion was based on the 
premise that an agreement to negotiate obliges conclusion of the substantive 
contract,352 the Constitutional Court seems to recognise that an agreement to 
negotiate does not necessarily guarantee successful negotiations and contract 
conclusion.353 This is particularly apparent from the focus that the court placed on 
attributing a legal content to the “obligation to negotiate in good faith”.354  
From this it is possible to infer that as long as parties have negotiated in good faith 
they will have complied with their obligation.355 If this is indeed the case, then it may 
be necessary to re-evaluate the need for a deadlock-breaking mechanism as a pre-
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requisite for enforceability in South African law.356  
It could be argued that the presence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism rather 
influences the type of agreement to negotiate, the nature of the contractual obligations 
and the type of remedies available.357 Thus, the presence of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism indicates the parties’ intention to bound by the contract irrespective of the 
outcome of negotiations, as the mechanism is invoked if parties are unable to agree.358 
It is proposed that the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism in an agreement 
to negotiate may indicate that the parties do not intend to be bound by the future 
principal contract irrespective of the outcome of negotiations, but nonetheless intend 
to be bound by an obligation to negotiate in good faith. If parties have negotiated in 
good faith, their obligation will have been discharged even if no principal contract is 
concluded.359 The absence of the deadlock-breaking mechanism will only become 
relevant once it is determined that parties failed to negotiate in good faith. The question 
that arises is whether the courts can in those circumstances enforce the principal 
contract by performing a deadlock-breaking function as a remedy for breach. 
(b) Giving content to the obligation to negotiate  
Determining the content of the obligation to negotiate is particularly important where 
there is no deadlock-breaking mechanism to establish what the consequences of a 
failure to negotiate are in order to render the obligation sufficiently certain to be 
enforceable.  
It would appear that a negotiation obligation requires parties to act “reasonably and 
honestly in the course of negotiations.360 Some agreements will expressly refer to 
good faith, but even if it is not referred to, Indwe seems to suggest that it can be implied 
in giving content to the obligation to negotiate. If this is accepted the next question is 
what an obligation to negotiate in good faith entails.  
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In Makate361 the court stated that it was both difficult and undesirable “to lay down 
an objective standard of good faith bargaining which the parties must undertake”. The 
court accepted that an obligation to negotiate in good faith, precludes parties from 
negotiating in bad faith.362 Hutchison argues that to impose an objective standard of 
good faith negotiations would excessively hinder “legitimate hard bargaining”.363 He 
suggests that the obligation to negotiate in good faith should preclude bad faith, which 
requires “something akin to dolus”.364 An example of bad faith in this context is where 
one of party deliberately intends “to string the other party along without intending to 
agree”.365  
McKerrow disagrees and argues that because all contracts are bonae fidei,366 the 
positive obligation of good faith is imported into all “contractual interactions” and this 
imposes a substantially higher standard than merely precluding bad faith conduct.367 
He suggests that whether an obligation to negotiate in good faith has been breached 
should be determined with reference to good faith as an objective standard.368 In Silent 
Pond Investments CC v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd369 the court concluded that a clause 
imposing an obligation on the parties to implement a contract in good faith was not too 
uncertain to be enforceable and imposed an obligation on the parties to behave in a 
way that will not prejudice the rights, interests or assets of the other party.  
It is argued here that an agreement to negotiate imposes no more than an obligation 
to abstain from bad faith conduct. To impose upon the parties a positive obligation to 
act in good faith set a much too onerous standard and prevents the efficient conclusion 
of business transactions. It is for this very reason that in terms of American law an 
agreement to negotiate excludes bad faith conduct. Parties should still be able to 
pursue their own interests and derive the most economically advantageous deal, but 
they must avoid bad faith conduct in doing so. 
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(iii) Conclusions that can be drawn from the comparative observations  
English and South African law seem to adopt a similar approach to agreements to 
negotiate and only enforce negotiation clauses in contracts that contain deadlock-
breaking mechanisms. However, the analysis of South African case law above 
promises the possibility that agreements to negotiate may be enforceable in the future 
even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism.  
It is proposed here that South African contract law has reached a stage where it 
can be developed to enforce what is referred to in American law as type II preliminary 
agreements. This type of agreement does not guarantee conclusion of the principal 
contract, but it does bind parties to negotiate in good faith towards conclusion of such 
contract. In this regard the approach to tendering contracts in English law and the 
public procurement process in terms of South African administrative law can inform 
development of the law of contract in its regulation of agreements to negotiate. 370 
Although in the South African administrative law context one is essentially dealing with 
a legal as opposed to contractual duty to negotiate in good faith, the enforcement of 
such an obligation in the administrative law context nevertheless bolsters the 
conclusion that the uncertainty and difficulty in enforcing a contractual obligation to 
negotiate in good faith is not sufficiently significant to justify its unenforceability. In fact, 
the rationale for the enforcement of an obligation to negotiate in good faith in an 
administrative law context, as derived from case law,371 is essentially based on “an 
innovative private law analysis”, 372 namely that parties to an agreement to agree are 
required to act in good faith and a court is able to determine whether a party has 
complied with that obligation.373  
It may even be possible to enforce negotiation obligations contained in agreements 
that may be likened to the agreement with open terms in American law. However, 
South African courts should be cautious with the latter type of agreement and take 
heed of the warnings of Sanders that these types of agreements are difficult to 
distinguish from agreements to negotiate (which do not guarantee the materialisation 
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of the final contract) and unenforceable agreements to agree. South African law in 
developing its precedent on the content and legal consequences of agreements to 
negotiate can take guidance from the substantial American case law and literature 
dealing with these agreements.  
3 2 3 Partial (inchoate) or incomplete agreements  
Although in chapter 2, we referred to partial agreements, there is no reference to this 
term in South African case law, and partial agreements do not have a legal definition. 
Therefore, for purposes of this chapter we shall refer to partial agreements as inchoate 
agreements. Inchoate or provisional agreements facilitate negotiations towards the 
conclusion of a final contract, but as long as essential terms are missing no contract 
will come into existence.374 The analysis of the legal nature of inchoate agreements 
often focuses on the certainty requirement, and some cases have concluded that no 
contract arises from such an agreement due to uncertainty or vagueness.375 While this 
may be true, as Bradfield argues in the context of South African law, the most 
appropriate analysis of an inchoate agreement reached in the course of continuing 
negotiations is that it is not binding due to an absence of an animus contrahendi.376 
The same approach will be adopted in this thesis. Inchoate agreements will therefore 
be considered more comprehensively when investigating the animus contrahendi 
requirement. It is to this requirement that the discussion now turns. 
3 3 Animus contrahendi  
As indicated above, the animus contrahendi or intention to create binding obligations 
is one of the pre-requisites for contract formation.377 The presence of such an intention 
distinguishes contracts from other types of non-contractual agreements.378 In 
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Conradie v Rossouw379 the court explained that for an agreement to constitute a 
contract it must be entered into “seriously and deliberately and with the intention that 
a lawful obligation should be established.” Determining the existence or absence of 
an intention to create legal obligations can be difficult, particularly in cases concerning 
pre-contractual agreements.380 The question that arises is whether the parties 
intended their transaction to be given effect to through a number of contracts or by 
way of one comprehensive contract embodying all the terms.381 A pre-contractual 
agreement could constitute the principal contract (in all but name), a contract to 
negotiate, or a non-binding agreement outlining the terms of the envisaged 
transaction.382 The type of agreement will depend on the intention of the parties,383 
and whether the specific jurisdiction is willing to contractually enforce such agreement. 
When examining the application of the animus contrahendi requirement to pre-
contractual agreements from a comparative perspective it is important to recognise 
certain differences between the various legal systems. In terms of English and 
American law the presence of an intention to be bound is not sufficient for a contract 
to be created.384 For a valid contract to arise, it is necessary for such an intention to 
be accompanied by some form of consideration in exchange for a party assuming 
obligations.385 This requirement does not exist in South African law and the presence 
of animus contrahendi is sufficient to create a contract.386 The English law test for 
determining such intention is an objective one, and if the agreement meets all the other 
validity requirements it is generally presumed that the parties intended to be legally 
bound.387 There is also a rebuttable presumption that business agreements are 
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intended to be legally binding.388  
South African courts will consider both objective and subjective factors in 
ascertaining the intention of the parties. 389 The general point of departure in South 
African law is that parties must express a subjective intention to be bound, but there 
are often circumstances where parties will be held contractually liable on the basis of 
the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent, which entails an objective enquiry.390  
In terms of American law, intent fulfils a crucial function in assessing the extent to 
which parties will be bound by a pre-contractual agreement.391 The test for intention is 
not subjective, but is a factual enquiry requiring inferences to be drawn from the 
agreement and surrounding circumstances.392  
The animus contrahendi requirement will now be applied to agreements with 
clauses negating legal liability, agreements to negotiate and inchoate or incomplete 
agreements. These types of agreements in particular bring the animus contrahendi 
requirement into question because they are uncertain and incomplete or have clauses 
specifically negating the intention to be bound. The impact that uncertainty or 
incompleteness and clauses negating liability have on the enforceability of the pre-
contractual agreement must therefore be considered.  
3 3 1 Agreements with clauses negating liability  
As we have seen, the intention to create legal obligations is a pre-requisite to contract 
formation. It follows therefore that where parties have expressed an intention not to 
be bound, no contract can come into existence.393 In chapter 2, the clauses potentially 
negating legal liability were considered. Where parties include such a clause in their 
agreement this reflects the opposite intention to that of having the animus contrahendi 
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and create no more than a moral obligation.394 
A “subject to contract” clause is one of the clauses potentially negating legal 
liability.395 Parties may choose to settle the details of an envisaged transaction in an 
informal pre-contractual agreement but intend to embody the final agreement in a 
formal contract; this may be based on the understanding that no contractual 
obligations will arise until execution of such contract.396 It can be challenging, however, 
to determine whether the inclusion of a “subject to contract” clause is indeed intended 
to indicate such an understanding.397 For this reason, it is necessary to consider, with 
reference to the legal position in different jurisdictions, the consequences of making a 
pre-contractual agreement subject to contract. 
3 3 1 1 South African law  
In terms of South African law, an agreement made subject to contract will generally 
not give rise to a binding contract because it indicates that parties do not yet regard 
the agreement as legally binding.398 In Command Protection Services (Gauteng) Pty 
Ltd t/a Maxi Security v South African Post Office Ltd,399 a letter of appointment was 
made subject to the conclusion of a formal contract and the court concluded that no 
contract could come into existence until this requirement was met.400 
In Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd401 the parties concluded a letter that made 
reference to conclusion of a more comprehensive agreement if necessary. Coleman 
J explained that in this case the question is whether in the absence of a more 
comprehensive agreement, “the parties will not be bound as they intend and desire to 
be”.402 He concluded that while conclusion of a more comprehensive agreement may 
have been desirable it was not necessary.403 In Commissioner, South African 
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Revenue Services v Capstone 557 (Pty)404 Ltd the parties concluded a memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) outlining the key terms of their transaction. The parties 
envisaged that this agreement would be superseded by a final written contract, but 
nonetheless agreed that the MOU gave rise to a binding preliminary contract.405 
It is possible that parties could make their agreement subject to writing and agree 
that they will not be legally bound until their agreement has been reduced to writing 
and signed by both of the parties.406 In Goldblatt v Fremantle,407 the court explained 
that whether an agreement made subject to writing gives rise to a valid contract is 
ultimately a question of construction. There is a presumption that a subject to writing 
clause is not intended to serve as a “pre-condition” to validity of the contract but rather 
as evidence or record of the agreement.408 In cases of uncertainty, the court will 
consider the language of the agreement, the conduct of the parties and the 
surrounding circumstances to ascertain the parties’ intention.409 
3 3 1 2 Foreign law  
In terms of American law, parties generally have the autonomy to bind themselves 
contractually in whatever manner they wish, and informal agreements can constitute 
valid contracts.410 It is, however, entirely possible that parties wish to maintain their 
freedom and not to be bound by contractual obligations, notwithstanding the fact that 
they concluded an informal agreement reflecting consensus on all the details of the 
envisaged transaction.411 Parties can maintain their freedom of negotiation, if they 
clearly express an intention not to be bound.412  
Whether a pre-contractual agreement subject to a future contract will give rise to a 
valid contract is wholly dependent upon the intention of the parties.413 If parties 
intended to be immediately bound prior to execution of a formal contract, then the 
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informal agreement will constitute a binding contract.414 Judge Leval in Tribune Co415 
classified this agreement as a type I preliminary agreement; execution of a formal 
contract is desirable, but not necessary for contract formation.416 
American courts take certain factors into account when determining whether a pre-
contractual agreement subject to contract is intended to be binding or provisional and 
non-binding.417 For example if the transaction is large and complex there is a greater 
likelihood that the informal communications and agreements are intended to be 
provisional and thus not binding.418 Section 27 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts lists useful factors that can be applied to determine whether the requisite 
animus contrahendi is present in an agreement subject to contract.419 New York courts 
apply a slightly different four-factor test to determine the intent of parties in concluding 
a pre-contractual agreement.420 This test is derived from Winston v Mediafare 
Entertainment Corporation421 (“Winston”) and requires consideration of the following: 
“(1) whether there has been an express reservation of the right not to be bound in the 
absence of a writing; (2) whether there has been partial performance of the contract; (3) 
whether all of the terms of the alleged contract have been agreed upon; and (4) whether 
the agreement at issue is the type of contract that is usually committed to writing.”422  
The context in which negotiations took place is also significant, and in some cases is 
considered by a court as a fifth factor, although it often overlaps with other factors.423 
A court considering the context may also look to the language of the agreement, for 
example, the existence of a condition precedent in a pre-contractual agreement 
generally indicates the absence of an intention to be bound.424 
These factors are not individually decisive in ascertaining the intention of the 
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parties; rather, each one constitutes a valuable guiding principle.425 In cases of 
uncertainty or ambiguity, American courts may rely on the presumption that pre-
contractual agreements are not binding.426 While the “subject to contract” clause is an 
important factor for determining whether the preliminary agreement gives rise to a 
contract, it is not conclusive, particularly if the agreement contains other language 
reflecting an intention to be bound.427  
American courts will first apply the all or nothing approach to ascertain whether the 
pre-contractual agreement constitutes a principal contract.428 If not, the enquiry does 
not necessarily end here. Courts in some states may go on to consider whether the 
otherwise non-binding pre-contractual agreement gives rise to other intermediate 
contractual obligations.429 Some states recognise that pre-contractual agreements can 
impose an obligation to negotiate.430 American courts use the criterion of intent to 
distinguish whether a pre-contractual agreement gives rise to the principal contract or 
a contract to negotiate and to identify specific contractual obligations in an otherwise 
non-binding agreement.431 
England adopts a similar legal position to South Africa and America regarding 
clauses negating legal liability.432 In Rose and Frank v Crompton Bros Ltd,433 for 
example, the agreement was unenforceable due to such a clause. In terms of English 
and American law, where an agreement contains all the material terms of the 
envisaged transaction, very clear language negating legal liability will be required to 
prevent contract formation.434 Generally, pre-contractual agreements subject to 
contract are regarded as non-binding.435 English courts recognise that the parties’ 
conduct in negotiations, the language of the agreement, and the parties’ subsequent 
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conduct can result in a finding that a subject to contract clause did not prevent contract 
formation.436 
3 3 2 Agreements to negotiate  
From the preceding section, it is clear that a pre-contractual agreement outlining the 
terms of the envisaged transaction will not give rise to the principal contract if it 
contains some clause negating legal liability. Such agreements may still give rise to 
an obligation to negotiate in good faith.437 While American courts recognise this 
possibility,438 English courts are unlikely to enforce this obligation due to the clause 
negating legal liability.439  
The main obstacle to the enforceability of agreements to negotiate is uncertainty 
(as discussed above). 440 In the English case of Barbudev v Eurocom Cable 
Management Bulgaria Eood441 the parties intended to be contractually bound by an 
express obligation to negotiate in good faith, but the agreement was nevertheless 
unenforceable due to uncertainty. However, in American law this obligation can be 
sufficiently certain, which still makes it necessary to consider whether there is an 
intention to be bound. The test for determining such an intention has been dealt with 
at great length in case law and literature. American courts require express language 
in the agreement manifesting the intention to create a legally binding undertaking to 
negotiate in good faith, but also look to the construction of the agreement and the 
surrounding circumstances.442  
Courts apply the four-factor test set out in the Winston case to determine the 
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intention to be bound by an obligation to negotiate .443 In Tribune Co, Judge Leval 
explained that this test, which is generally applied to determine the existence of a final 
preliminary contract, has to be applied differently to agreements to negotiate.444 For 
example, the existence of outstanding terms would usually weigh heavily against a 
finding that a principal contract had come into existence. However, in the context of 
an agreement to negotiate, this factor would not weigh as heavily, because the very 
purpose of such agreement is to bind parties to negotiate those outstanding terms.445 
Furthermore, reference to further approvals may indicate the absence of an intention 
to enter into the final contract, but it does not necessarily indicate that parties do not 
intend a contract to negotiate.446 Courts should be cautious not to impose obligations 
on the parties which they did not intend.447 
3 3 3 Inchoate or incomplete agreements  
Inchoate or incomplete agreements could record the terms upon which consensus has 
been reached and facilitate the negotiation of the remaining terms of the envisaged 
transaction.448 If the principal contract is not concluded, it is possible that one of the 
parties will seek enforcement of the inchoate agreement as a valid contract.449 One 
main obstacle to an inchoate agreement giving rise to a binding contract is the 
absence of the animus contrahendi. 
3 3 3 1 South African Law  
Generally, inchoate agreements are intended to be provisional non-binding records of 
negotiations; the absence of the animus contrahendi therefore prevents contractual 
obligations from arising.450 However, reference in an incomplete or inchoate 
agreement to further terms to be negotiated will not necessarily give rise to an 
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inference that the agreement was intended to be only provisional or non-binding.451 
The parties could, for example, intend that missing terms would be provided on the 
basis of what is “usual, or reasonable, or on which there can be no dispute”.452 It is 
also possible that the parties intended that the rules of the common law would provide 
the missing terms.453  
When considering the legal nature of an incomplete agreement, Pitout v North Cape 
Livestock Co-operative Ltd454 provided that it is necessary to ask the following 
question: 
“[w]as the undertaking an offer made, animo contrahendi, which upon acceptance would 
give rise to an enforceable contract, or was it merely a proposal made … while the parties 
were in the process of negotiating and were feeling their way towards a more precise and 
comprehensive agreement? This is essentially a question to be decided upon the facts of 
the particular case.” 
The court concluded that the arrangement in this case was made in the course of 
incomplete negotiations and did not acquire contractual force, because it was no more 
than a proposal made during negotiations which if successful would have culminated 
in a final contract.455  
Various cases explain the types of circumstances that prevent an incomplete 
agreement from giving rise to a binding contract. In Kenilworth Palace investments 
(Pty) Ltd v Ingala456 the parties formulated heads of agreement. Friedman J concluded 
that the heads of agreement were not capable of “standing on their own”.457 The 
parties contemplated “that certain other agreements, which were essential to the 
validity of the heads of agreement, would be in existence when that agreement was 
signed”.458 An agreement that makes reference to annexures that are not in existence 
at the time of its conclusion will also not constitute a binding contract; it is inchoate.459  
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Parties will lack the animus contrahendi if an agreement is concluded solely for 
purposes of assisting parties in further negotiations.460 In OK Bazaars v Bloch,461 for 
example, the court concluded from the evidence before it that an agreement reached 
in the course of negotiations, outlining the essential terms of a contract of sale, was 
not binding because parties contemplated that outstanding material terms would be 
resolved by their respective attorneys and be embodied in a formal contract. In Titaco 
Projects (Pty) Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd462 the court found that a settlement 
agreement amounted to no more than a “basic framework for an agreement or an 
‘agreement in principle’” and that the parties lacked the animus contrahendi, because 
material terms regarding specifications had yet to be negotiated and agreed upon.  
An agreement will not give rise to a valid contract if there are material terms 
outstanding and parties do not intend to be bound until such terms have been agreed 
upon.463 Whether outstanding terms are material will be determined with reference to 
the agreement itself and evidence of the parties’ conduct during negotiations and after 
agreement conclusion.464 It appears that inessential terms may be left to further 
negotiation without the validity of the contract being affected.465  
It is indeed possible for the parties to enter into a binding contract, despite expressly 
or impliedly leaving important outstanding terms to future negotiation or having agreed 
to conclude a comprehensive contract in the near future.466 If consensus is reached 
on the outstanding matters, the complete contract will supersede the initial contract, 
but if not, the initial contract will stand.467  
The court in CGEE Alsthom 468 stated that “[w]hether in a particular case the initial 
agreement acquires contractual force or not depends upon the intention of the parties, 
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which is to be gathered from their conduct, the terms of the agreement and the 
surrounding circumstances”.469 In this case, the appellants sent a telex to the 
respondents, informing them that their tender had been accepted.470 The question is 
whether in light of all the surrounding circumstances, the acceptance of the tender by 
telex could give rise to a binding contract.471 
The court conceded that there were a number of outstanding terms and that a 
comprehensive contract had yet to be concluded,472 but emphasised that this does not 
necessarily deprive an agreement of contractual force.473 The outstanding terms, 
which the appellants regarded as important, were a factor weighing heavily against 
the existence of a contract.474 There were, however other, compelling factors, namely 
the unconditional wording of the telex, the surrounding circumstances, and the 
subsequent conduct of the parties. 475  
Ultimately, the court found that the wording in the telex “we have the pleasure of 
informing you that the order has been awarded to yourselves”, in the circumstances 
could only be construed as an unqualified acceptance of the offer, thus creating a 
binding contract.476 
Thus far the focus was on the need for an animus contrahendi in the sense of an 
actual, subjective intention to be bound. However, sometimes a party may be bound 
even in the absence of such an intention, due to instruments such as the doctrine of 
quasi-mutual assent.477 If one party creates a “reasonable impression in the mind of 
the other party” that he intends a contract to arise from the agreement, and the latter 
enters into such agreement on the basis of such impression, a binding contract can 
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The practical application of the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent to a preliminary 
agreement is illustrated by MV Navigator (no 1): Wellness International Network Ltd v 
MV Navigator.479 While there was no subjective meeting of the minds in this case, it 
still had to be established whether the claimant had been reasonably led to believe 
that the other party, by an exchange of emails, intended to conclude a contract of 
sale.480 The test is an objective one, which takes into account the knowledge that the 
claimant had and could reasonably have acquired.481 The court found that due to the 
nature of the communications, the outstanding terms, and reference to the execution 
of a formal contract, a reasonable person would not have been misled to believe that 
the owner intended to be bound by a contract on the basis of email correspondence.482 
This case nonetheless confirms that it is indeed possible for an initial agreement to 
give rise to a binding contract on the basis of this doctrine. 
3 3 3 2 Foreign law  
As a point of departure, the American and English legal systems generally also regard 
incomplete or inchoate agreements to be non-binding. However, an inchoate 
agreement can sometimes constitute a contract despite important matters having 
been left to future negotiation.483 This was confirmed in the English case of Bear 
Stearns Bank plc v Forum Global Equity Ltd,484 where only the subject matter and 
price had been agreed upon. Such an agreement could be valid, unless the absence 
of consensus on outstanding terms renders the agreement uncertain or parties do not 
intend to be bound until such terms have been agreed upon.485 In the American case 
of Borg-Warner Corp v Anchor Couple Co486 the court concluded that a pre-contractual 
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agreement with open terms could constitute a contract binding parties to their original 
agreement with missing terms being supplied by the court if the parties are unable to 
agree.487 The PICC also confirm that if parties intend to conclude a contract, the 
existence of open terms left to future negotiation will not necessarily prevent contract 
formation, if there is an alternative mechanism for rendering those terms certain.488 
3 4 Public policy, and the values of good faith and ubuntu 
There is considerable debate over the role of fairness, reasonableness and the value 
of good faith in the law of contract.489 For present purposes, the focus will be on the 
extent to which these values can influence the determination of the validity of pre-
contractual agreements. Lewis confirms that these values are regularly relied on as 
factors in the evaluation of the contractual enforceability of agreements.490 In fact, she 
argues that this has to some extent resulted in the importance of other foundational 
values of contract law, such as certainty in contract, being overlooked.491 Certainty is 
of particular importance in commercial dealings.492 It is a fundamental principle of 
contract law that parties should observe their agreements unless they are contrary to 
public policy.493 
In Barkhuizen v Napier,494 Ngcobo J, delivering judgment for the majority, explained 
that the constitutionally-recognised values of ubuntu and good faith can inform public 
policy.495 Hutchison describes good faith as “an ethical value or controlling principle, 
based on community standards of decency and fairness that underlies and informs 
substantive contract law”.496 This thesis does not seek to extensively analyse the 
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proper role of the broader value of good faith in the South African law of contract, but 
this concept will be touched upon insofar as it influences the enforceability of 
agreements to negotiate. 
Public policy may demand the preservation and promotion of good faith and ubuntu 
in contractual relationships, and arguably requires the enforcement of pre-contractual 
understandings that foster mutual respect and regard for each other’s interests, or at 
the very least requires of parties to abstain from bad faith conduct in the course of 
negotiations. However, freedom of contract, which includes freedom not to contract 
and contractual autonomy, is also regarded as one of the fundamental values in the 
South African contract law.497 Upholding these values may in turn be necessary to 
promote commercial growth and efficiency.498  
The underlying values of good faith and ubuntu therefore have to be balanced with 
the notions of certainty, freedom of contract and party autonomy.499 This brings into 
question the validity of certain pre-contractual agreements that potentially undermine 
legal certainty and deprive parties of their autonomy by limiting their freedom of 
contract, including the right to terminate negotiations.500 
In Walford,501 an English case, the court refused to recognise an agreement to 
negotiate in good faith because it was “inherently repugnant to the adversarial position 
of the parties when involved in negotiations.”502 Cumberbatch argues that the 
reluctance of the court to enforce such an agreement was primarily based on public 
policy, because such an agreement infringes on freedom of contract and party 
autonomy.503 Cohen in turn argues that this decision protects “negative freedom from 
contract”, allowing parties to avoid obligations until a final contract has been 
concluded.504 Cumberbatch rejects this notion, arguing that the value of freedom of 
 
497 Lewis 2013 THRHR 84. 
498 Hutchison 2011 SALJ 290. 
499 Lewis 2013 THRHR 83; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 28-30; McKerrow 2017 Stell 
LR 326.  
500 Bhana & Broeders 2014 THRHR 173; McKerrow 2017 Stell LR 326. 
501 [1992] 2 AC 128 129. 
502 129. 
503 “In Freedom’s Cause: The Contract to Negotiate” (1992) 12(4) Oxford J Legal Stud 586 587.  
504 “Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate” in D Friedmann & J Beatson (eds) Good Faith and 




contract might actually be better given effect to by holding parties to what they have 
agreed earlier, rather than by refusing to enforce agreements that the parties intended 
to be binding.505 
To force one party to negotiate with another does appear at first sight to be an 
infringement of contractual freedom and autonomy. Hoskins, an English academic 
correctly argues that this rationale would only justify a refusal to impose a “legal duty 
to negotiate in good faith”.506 Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright conclude that unlimited 
freedom to withdraw is not an essential element of negotiations.507 If the parties have 
voluntarily chosen to regulate their negotiations by imposing an obligation to negotiate 
in good faith, then objection to these types of agreements on the basis of public policy 
seems less convincing.508  
The validity of pre-contractual agreements that limit freedom of negotiation needs 
to be considered in light of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in South African 
contract law.509 Legal certainty, an important value in commercial contracts in 
particular, is supported and advanced by this principle.510 It can be argued that the 
values of pacta sunt servanda and freedom of contract favour the recognition of 
agreements to negotiate as valid contracts, as long as they are voluntarily concluded 
with the requisite animus contrahendi.511  
However, Lewis does not agree with this contention, arguing that before this 
principle can apply it is necessary first to establish whether a pactum is in fact at 
hand.512 In Everfresh513 the court considered in an obiter dictum whether an 
agreement to negotiate should constitute a valid pactum.  
Yacoob J, for the minority, explained that when interpreting a negotiation clause, it 
is essential to consider public policy and section 39(2) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 and he proceeded to emphasise that the values of 
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ubuntu, good faith and public policy are also closely interlinked.514 Yacoob J concluded 
that: 
“A common-law principle that renders an obligation to negotiate enforceable cannot be said 
to be inconsistent with the sanctity of contract and the important moral denominator of good 
faith.”515 
Furthermore, 
“the determination whether a promise is too illusory or too vague and uncertain must be 
made against the backdrop of an understanding that good faith should be encouraged in 
contracts and a party should be held to its bargain.”516 
Moseneke DCJ, in an obiter dictum also emphasised the importance of developing the 
common law in accordance with underlying values of good faith, ubuntu and pacta 
sunt servanda.517 Moseneke DCJ conceded that these values tend to support the 
development of the common law to recognise agreements to negotiate:518 
“Were a court to entertain Everfresh’s argument, the underlying notion of good faith in 
contract law, the maxim of contractual doctrine that agreements seriously entered into 
should be enforced, and the value of ubuntu, which inspires much of our constitutional 
compact, may tilt the argument in its favour. Contracting parties certainly need to relate to 
each other in good faith. Where there is a contractual obligation to negotiate, it would be 
hardly imaginable that our constitutional values would not require that the negotiation must 
be done reasonably, with a view to reaching an agreement and in good faith.”519  
It is clear from these obiter statements that the Constitutional Court firstly, envisages 
a more substantial role for good faith in the South African law of contract,520 and 
secondly, that it is receptive to developing the common law to enforce agreements to 
negotiate.521 It also supports the movement towards an approach which emphasises 
“fairness in the pursuit of contractual justice.”522 It is however unfortunate that the court 
fails to draw a clear distinction between the subjective and objective meanings of good 
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faith in their analysis of agreements to negotiate in good faith. It is also unclear whether 
the court is supporting the imposition of an overarching obligation to negotiate in good 
faith or merely confirming that agreements to negotiate should be enforceable and that 
the value of good faith can be directly relied upon to develop the common law to 
enforce such agreements. In this thesis the latter interpretation of the Everfresh 
judgment will be adopted.  
Lewis criticises Everfresh, arguing that it undermines legal certainty regarding 
“contractual arrangements that are simply not valid”.523 Lewis concedes with reference 
to the CGEE Alsthom case that a valid obligation to agree on outstanding terms of a 
contract is possible, but emphasises that the agreement to negotiate envisaged in 
Everfresh is simply not a pactum.524 She argues that there is no general obligation to 
negotiate in good faith that parties can rely upon, because it is too vague and 
concludes that for this reason the Everfresh judgments “offend the principle of legality 
and infuse the law of contract with confusion”.525 
Louw, however, correctly points out that this judicial conservatism to maintain legal 
certainty is inconsistent with the values enshrined in the Constitution and the principle 
that all contracts are bone fidei.526 Louw explains that this principle establishes “good 
faith as a criterion in the interpretation of contracts as well as in the evaluation of the 
parties in performance and antecedent negotiations”. 
In Brisley v Drotsky527 the court set out the principle that good faith cannot be relied 
upon as an independent, or a free-floating basis to enforce or set aside contractual 
terms. Van der Sijde, however, observes that the role of contract law in the regulation 
of contractual relationships has seen a shift since the advent of the Constitution.528 
This has laid the foundation for the doctrine of good faith to be developed to promote 
societal values and fairness in contractual negotiations. In Savage & Lovemore Mining 
(Pty) Ltd v International Shipping Co Pty Ltd529 the court explained bona fides in 
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contracting extends to “the process of reaching consensus”. Therefore “a party who 
adopts an ambivalent posture with a view to manipulating to his own advantage…has 
a state of mind that falls short of the requirements of bona fides”.530  
Mupangavanhu, argues that “if good faith is indeed the basis of contracts in South 
Africa, it is inconsistent with sections 8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution that good faith 
still plays a peripheral role in resolving contractual disputes.”531 She concludes that a 
different outcome in Everfresh was possible; the common law of good faith could have 
been developed to impose an obligation to negotiate in good faith, even in the absence 
of a deadlock-breaking mechanism.532  
The pertinent question here is therefore whether the common law can indeed be 
developed beyond existing precedent to enforce an agreement to negotiate even in 
the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism.533 
McKerrow suggests that it is possible to “enforce agreements to negotiate in a 
manner that satisfies the requirements of pacta sunt servanda, legal certainty and 
fairness to the affected parties”.534 Building on the obiter statements made in 
Everfresh, he argues that the underlying value of good faith can be applied to enforce 
agreements to negotiate and should be interpreted as an objective standard infusing 
notions of reasonableness.535 Louw explains that much of the legal uncertainty 
surrounding good faith is resolved if good faith is understood as an objective value.536 
Public policy as influenced by the objective value of good faith can inform the 
contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith and to determine whether there has 
been breach of such obligation.537 If good faith is interpreted as an objective  value, 
the concerns raised by Lewis regarding legal uncertainty will be minimised. 
Everfresh illustrates precisely why the common law requires development. In this 
case the parties had intended to be bound by an obligation to negotiate in good faith 
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and such an animus contrahendi was “frustrated by a common-law rule that does not 
yet consider… a duty to negotiate in good faith enforceable, especially in the absence 
of a deadlock-breaking mechanism”.538 The shortfalls of the common law allowed 
Shoprite Checkers to escape an obligation that was originally intended to be 
contractually binding.  
The utility of good faith as an underlying value lies in its innate sensitivity to the 
demands on modern commerce.539 It thus seems fitting for good faith as an underlying 
value to help resolve uncertainty of the ever-increasing phenomena of agreements to 
negotiate. The underlying value of good faith can be relied upon to develop the rules 
regarding contract formation to recognise the enforceability of agreements to 
negotiate, even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. Everfresh540 and 
the supporting academic commentary, bolster the conclusion that the value of good 
faith as informed by ubuntu could be applied to develop the legal rules so as to impose 
an enforceable obligation to negotiate in the context of agreements to agree or 
negotiate.541  
3 5 Conclusion  
Homburger and Scheuller’s classic study of letters of intent in the context of Illinois law 
describe pre-contractual agreements as “traps for the unwary”.542 There is much 
uncertainty and controversy both locally and internationally about the legal nature of 
pre-contractual agreements and this creates an environment in which negotiating 
parties can either behave opportunistically543 or be bound by contractual obligations 
which they never intended to bring into existence. In either case this gives rise to 
inequitable consequences. Developing certain, but flexible legal rules which provide 
clarity regarding the contractual nature of different types of pre-contractual 
agreements is essential to promoting efficient business transactions while maintaining 
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legal certainty in the law of contract. 
It was indicated that different legal systems adopt different approaches to the 
regulation of the various types of pre-contractual agreements, but all accept that the 
name given to the agreement does not determine its contractual nature. Thus, 
agreements erroneously labelled as pre-contractual agreements can constitute 
binding principal contracts if they meet the requirements of certainty and animus 
contrahendi, notwithstanding outstanding terms or clauses negating liability.544 Save 
for those agreements falling into the aforementioned category, the South African and 
English legal systems remain relatively conservative in their approach to pre-
contractual agreements. In particular, agreements to negotiate are regarded as 
unenforceable, unless the obligation to negotiate forms part of a pre-existing contract 
or contains a deadlock-breaking mechanism. American law by contrast has seen 
some recent development in relation to pre-contractual agreements. It was observed 
that the grey area common to each of the jurisdictions under consideration is in the 
legal nature of preliminary agreements that are intended to impose contractual 
obligations, but do not contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism and have outstanding 
terms to be negotiated in good faith.545 These agreements can give rise to one of two 
possible contractual obligations: They could either bind parties to the final contract (or 
to conclude the final contract) or bind parties to negotiate in good faith towards 
conclusion of the final contract. Some American states have recognised the 
enforceability of both types of contractual obligations.  
The question that remains to be answered is whether an obligation to negotiate in 
good faith can meet the validity requirements in terms of South African law. South 
African contract law, as it stands, requires that a negotiation clause forms part of a 
binding preliminary agreement and that it should have a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism to be valid and enforceable.546 This excludes the enforceability of the two 
types of agreements falling in the grey area. With the benefit of comparative analysis, 
it can be argued that South African contract law has reached a stage where 
development to recognise other types of agreements to negotiate (or agreements to 
agree) is both necessary and possible, particularly if our law is to promote the values 
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enshrined in the Constitution and is to be harmonised with the legal position in foreign 
jurisdictions.547 
It is proposed that two types of agreements to negotiate can potentially be 
recognised in South African law as valid and enforceable with different legal 
consequences and remedies. First, if an agreement containing a negotiation clause 
outlines most of the terms of the principal contract and it is intended to give rise to 
contractual obligations, it can be argued that South African law can be further 
developed to recognise enforceability of the clause even in the absence of a deadlock-
breaking mechanism. In terms of English law the possibility of enforcing a negotiation 
clause in a pre-existing contract, even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism, was recognised because the outstanding term could be determined by 
the court.548 As Hutchison argues, as long as a negotiation clause forms part of a 
binding preliminary agreement and open terms are ascertainable with reference to an 
external standard, they should be enforceable.549 Based on the sentiments expressed 
in Indwe and by McKerrow550 and Hutchison,551 courts could also potentially perform 
a deadlock-breaking function and such power would be restrained by good faith and 
reasonableness. 
Drawing on the legal position in some American jurisdictions and the obiter views 
expressed in Everfresh552 it can be argued that South African law can be further 
developed to potentially recognise a second type of agreement to negotiate that 
imposes a contractual obligation on the parties to negotiate the principal contract or 
the remaining terms thereof in good faith, but which does not guarantee the 
materialisation of such a contract.553 As long as parties have negotiated in good faith 
their obligations will be discharged even if no principal contract is concluded.554 
Concerns regarding uncertainty of the obligation to negotiate in good faith have 
been considered. It is proposed that these uncertainties can be addressed and 
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overcome. This proposition is supported by the obiter dictum statements in 
Everfresh555 and by academics who suggest that the doctrine of good faith as an 
objective value could be applied to develop the rules of contract to enforce this type of 
agreement to negotiate in good faith.556 By drawing a distinction between these two 
types of agreements to negotiate, courts could avoid uncertainty in relation to the 
terms of the final contract where there is no deadlock-breaking mechanism or means 
of determining outstanding terms, but also give effect to the underlying values of good 
faith and ubuntu by enforcing agreements that are intended to impose upon the parties 
an obligation to comply with a certain standard of conduct in the course of negotiations. 
The prospects of successfully enforcing this type of agreement is illustrated by 
American case law.557
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Chapter 4: The consequences of pre-contractual 
agreements 
4 1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, it was indicated how pre-contractual agreements that meet 
certain requirements for validity can give rise to contractual obligations prior to the 
conclusion of the principal contract. This chapter considers the main contractual 
obligations potentially arising from pre-contractual agreements, namely negotiating in 
good faith, and maintaining confidentiality and exclusivity. The focus is especially on 
the legal consequences of these obligations and the remedies they potentially give 
rise to in the event that they are breached. 
This is a complex issue; courts have been hesitant to enforce pre-contractual 
agreements and more specifically the obligation to negotiate in good faith precisely 
because of the difficulty of constructing remedies.1 These difficulties exist because this 
area of law is relatively undeveloped.2 South African and English law have only 
recognised agreements to negotiate to a very limited extent. As indicated earlier, some 
states in America have recognised that these agreements are enforceable, but parties 
often choose to settle out of court.3 Furthermore courts still tend to apply an “all or 
nothing approach” to contract formation.4 Therefore, the question of remedies for 
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breach of an obligation to negotiate has rarely been judicially addressed until recently.5  
Agreements to negotiate do not have a set content. Some contain terms of the 
envisaged transaction in varying levels of detail, while others will solely record an 
arrangement to negotiate a contract in the future. Identifying remedies for breach of 
an obligation to negotiate in good faith is therefore particularly difficult. The contractual 
remedies for breach will ultimately depend on the type of agreement and the 
jurisdiction in question. For example, the consequences and remedies for breach of 
an obligation to negotiate will differ depending on whether the obligation arises from 
an independent agreement to negotiate or an agreement that is intended to be legally 
binding but has open terms that have been left to future negotiation. The United States 
of America, South Africa and England treat the enforceability of these agreements 
differently and this influences the consequences flowing from these agreements (if 
any).  
This chapter will analyse and critically evaluate the potential remedies for breach of 
enforceable agreements to negotiate, and propose remedies for other types of 
agreements to negotiate that may be enforceable in South Africa in the future. This 
assessment will focus on specific performance as the primary remedy for breach of 
contract in South Africa.6 The utility of comparative analysis in this regard is limited by 
the fact that jurisdictions such as America that enforce agreements to negotiate regard 
damages as the primary remedy for breach.7 Such analysis will however be useful 
when considering damages as an alternative remedy in South Africa for breach of 
these obligations. 
While the focus of this chapter will be on remedies for breach of the obligation to 
negotiate, there are also other important obligations that can arise in the course of 
contract negotiations. The contractual obligations to maintain confidentiality and 
exclusivity will be considered as practical examples of provisions that are commonly 
included in pre-contractual agreements, and the remedies for breach of these 
obligations will also be analysed.  
It is acknowledged that an enquiry into the legal consequences that flow from 
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breach of contractual obligations regulating the course of negotiations is based on the 
assumption that breach has or will give rise to legal action.8 In practice however, there 
are significant commercial risks in instituting legal action against the other party.9 
Therefore the last part of this chapter will discuss extra-judicial consequences that 
promote compliance with pre-contractual agreements. 
4 2 Remedies for breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith 
As previously discussed in chapter three, a contractual obligation to negotiate may be 
contained in a preliminary agreement that is intended to be immediately binding, but 
contains open terms that have been left to future negotiation.10 Alternatively the 
negotiation obligation may form part of an independent agreement to negotiate which 
may outline some of main terms of the envisaged transaction or solely record an 
arrangement to negotiate a principal contract in the future. Parties to the latter type of 
agreement are not bound to their ultimate contractual objective; parties are merely 
bound to negotiate in good faith. It is clear that these two types of agreements to 
negotiate are intended to perform distinct functions and should thus give rise to 
different legal consequences and remedies. The investigation of the potential 
remedies for breach of the obligation to negotiate will focus strongly on American law 
where both these types of agreements have been enforced.11  
International instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (“PICC”) are also relevant insofar as they deal with remedies 
for breach of a contractual obligation to negotiate. Article 2.1.15 of the PICC confirms 
that remedies for bad faith conduct in negotiations is generally limited to reliance 
damages,12 however where parties have concluded an express agreement to 
negotiate,13 the “full spectrum of remedies” are available for breach.14 This includes 
 
8 M Fontaine & F De Ly Drafting International Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Clauses (2009) 53; 
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13 Art 2.1.15 read with comment 3. 




an order compelling parties to negotiate, and damages reflecting the positive or 
negative interest depending upon the extent to which the requirements for such 
remedy can be demonstrated.15 This provision is relevant insofar as it can inform 
development of national law.  
Thus far, foreign legal systems that have recognised the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith have been conservative regarding remedies, because the content of such 
an obligation is uncertain and controversial.16 It is difficult for a court to assess what 
the outcome of negotiations would have been, whether a final contract would have 
been concluded and, if so, on what terms.17  
Remedies typically include, but are not limited to specific performance in the form 
of an order compelling parties to negotiate or damages measured by the reliance 
interest.18 The following discussion of specific performance is not limited to an order 
compelling parties to negotiate, but also considers the possibility of a court or arbitrator 
determining outstanding terms and enforcing the principal contract. 
4 2 1 Specific performance 
Specific performance, as previously mentioned, constitutes the primary remedy for 
breach of contract in South African law19 and will therefore be considered as the first 
potential remedy for breach of an obligation to negotiate in good faith. Contracts to 
negotiate, due to their “peculiar nature”, give rise to two potential types of specific 
performance.20 Firstly specific performance in this context can consist of an order 
compelling parties to comply with the obligation to negotiate further in good faith, or 
secondly specific performance can consist of an order to perform the obligations 
arising from the envisaged principal contract under negotiation.21 In respect of the 
latter type of specific performance, the court will essentially be enforcing the principal 
 
15 Art 2.1.15 read with comment 3. 
16 E Pannebakker Letter of Intent in International Contracting LLD thesis Eramus University Rotterdam 
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contract that formed the subject matter of the negotiation clause, with the court or an 
arbitrator determining the outstanding terms.22 
Whether a court can order parties to conclude the envisaged principal contract that 
contained outstanding term(s) still under negotiation is particularly controversial.23 
Although this type of specific performance is far more extreme and invasive than an 
interdict, both types of specific performance must be critically evaluated and analysed 
for purposes of establishing a remedy most fitting to the South African legal system.  
4 2 1 1 Order compelling parties to negotiate in good faith 
An order compelling parties to negotiate in good faith is probably the most appropriate 
form of specific performance for breach of an agreement to negotiate, particularly 
where such agreement solely imposes an obligation to negotiate the main contract in 
the future. However this type of specific performance is often regarded as an 
impractical remedy for breach of a negotiation obligation because the relationship 
between the parties has probably broken down and the parties are estranged.24 While 
it is theoretically possible for courts to order parties to comply with their negotiation 
obligation and subsequently determine compliance with such order, it is doubtful 
whether the outcome will fulfil the expectations of the aggrieved party.25 
It is for this very reason that French courts do not award specific performance in the 
form of “forced negotiation” in this context.26 Even legal systems that do award specific 
performance as the primary remedy regard an order compelling parties to negotiate 
as problematic, because it is difficult to force a party to cooperate and resume 
negotiations that have already broken down.27 A claim for specific performance 
therefore has little prospects of success.28 
 
22 Pannebakker Letter of Intent 230. 
23 Fontaine & De Ly Drafting International Contracts 48. 
24 Knapp 1969 NYU L Rev 725; RD Mckerrow “Agreements to Negotiate: A Contemporary Analysis” 
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25 McKerrow 2017 Stell LR 331. 
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The application and efficiency of this remedy will firstly be considered in the context 
of agreements to negotiate that contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism and are 
consequently enforceable in South Africa. Where such a mechanism is present, South 
African courts have been willing to grant an order compelling parties to negotiate in 
good faith as a remedy for breach of a negotiation obligation.29 The practical 
application of this remedy will be considered with reference to Makate v Vodacom 
(Pty) Ltd (“Makate”).30 
In Makate31 the parties concluded an agreement to negotiate in good faith the 
compensation that should be paid to Makate for his “please call me” idea, which was 
used by Vodacom to develop a new product. It was agreed that if the parties failed to 
reach agreement on the amount payable, the CEO of Vodacom would determine such 
amount.32  
The court ordered Vodacom to negotiate in good faith with Makate to determine “a 
reasonable compensation payable to him in terms of the agreement.”33 The court 
recognised determination by the CEO as a valid deadlock-breaking mechanism as 
long as the CEO did not represent Vodacom in negotiations.34 If, despite good faith 
negotiations, the parties failed to reach agreement on the reasonable compensation 
that should be paid in terms of the agreement, the deadlock-breaking mechanism must 
be invoked.35  
However, whether determination by the CEO should constitute a valid deadlock-
breaking mechanism is debatable because of the close relationship that exists 
between the CEO and Vodacom as a party to negotiations. The court is arguably 
leaving determination of the appropriate compensation to Vodacom. Generally, the 
presence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism makes it easier to enforce the obligation 
to negotiate because parties know if they fail to agree that the court may invoke the 
 
29 See Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 2005 2 SA 202 (SCA) paras 4, 17-18, where 
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deadlock-breaking mechanism. This creates an incentive for parties to comply with an 
order to negotiate in good faith because there are consequences attached to deadlock. 
Parties are motivated to negotiate seriously in attempt to reach consensus because 
the outcome is more likely to be preferable to them than determination by an arbitrator 
or other deadlock-breaker.36 In Makate however the incentive to negotiate seriously is 
absent because Vodacom knows that it has a close relationship with the deadlock-
breaker. 
If a party breaches an agreement to negotiate by attempting to conclude the 
envisaged transaction with a third party it may also be possible for the court to grant 
an interdict prohibiting such party from doing so.37 In Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd,38 for example, the court 
granted an interim interdict prohibiting the conclusion of the envisaged transaction with 
a third party. 
In some European legal systems it may be possible to compel the party in breach 
to continue negotiations by issuing a formal warning that failure to comply will result in 
a judicial penalty.39 Even so, an order compelling parties to negotiate in good faith, in 
the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism, is ultimately unlikely to achieve the 
result that may be desired by the aggrieved party, which is conclusion of the envisaged 
contract under negotiation. 
If an agreement to negotiate is enforceable even in the absence of a deadlock-
breaking mechanism, it is likely that an aggrieved party will at the very least be entitled 
to an interdict for breach of the obligation to negotiate.40 In this regard, we can draw a 
parallel with remedies for breach of a pre-emption contract. Pre-emption contracts, 
like agreements to negotiate, do not guarantee conclusion of the principal contract, 
but merely increase the likelihood of its conclusion. Bhana, in her discussion of 
remedies for breach of a pre-emption contract, explains that a grantee or holder of a 
pre-emption right may claim specific performance, in the form of a interdict preventing 
 
36 See the similar sentiment expressed in respect of a court or jury performing this function in Eisenberg 
Principles of Contract Law 518.  
37 N Thokozani Pre-Contractual Liability: The Enforceability of Agreements to Negotiate LLM thesis, 
University of Kwazulu-Natal (2016) 45. 
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the grantor of the pre-emption right from “frustrating the grantee’s right of pre-
emption”.41 However, it can be argued that the imposition of other significant 
consequences for the failure to comply appears to be necessary for the efficacy of an 
otherwise “toothless”42 obligation. In making this argument it is important to concede 
that an order compelling parties to negotiate is not totally meaningless and can at the 
very least oblige negotiating parties to go through the motions of negotiating, even if 
it does not necessarily guarantee a successful outcome. The next aspect to address 
is whether specific performance can, in the case of certain agreements to negotiate, 
entail enforcement of the principal contract under negotiation.  
4 2 1 2 Fleshing out terms and enforcement of the principal contract 
Specific performance in the form of a court fleshing out terms and enforcement of the 
principal contract can be problematic. As in most cases the obligation to negotiate 
regulates the process rather than the outcome of negotiations.43 Moss explains that if 
negotiation clauses regulated the outcome of negotiations it would be easier to grant 
specific performance of the final contract, but because they regulate the process, 
forcing parties to cooperate to reach consensus would be inappropriate.44 Bhana 
explains in the context of pre-emption contracts, that specific performance of contracts 
which “contemplate co-operation between the parties” gives rise to greater difficulties 
than specific enforcement of classical contracts.45 Specific performance seems 
impossible if there is uncertainty regarding outstanding terms and whether the final 
contract will even materialise.46  
There are nevertheless academics that argue that specific performance in the form 
of the court fleshing out the terms of the envisaged transaction or appointing an 
arbitrator to do so should be available for breach of an agreement that is similar in 
 
41 D Bhana “The Enforcement of Pre-Emption: A Proposed New Form of Specific Performance” (2010) 
73 THRHR 288 296. 
42 See Hutchison 2012 SALJ 294.  
43 GC Moss International Commercial Contracts: Applicable Sources and Enforceability (2014) 98; 
Fontaine & De Ly Drafting International Contracts 48; Bhana et al Student’s Guide 101; see also 
discussion in Van Huyssteen et al Contract 222. 
44 International Commercial Contracts 98; Fontaine & De Ly Drafting International Contracts 48. 
45 Bhana 2010 THRHR 296. 




construction to a so-called “agreement with open terms” in American law.47 These 
arguments will now be evaluated.  
(i) Court determining outstanding terms 
Some academics have questioned whether it may be possible for the court to perform 
the role of deadlock-breaker to determine the outstanding terms in order to finalise the 
principal contract as a remedy for breach of a negotiation obligation.48 To grant specific 
performance in this situation would essentially be to enforce an agreement to agree 
and requires of the court to predict whether consensus would have been reached on 
outstanding terms, had the parties negotiated in good faith, and to then fill in those 
outstanding terms.49 The availability of this drastic remedy will ultimately depend on 
the type of agreement to negotiate that has been breached.  
As a point of departure, this remedy should not be available for breach of an 
independent agreement to negotiate the second (main) contract in the future, which 
does not outline any substantive terms of the future contract.50 Courts have 
emphasised that they will not make a contract for the parties.51 Moss correctly points 
out that parties to most types of agreements to negotiate are not making a final offer 
but “following the respective strategic lines towards a complex meeting of the minds” 
and ultimately the final terms that will be acceptable to both parties are not known until 
negotiations are complete.52 Specific performance that speculates regarding the 
outcome of negotiations before parties have concluded their negotiations would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of such negotiations.53  
Fontaine and De Ly argue that specific performance in the form of a judicial 
determination of terms should generally not be available as a remedy for breach of an 
obligation to negotiate in a pre-contractual agreement because “a contract can only 
 
47 See ch 4 (4 2 2 2(i)), see also Hutchison 2012 SALJ 274.   
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result from the mutual agreement of the parties and a judge cannot substitute for 
this”.54  
This is a satisfactory conclusion when dealing with independent agreements to 
negotiate, but what about agreements recording consensus on the main elements of 
the contract, which are intended to be binding?55 Can the court in these circumstances 
perform the role of deadlock-breaker to determine the outstanding terms of the 
principal contract?56  
It is possible that parties have left outstanding terms to future negotiation. In South 
African law, such an agreement may be enforced if it is clear that the parties intended 
to be bound notwithstanding outstanding terms - the original contract will prevail if 
consensus is not reached on the outstanding elements.57 It can be inferred that in 
these circumstances, the original agreement must be sufficiently certain to be capable 
of enforcement. This in turn suggests that outstanding terms would have to be of a 
secondary or subsidiary nature. This stands in contrast to the approach of systems 
like Swiss law, where the agreement will also be enforced, but in the event of deadlock 
the judge will determine the outstanding terms.58 
The legal position is more complex and uncertain when the agreement to negotiate 
records consensus on the main terms of the contract, but some material or essential 
term(s) have been left to future negotiation.59 Assuming that these agreements do give 
rise to a binding negotiation obligation, the question is whether breach of such an 
obligation can give rise to this type of specific performance. 
(a) Observations from American law and English law 
Some American states have been willing to enforce a so-called agreement with open 
terms.60 An agreement with open terms is a binding preliminary contract that outlines 
most of the terms of the envisaged transaction, but parties have left terms such as the 
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rental price to future negotiation.61 If parties intended for the principal contract to come 
into existence, the contract will not fail for uncertainty as long as “there is a reasonably 
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy”.62 Nedzel explains that courts will 
generally “fill in” outstanding terms if it is “reasonable to do so”, and if not, they will 
grant another appropriate contractual remedy.63 While it is not uncommon for 
American courts to flesh out or fill in agreements with open terms, such a remedy is 
not necessarily desirable because of the element of speculation.64  
In Stanford Hotels Corporation v Potomac Creek Associates65 the court noted in an 
obiter statement that specific performance may even be available for breach of type II 
preliminary agreements. As explained in chapter 3, these agreements bind parties to 
negotiate in good faith towards conclusion of the principal contract but do not oblige 
them to ultimately conclude such contract. 66 The court was careful to qualify such 
statement, explaining that specific performance would only be available if the parties 
had negotiated in good faith to reach consensus on outstanding terms, and the other 
party subsequently refuses in bad faith to finalise the contract.67 The court is then 
merely enforcing the obligation on terms already undertaken by the parties.68 If, 
however, parties failed to reach agreement on outstanding terms, specific 
performance would not be available.69 There is no American case law where the court 
has actually granted specific performance in the form of an injunction compelling 
parties to negotiate or conclude the envisaged transaction for breach of this agreement 
to negotiate.70 In America, the prevailing opinion appears to be that specific 
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performance is an unrealistic remedy for breach in these circumstances.71  
In English law, breach of a negotiation clause in a pre-existing contract can 
potentially result in a court determining an outstanding term. In Petromec Inc v 
Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras72 (“Petromec”) the court found that in the event that 
parties were unable to reach agreement on an outstanding term (reasonable costs of 
upgrade), the court could ascertain such term.73 There is little difficulty in predicting 
what the probable outcome of good faith negotiations would be.74 However it must be 
noted that the reasonable costs of upgrade is arguably a subsidiary rather than 
material outstanding term.  
(b) Position in South African law and potential development 
There are proposals in South African literature regarding the enforceability75 and legal 
consequences of agreements to negotiate that do not contain deadlock-breaking 
mechanisms. Some South African academics argue that breach of the obligation to 
negotiate may in certain circumstances justify enforcement of the principal contract.76 
They suggest that in the event of breach, courts can give “content to the final contract 
envisaged by the parties in their preliminary agreement”.77  
Hutchison, for example, argues that an obligation to negotiate in good faith is only 
enforceable if it forms part of a binding preliminary agreement “which imposes upon 
them [the parties] a set of contractual obligations” but leaves certain open terms to be 
fleshed out in the future.78 He suggests that a court should as an “optional power” be 
able to determine outstanding terms of the principal contract in the event of  breach of 
an obligation to negotiate because it “would achieve for the parties what failed 
negotiations should have resulted in”.79 He concedes that a court needs to be careful 
not to impose “an entirely new contract on the parties” but he nevertheless argues that 
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it should theoretically be possible for the court to exercise a deadlock-breaking 
function and determine, for example, a market-related rental or sale price based on 
what is objectively reasonable.80  
Where parties do not mention anything specific about the price, the market-related 
price can indeed be implied.81 However, agreements to negotiate specifically provide 
that parties agree to negotiate regarding the open terms. In these circumstances it 
seems unlikely that a court will be willing to imply and determine a market-related price 
to fill in an outstanding term as a remedy for breach of the obligation to negotiate. 
Parties have not expressly agreed to such an external standard or an “objectively 
reasonable determination” by the court to determine the open terms in the event that 
the parties fail to agree  
In H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v the B-M Group (Pty) Ltd82 a clause in the agreement 
provided that price adjustments were to be determined “by the parties agreeing 
thereto”.83 One party argued that a reasonable price adjustment could be implied into 
the agreement. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the machinery 
provided for determination of the price adjustment was the agreement by the parties 
and that a court will not “substitute its own machinery in the form of a reasonable price” 
for the machinery provided by the parties even if their machinery fails.84 In a similar 
vein it can be argued that when a party has breached a negotiation obligation forming 
part of an incomplete agreement, a court cannot as a remedy for breach, substitute its 
“own machinery” to perform a deadlock-breaking function. A court will only be able to 
perform such a function if it can be inferred from the facts that the parties intended, in 
the event of their failure to agree, that open term(s) would be determined by a court or 
arbitrator based on what is objectively reasonable.  
McKerrow, like Hutchison, argues that this type of specific performance is a 
potential remedy for breach of a duty to negotiate.85 According to him, a court will be 
able to fill in outstanding terms as a remedy for breach of such a duty if it can derive 
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some form of “guiding standard” from the contract to negotiate that can be applied to 
“construct the final contract” as intended by the parties.86 He explains that this 
standard or framework can be internal or external “but must necessarily be imposed 
by the parties themselves”. In the absence of this contractual framework or structure, 
there will be “no contractual bones to flesh out” and courts would in effect be displacing 
the parties’ autonomy by making a final contract for them.87 
To this end, the principles set out in Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v 
Transnet Ltd88 (“Southernport”), with regard to an arbitrator performing the role of 
deadlock-breaker can be extended to courts performing such function.89 These 
principles can be expressed as follows. Firstly, there would have to be an agreement 
that is intended to be immediately binding. Secondly, the court should not be making 
a contract for the parties, but merely be fleshing out terms of an agreement that they 
have already concluded.90 This proposed approach is consistent with the views 
expressed by Hoskins in the context of English law. 91 
McKerrow does not clarify whether the outstanding terms may be material or 
essential or whether this specific performance is limited to agreements to negotiate 
where outstanding terms are secondary. In the Southernport92 case, which is referred 
to as authority,93 all essential elements had been agreed upon and outstanding terms 
were subsidiary.  
McKerrow also does not give practical examples of what constitutes a “guiding 
standard” or framework for determining the final contract. It however appears that the 
parties would need to provide the court with some form of “machinery” for constructing 
the final contract such as a reference to a “readily ascertainable external standard”. 
The “machinery” must have been expressly or implicitly provided by the parties in lieu 
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If there is a guiding standard from which to construct the principal contract, courts 
can apply the objective doctrine of good faith to inform, direct and qualify the 
application of such guiding standard to determine the content of the envisaged 
contract.94 In this thesis, it is proposed that a further requirement should be added - 
the court must conclusively determine that had the parties negotiated in good faith, 
they would have reached consensus on the outstanding term(s).95 Nevertheless it is 
conceded here that this type of remedy can still be problematic because establishing 
whether consensus would have been reached (and on what terms) entails a 
speculative enquiry.  
McKerrow also raises the concern that specific performance by judicial 
determination of outstanding term(s) disregards the subjective intention of the parties 
and treats pre-contractual agreements as enforceable agreements to agree rather 
than agreements to negotiate.96 He proceeds to argue however that this type of 
specific performance is “fair, balanced and in line with our constitutional values” and 
is more practical than compelling parties to negotiate.97 The aggrieved party would not 
object to such a remedy and in McKerrow’s opinion the other party, by failing to 
negotiate in good faith, relinquishes his or her role in the determination of outstanding 
terms.98  
In contrast to McKerrow, Lewis argues that although notions of reasonableness and 
fairness and the value of good faith are important, their application should not entirely 
displace other fundamental values such as legal certainty, party autonomy and 
freedom of contract, which includes freedom not to contract.99 Parties should know 
what the content and legal consequences of their agreement are.100 Parties could not 
possibly intend, in the absence of an express indication in their agreement to the 
contrary, that a failure to negotiate in good faith would result in the court filling in the 
outstanding terms of their agreement. It is unlikely that fairness, reasonableness and 
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the value of good faith can justify ignoring the original subjective intention of the parties 
and deprive them of their contractual autonomy for the failure to negotiate in good 
faith. 
There is nevertheless some merit to Hutchison’s and McKerrow’s arguments for 
specific performance, particularly in circumstances where the contract to negotiate is 
intended to be binding and is the product of advanced negotiations. The suitability of 
this remedy will ultimately depend upon whether such a remedy was an intended 
consequence of the contract to negotiate and the court is of the view that the parties 
intended to be bound by the agreement notwithstanding outstanding terms. The 
possibility of granting this type of specific performance will depend on the willingness 
of the court to perform a so-called “gap filling” or deadlock-breaking function. Courts 
have emphatically held that they will not create a contract for the parties,101 or subject 
them to an arrangement that is vastly “different in its essential character from what 
they had in mind”102 when entering into the agreement. 
Courts need to be extremely cautious of granting specific performance for breach 
of an agreement to negotiate. Parties often do not intend to be bound to the ultimate 
contract103 and commonly include language negating liability in respect of the terms of 
the principal contract.104 There are American academics that have pointed out that 
even if an agreement is comprehensive and only has a few open terms, specific 
performance may be inappropriate if the parties have not included a deadlock-
breaking mechanism, and do not expressly or tacitly agree to a third party, in this case 
the court, determining the outstanding terms.105 Outstanding terms are unknown to 
the parties themselves, much less capable of ascertainment by the court. 
Although the above observations caution us against granting specific performance 
by judicial determination of outstanding terms, it is not necessary to dismiss the 
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possibility of granting specific performance entirely, nor is it necessary to limit specific 
performance to cases where parties have expressly or tacitly agreed to the court 
determining the outstanding terms. In this thesis it is proposed that specific 
performance may be available even in circumstances where parties have not 
expressly or tacitly agreed to the court determining the outstanding terms in their 
contract.  
In evaluating the possibility of awarding specific performance for breach of an 
agreement to negotiate, we will once again draw on the comparison between 
agreements to negotiate and pre-emption contracts. Bhana explains that where one 
is dealing with agreements such as pre-emption contracts, which require co-operation 
between the parties, an adjustment of mindset is necessary - courts will need to 
acknowledge that an equitable discretion to award specific performance now plays a 
more prominent role in judicial determinations.106 It is essential for courts to invoke this 
judicial discretion when dealing with these types of agreements which require parties 
to co-operate and act in good faith. Pre-emption contracts also give rise to difficulties 
regarding specific performance of the positive obligation to cooperate in concluding 
the substantive contract by forcing the grantor to grant the preference, by making an 
offer to the grantee once the preference is triggered. Where parties conclude a pre-
emption contract, they clearly intend to be bound by the obligation to cooperate in 
concluding the principal contract, and the commercial utility of these types of 
agreements will be lost entirely if a party cannot be compelled to enter into the contract 
to which the pre-emption right relates.107 
It is however recognised that these proposals have been subject to academic 
criticism108 and do not align with the Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v 
Oryx & Vereinigte Backereien (Pty) Ltd109 case which introduced the so-called “Oryx 
mechanism” for breach of a pre-emption contract. This remedy does not involve 
judicial discretion and entails that the holder of a pre-emption right unilaterally creates 
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a contract on similar terms to that which the grantor concluded with the third party. 
The holder of the pre-emption right therefore steps into the shoes of the third party. 
The intricacies and complexities around remedies for breach of a pre-emption contract 
fall beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say, that notwithstanding the 
challenges regarding specific performance in the context of pre-emption agreements, 
courts have nevertheless recognised the validity of such agreements and have been 
willing to award specific performance. As such, it is proposed that courts could in a 
similar vein recognise the validity of agreements to negotiate and construct an 
appropriate form of specific performance. It is however emphasised that specific 
performance for breach of an agreement to negotiate will not take on the form of the 
Oryx mechanism. 
It is proposed that agreements to negotiate that are expressly or by implication 
intended to be legally binding and are a product of advanced negotiations where most 
of the terms have been agreed upon, the principle of pacta sunt servanda demands 
that courts exercise an equitable discretion to enforce the substantive agreement by 
either obliging the parties to reach consensus on the outstanding term(s) according to 
the arbitrium boni viri or determining the outstanding term for the parties with reference 
to what is objectively reasonable. In this manner, a party is obliged to comply with his 
or her co-operation obligation in good faith. Bhana provides useful insight into how an 
award of this type of specific performance can be practically executed. She explains 
that the court would be guided by the context and the arbitrium boni viri standard which 
it should apply; this will ultimately align with the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.110 It is acknowledged that the application of this reasoning in the context of 
agreements to negotiate is distinct because breach of a pre-emption right is generally 
triggered by an offer or conclusion of the contract with a third party, which gives some 
indication of the terms on which the grantor was willing to conclude the contract. 
Nevertheless the Bhana’s suggestions for the practical execution of specific 
performance has merit in the context of agreements to negotiate. 
From the explanation above, it is possible to formulate the following legal position. 
Breach of independent agreements to negotiate, entered into prior to the main 






give rise to the remedy of specific performance of the final contract, with the court 
determining outstanding terms. Nevertheless, breach of other types of agreements to 
negotiate may justify the court fulfilling a deadlock-breaking function. In the light of the 
preceding comparative observations and exposition of local academic opinion, the 
following requirements for such a remedy to be available is proposed.  
Firstly, parties must have expressly agreed to be immediately bound by the contract 
notwithstanding outstanding terms, or it must be possible for the court to reasonably 
infer from the surrounding circumstances and the stage of negotiations reached that 
parties intended to be bound by the substantive agreement despite outstanding terms. 
Secondly, the agreement should be a product of advanced negotiations where parties 
have reached consensus on most of the terms of the principal contract. Thirdly, it must 
be clear with reasonable certainty that had parties negotiated in good faith, consensus 
would have been reached on outstanding term(s). Lastly it must be possible to identify 
or infer some form of machinery to determine outstanding terms, so that courts are 
neither making a contract for the parties nor substituting the parties’ machinery with 
their own. This machinery could be derived from evidence adduced by the parties 
regarding the negotiations on outstanding terms (and any terms that may have been 
proposed), the use of standard commercial terms, and from the content of the 
agreement itself (for example reference to some standard that could be applied to 
determine outstanding terms). In practice it will probably be difficult for all these 
conditions to be satisfied, and it is therefore argued that this type of specific 
performance will seldom be an appropriate remedy for breach of an obligation to 
negotiate. 
(ii) Directing parties to appoint an arbitrator to determine outstanding terms 
Thus far, we have considered the possibility of completing outstanding terms by 
judicial determination. It is now necessary to consider the possibility of other potential 
deadlock-breakers that may exercise a discretion to determine outstanding terms. 
Hutchison, in constructing a remedy for breach of negotiation clauses forming part of 
binding preliminary agreements, looks to the “simplicity” of the remedy constructed by 
the court in Southernport.111 In this case, there was an arbitration clause and the court 
 




ordered that the arbitrator should determine the outstanding terms.112 He proceeds to 
suggest that the most appropriate remedy for breach of a binding preliminary 
agreement that does not contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism is an order 
compelling parties to appoint an independent arbitrator to determine the outstanding 
term(s) of the contract.113  
Once again, this remedy is limited to a specific type of agreement.114 Hutchison 
explains that outstanding term(s) would need to be readily ascertainable with 
reference to an external standard.115 While conceding that this remedy is drastic, he 
argues that the proposed remedy gives effect to the right of an aggrieved party to claim 
specific performance for breach of a contractual obligation.116  
This remedy addresses the failure of the parties to include a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism and the court does not make a contract for the parties.117 Hutchison 
concludes that this remedy would constitute a “tangible and credible sanction to what 
is otherwise a toothless duty to negotiate”.118 There are advantages and 
disadvantages to the possibility of arbitrators performing this function. Advantages to 
arbitral determination of outstanding terms are that arbitration is a faster and cheaper 
means of resolving deadlock, and that arbitrators dealing with commercial disputes on 
a regular basis may have more experience or knowledge than courts regarding the 
content of commercial agreements. Conversely it can be argued that only courts are 
in a position to make a binding determination regarding the validity of an agreement 
(unless the parties have agreed to refer disputes to an arbitrator) and in any event 
courts are better placed to exercise the power arbitrium boni viri. It is therefore argued 
that determination of outstanding terms by an arbitrator will not be appropriate unless 
agreed upon by the parties or specifically so determined by the court.  
Fontaine and De Ly in their analysis of pre-contractual agreements in various 
European legal systems conclude that the type of cases that would be suitable to 












or an arbitrator will be extremely rare in practice.119 The analysis above appears to 
support this contention. If specific performance is not available as a remedy, the 
aggrieved party is left with a claim for damages. This remedy shall now be considered. 
4 2 2 Damages  
The analysis above reveals that specific performance may not always be an 
appropriate remedy for breach of an obligation to negotiate. This suggests that the 
remedy of damages must be considered as an appropriate alternative. Again a 
comparative perspective may be instructive.  
One of the justifications cited for the unenforceability of agreements to negotiate is 
the difficulty in assessing damages.120 Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright question this 
rationale, arguing that it has been possible for courts to assess damages in other 
contexts, where “the transaction contains a large amount of chance.”121 Nedzel also 
objects to this rationale, describing it as “specious”.122 She argues that difficulties 
assessing damages should not exclude the possibility of enforcement; it should merely 
confine the type of damages awarded.123 In this regard American and English law, 
which tend to grant damages as the primary remedy for breach of contract,124 
sometimes draw a somewhat challenging distinction between types of damages. 
These are damages measured by the reliance interest and the expectation interest.125 
Reliance damages is a monetary award placing the injured party in the position he 
would have been in had no contract been concluded.126 Expectation damages is a 
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monetary award placing the injured party in the position he would have been in had 
the contract been successfully performed.127 The extent to which different type of 
damages should be awarded for breach will now be considered. 
4 2 2 1 Reliance damages 
Both civil-law systems, such as German law, and common-law systems, such as 
American law, appear to accept that breach of an obligation to negotiate in good faith 
may give rise to a claim for reliance damages.128 Although South Africa has yet to 
enforce an agreement to negotiate in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism, 
academics seem to agree that an aggrieved party should be entitled to claim their 
reliance losses for breach of such an obligation (if it were to be enforced).129  
Some foreign academics are firmly of the opinion that in most cases an award of 
reliance damages is the only appropriate remedy for breach of a contractual duty to 
negotiate.130 In order to understand the rationale behind this view, it is necessary to 
briefly refer to the proposed purpose of obligations to negotiate. In American law, the 
majority of cases have dealt with negotiation obligations arising from type II preliminary 
agreements.131 The purpose of concluding such agreements is clearly not to 
guarantee conclusion of the envisaged contract, and therefore must lie in compelling 
parties to comply with a certain standard of conduct in the course of negotiations. If 
this is the case, what interests are the parties seeking to protect by agreeing to such 
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Various academics suggest that parties conclude these agreements because they 
wish to protect themselves against wasted reliance expenditure if negotiations are 
terminated in bad faith.132 According to this theory, a contractual obligation to negotiate 
manages the allocation of risk between parties particularly where one party has made 
substantial relationship-specific investments and is at risk of sustaining financial loss 
if the other party suddenly discontinues negotiations.133 On this understanding reliance 
damages is the intended remedy for breach of an obligation to negotiate. 
There is also another compelling reason why reliance damages constitute the 
preferred remedy in American law. In the American case of Copeland v Baskin 
Robbins USA134 the court confirmed that proof of expectation damages is impossible 
because terms of the envisaged transaction are unknown, and it is uncertain whether 
the principal contract will materialise; therefore, a party’s claim for breach of an 
agreement to negotiate is limited to reliance damages and not the “party’s lost 
expectations under the prospective contract”. Americans courts are more inclined to 
award reliance damages for breach of an obligation to negotiate in good faith,135 as it 
is a robust means for assessing loss because it is often readily ascertainable.136  
Some scholarly discussions regarding development of the English law on 
agreements to negotiate address the controversial issue of appropriate remedies for 
breach if these agreements were to be enforced.137 Peel explains that difficulties in 
assessing damages for breach of agreements to negotiate is limited to the award of 
expectation damages.138 The same problems are not encountered with reliance 
damages, which reimburse parties for wasted costs incurred in the course of 
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unsuccessful negotiations.139 He concludes that reliance damages would be the most 
readily available remedy for breach.140 Loveridge and Mills also seem to support this 
conclusion. In this regard they draw a comparison with mediation cases, where English 
courts award damages measured by the wasted cost incurred due to an “unreasonable 
failure to negotiate”.141 Nominal damages may also be awarded for breach.142 
In German law the remedy for breach of a legal duty to negotiate in good faith is 
also limited to reliance damages.143 Nedzel explains that reliance damages are 
preferable because “it was the fault of the promisor that gives rise to liability and not 
the unmet expectations of the promisee”.144 If like a legal duty to negotiate, a 
contractual duty to negotiate regulates the process rather than the outcome of 
negotiations then reliance damages is the most suitable remedy. The more difficult 
question is whether an injured party’s claim for breach of a contract to negotiate should 
always be limited to reliance damages or whether there are cases that justify an award 
of expectation damages.145 It is to this question that the discussion now turns. 
4 2 2 2 Expectation damages 
Expectation damages are often regarded as an inappropriate remedy for breach of an 
agreement to negotiate because of uncertainty regarding the outcome of negotiations 
and the terms of principal contract.146 However, Knapp,147 as well as Burton and 
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uncertainty, it does not follow that the remedy should always be confined to reliance 
damages.149 For example if the parties have agreed to all essential terms of the 
principal contract, then there will be sufficient certainty for courts to assess the 
expectation damages based on the tentative agreement.150 The fundamental question 
is whether the court can determine the economic gains that the aggrieved party would 
have obtained in respect of the final contract.151 Expectation damages may be 
awarded, in terms of American law, if the instrument in question constitutes an 
enforceable “agreement with open terms.”152 Lake and Draetta argue that expectation 
damages should only be awarded if the agreement is complete regarding the 
envisaged transaction, and not just complete as an agreement to negotiate.153  
In South African law, an award of expectation damages for breach of an obligation 
to negotiate gives rise to difficulties even when one is dealing with an agreement to 
negotiate that is intended to be immediately binding and only has one or two 
outstanding terms.154 As in other legal systems, the existence of outstanding term(s) 
makes it difficult for courts to assess the aggrieved party’s position, had contractual 
obligations been discharged.155 Hutchison argues that if courts exercise their 
discretion not to award specific performance by filling in outstanding terms and 
enforcing the substantive contract, they may nonetheless award expectation damages 
if the outstanding terms are capable of “objectively reasonable determination”.156 This 
type of agreement that Hutchison describes appears to be similar to the American 
concept of an agreement with open terms and it is clearly distinguishable from an 
independent agreement to negotiate that is entered into prior to the main contract.  
Independent agreements to negotiate, whether they outline some of the terms or 
merely record an arrangement to negotiate could not possibly have been intended to 
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give rise to a claim for expectation damages in the event of breach.157 Expectation 
damages are aimed at placing a party in the position he would have been in had the 
other party discharged their contractual obligations, whereas most agreements to 
negotiate do not guarantee the materialisation of the principal contract.158 If courts 
were to grant expectation damages, in these circumstances, they would essentially 
have to speculate regarding whether the principal contract would have materialised, 
and if so, on what terms.159  
Due to these reasons, American courts have traditionally refused to award 
expectation damages for breach of type II preliminary agreements.160 There have, 
however, been recent developments in this regard. In Venture Associates Corporation 
v Zenith Systems Corporation161 Posner CJ explained that if, even in the absence of 
bad faith, negotiations would have been unsuccessful, then the injured party’s claim 
would be limited to reliance damages.162 He then proceeded to recognise that 
expectation damages could be awarded if the injured party can prove that the final 
contract would have been concluded, but for the other party’s bad faith.163 Concerns 
regarding the award of expectation damages “goes to the practicality of the remedy, 
not the principle of it”.164 
In Network Enterprises, Inc v APBA Offshore Productions, Inc165 Haight DJ 
recognised the difficulties regarding the award of expectation damages but found that 
such difficulties do not exist in every case.166 This case dealt with a renewal option 
that required negotiations regarding times and dates of telecasts.167 Haight DJ 
concluded that the “apparent ease with which the parties agreed to the dates and 
times” in the previous contract supported the conclusion that had parties negotiated in 
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good faith the outstanding terms would have been agreed upon.168  
In the seminal case of Siga Technologies Inc v PharmaAthene Inc169 (“Siga”) Steele 
CJ expressed similar sentiments and confirmed that if a court finds “that the parties 
would have reached an agreement but for the defendant’s bad faith negotiation” 
expectation damages will be available as a remedy for breach of a type II preliminary 
agreement. 
It is significant that in all of these cases, the agreements outlined most of the terms 
of the principal contract and therefore required less speculation. 
Foreman criticises the logic applied in these cases, arguing that it fails to account 
for the uncertainty of the obligation to negotiate in good faith.170 It is difficult to see how 
courts can infer from a pre-contractual agreement containing outstanding terms that a 
contract would have been concluded “but for the defendant’s bad faith”.171 Such a 
conclusion ignores issues that may be raised by due diligence and future impediments 
potentially preventing contract conclusion.172 Expectation damages imply the 
existence of a principal contract where there is not in fact one.173  
Rios in his commentary on article 2.1.15 of the PICC174 argues that it is debatable 
whether a party should be entitled to expectation damages when parties have not 
reached agreement on the final terms of the contract.175 However, he does concede 
that the award of expectation damages will ultimately depend on the type of agreement 
to negotiate and how far parties have advanced in negotiations.176 
In conclusion the arguments made by Foreman against an award of expectation 
damages are compelling. Expectation damages are aimed at placing the party in the 
position he would have been in had the contract been concluded. For a court to award 
such damages, it would need to speculate about whether good faith negotiations 
would have resulted in parties reaching consensus on outstanding terms. Even if the 
 
168 487. 
169 (2013) 67 A 3d 330 (Del) 349-352. 
170 2014 U Toronto Fac L Rev 34. 
171 34. 
172 34. 
173 16-17,37.  
174 See ch 4 (4 2). 
175 “Art. 2.1.15 - 2.1.16 Negotiations” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the PICC 361-362. 




agreement to negotiate is comprehensive, the court would still be required to enter 
into the realm of speculation regarding the outstanding term(s). This creates the risk 
of essentially imposing, in the monetary sense, a contract on the parties with terms 
they may not have intended.  
4 3 Remedies for breach of non-disclosure obligations 
Confidentiality or non-disclosure clauses are commonly included in pre-contractual 
agreements because valuable confidential information is often disclosed in the course 
of commercial negotiations. Confidentiality obligations can arise from other sources of 
law,177 but parties often conclude confidentiality agreements to ensure their 
confidential information is protected. These agreements will generally also list the 
penalties, damages or injunctive relief available for breach of confidentiality.178 
Confidential information has an economic value that will be diluted or destroyed if 
information is disclosed in breach of a confidentiality agreement. There are two main 
remedies for breach of this obligation, namely an interdict preventing disclosure of 
confidential information and damages. It is important that an interdict is only useful 
where the harm is not “irremediable”,179 as it can only prevent the anticipated use or 
disclosure of confidential information. If an interdict is not available, the aggrieved 
party may claim damages.180  
There appears to be limited local and foreign literature and case law on remedies 
for breach of confidentiality obligations in pre-contractual agreements. This may be 
explained by difficulties in establishing breach,181 the inclusion of liquidated damages 
clauses and the existence of other sources of liability for breach of confidentiality.182 
Fontaine also points to the scepticism regarding “the possibility of enforcing 
compliance with a confidentiality undertaking”.183 This analysis will consider remedies 
for breach provided in foreign law and international instruments and compare it to 
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South African law. 
4 3 1 English and American law 
The common-law tradition distinguishes between contractual and equitable remedies 
for breach of confidentially.184 An equitable obligation of confidentiality arises from a 
“general duty of trust and confidence”185 derived from equity, and applies during the 
negotiation period even in the absence of a contractual obligation.186 Breach of 
contractual confidentiality obligations gives rise to remedies such as an interdict, which 
is discretionary, and damages.187  
In English law contractual damages are generally assessed according to the 
aggrieved party’s loss as a result of the disclosure or use of information.188 In Attorney 
General v Blake189 however, the court found that some cases will justify the award of 
damages measured by the aggrieved party’s loss of profits. This is the equitable 
remedy for breach of a duty of confidence and the court concluded that there is no 
reason for such damages to be available “in respect of an equitable wrong” but not for 
breach of a contractual confidentiality obligation.190  
English courts typically measure damages by the “value of a notional reasonable 
agreement to buy release”191 from the confidentiality agreement.192 Whether a court 
will deviate to measure damages by the loss of profits will depend on the nature of the 
confidentiality obligation.193 If the contractual obligation is similar to the “fiduciary 
obligation” developed from equity, it may be appropriate for the court to award the lost 
profits.194 
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American law recognises that breach of a confidentiality obligation can have 
significant detrimental effects on an aggrieved party’s business and in these 
circumstances it will be appropriate for a court to grant an interdict compelling parties 
to comply with their obligation.195 If the requirements for an interdict cannot be met, 
the party may claim damages.  
There are often difficulties in providing evidence to prove the damage suffered as a 
result of a breach of confidentiality,196 and the damages that can be proven may be 
far less than the damage actually suffered.197 For this reason parties may include a 
liquidated damages clause.198 In certain foreign legal systems it is also standard 
practice to include a provision to the effect that remedies provided by law may be 
inadequate, and that the parties agree that equitable remedies such as an injunction 
will be available in the event of breach.199 Such a provision can also provide that 
breach of confidentiality will constitute irreparable harm and the party consents to the 
aggrieved party applying for injunctive relief.200 In American law, some courts have 
been willing to conclude that an aggrieved party has demonstrated irreparable harm, 
due to the mere existence of such a clause while other courts have not done so.201  
4 3 2 International instruments  
The PICC,202 the Principles of European Contract law (PECL)203 and the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)204 all recognise an automatic obligation of 
confidentiality during negotiations and deal with remedies available for breach. These 
instruments recognise that an aggrieved party will be entitled to damages that 
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compensate any losses suffered and any benefit received by the party as a result of 
the use or disclosure of confidential information.205 The PICC provides that the 
quantum of damages will vary depending on whether a confidentiality agreement has 
been concluded and the content thereof.206 An injunction is also available in terms of 
the applicable law to prevent anticipated disclosure or use of confidential 
information.207 
4 3 3 South African law 
South Africa, unlike common-law systems such as England, has no law of equity that 
gives rise to an equitable duty of confidentiality. The circumstances in which a duty of 
confidentiality will arise in terms of South African law can be considered with reference 
to Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter208 (“Meter Systems Holdings”) In this case 
the court explained that an obligation of confidentiality can arise in the law of delict (on 
the basis of the application of the principles of Aquilian liability) or in the law of contract. 
We shall focus on the latter source of an obligation of confidentiality.209 Parties may 
choose to enter into a contract that contains a confidentiality obligation and the parties 
are free to define the exact scope or purpose of such an obligation. On the other hand, 
certain contracts that create a fiduciary relationship will give rise to an ex lege 
obligation of confidentiality (i.e a contractual duty of confidentiality is implied by law 
into the contract).210 The court in the Meter Systems Holdings211  case gives examples 
of the types of contracts which will give rise to an ex lege confidentiality obligation; 
these include employment contracts, contracts between a banker and a customer, and 
contracts between a doctor and a patient. In Alum-phos (Pty) Ltd v Spatz212 (“Spatz”) 
the court explained that it is an implied term in every contract of service that an 
employee will not disclose or utilise confidential information acquired during his course 
of employment and this obligation often survives after termination of employment. 
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Confidentiality provisions are also commonly included or inferred into restraint of trade 
agreements. The types of remedies available for breach of an express or implied 
obligation of confidentiality, namely an interdict and damages, will now be considered 
with reference to case law.  
In the Spatz213 case, the court awarded an interdict preventing and restraining the 
employee from divulging or utilising the confidential information acquired during the 
course of employment. In Traka Africa (Pty) Ltd v Amaya Industries214 the parties 
concluded a confidentiality agreement that prohibited the second respondent, an ex-
employee of the company, from disclosing or using confidential information.215 The 
second respondent breached the confidentiality obligation by utilising such information 
under the employment of the first respondent for purposes of competing with the 
applicant.216 The court granted an interdict preventing the other party from using or 
disclosing confidential information and directed them to return all confidential 
documents.217 The court concluded that damages would not be a suitable remedy 
because it was impossible to quantify the damages and by the time an action for 
damages was heard, the aggrieved party’s business would potentially be destroyed.218  
In Valunet Solutions Inc t/a Dinkum USA v eTel Communication Solutions (Pty) 
Ltd219 the parties concluded a confidentiality agreement to protect the confidential 
information and trade secrets disclosed during contractual negotiations. This 
confidential information was protected by way of a restraint of trade clause enduring 
ten years.220 Van Oosten J refused to enforce such clause because it unreasonably 
fettered the respondent’s freedom of trade.221 He also refused to grant an interdict 
because by the time the application was brought, the information had become general 
knowledge, and the applicant in any event had the alternative remedy of damages at 
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its disposal.222 It is thus clear that an interdict will only be granted where further harm 
can and should be prevented, otherwise the claim will be limited to damages. 
Although South African case law dealing with breach of a confidentiality obligation 
primarily focuses on an award of an interdict, it is clear that a claim for damages can 
also lie as outlined in the aforementioned case. It is proposed that a claim for damages 
should place the aggrieved party in the position he or should would have been in had 
the other party complied with their confidentiality obligation.  
4 4 Remedies for breach of exclusivity obligations 
Exclusivity provisions are also commonly included in pre-contractual agreements and 
require parties to refrain from negotiating with third parties for a specific length of 
time.223 American and English law have recognised the enforceability of exclusivity 
clauses in the pre-contractual context, but there is little case law dealing with remedies 
for breach of this obligation. This may be explained by the inclusion of liquidated 
damages or break-up fee clauses that commonly accompany exclusivity provisions.224 
There are two main remedies for breach of an obligation to negotiate exclusively, 
namely an interdict and damages.  
4 4 1 English and American law 
In terms of English law an interdict may be granted to prevent breach of an exclusivity 
obligation, but this will only restrain a party from negotiating with third parties; it will 
not impose a positive obligation to negotiate or conclude the final contract.225 In Tye v 
House,226 an English court refused to grant an injunction because reliance damages 
could adequately meet the purpose of the exclusivity agreement.227 In Pitt v PHH Asset 
Management,228 the court also awarded damages. Damages are usually limited to 
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compensation for losses suffered by the aggrieved party in reliance on negotiations 
as the purpose of an exclusivity agreement is to protect the party against wasted 
expenditure if the other party negotiates or concludes the contract with a third party 
during the exclusivity period.229 
In American law, remedies for breach of an obligation to negotiate exclusively 
include interdicts and reliance damages230, the latter being the primary remedy for 
breach.231 In Logan v DW Sivers232 the court explained that an exclusivity clause in a 
pre-contractual agreement is “directed to the manner of the negotiations and not to 
their outcome and the damages that may be deemed to have arisen from the 
defendant’s breach of that promise are similarly limited”.  
Remedies for breach of this obligation are limited in both English and American law, 
and therefore to ensure certainty with regards to compensation parties may include a 
liquidated damage or “break-up fee” clause.233 These clauses allow the aggrieved 
party to set a specific sum payable for breach and avoid the evidentiary difficulties in 
proving damages.234  
4 4 2 South African law  
There does not appear to be any reported South African case law on remedies for 
breach of an obligation to negotiate exclusively. This may stem from the inclusion of 
break-up fee clauses and parties electing not to enforce these agreements or settling 
out of court.  
An interdict restraining a party from negotiating with third parties should theoretically 
be a remedy for breach of an obligation to negotiate exclusively. However, in the 
absence of an order compelling parties to negotiate, the other party who has been 
ordered to comply with an exclusivity obligation can merely wait for the period of 
exclusivity to lapse without making any effort to negotiate. Reliance damages thus 
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appears to be the only useful remedy for breach, but some commercial utility may 
nevertheless lie in preventing a party from negotiating with a third party.  
4 5 Extra-judicial consequences of pre-contractual agreements  
Business professionals often conclude transactions involving significant economic risk 
by means of informal agreements rooted in “common honesty and decency”.235 They 
expect that pre-contractual agreements will be abided by, irrespective of their 
uncertain legal effect. Studies conducted by Macaulay reveal that business 
professionals commonly settle contractual disputes without relying on legal sanctions 
or the threat thereof.236 Sanctions (remedies for breach) often have little influence on 
parties’ compliance with their contractual obligations.237 Hwang, after having 
interviewed various American lawyers, concludes that legal liability for breach of an 
agreement to negotiate in good faith is both weak and limited.238 Lawyers explain that 
pre-contractual agreements are rarely enforced in practice despite sophisticated 
parties being aware of their enforceability.239 Enforceability has little effect on the 
parties’ behaviour because the risk of enforcement is not regarded as a “real 
possibility” and the remedy is generally very limited and far exceeded by the exorbitant 
costs of litigation.240 Furthermore business professionals generally strive to avoid legal 
enforcement of agreements or the threat thereof, because it can negatively influence 
their reputation in an economic sector and discourage others from doing business with 
them. 241 
Extra-judicial consequences offer an alternative explanation for why pre-contractual 
agreements affect parties’ behaviour and promote compliance, even in the absence 
of legal enforcement.242 Parties may be compelled to comply to protect their 
reputations, to ensure business relationships are maintained for future dealings, to 
avoid economic sanctions that may flow from non-compliance or out of a sense of 
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moral obligation.243 Potential economic consequences include the termination of 
business relationships, and harm to commercial credit.244 These consequences are 
often more serious than the legal consequences.245  
The reputational consequences potentially flowing from non-compliance with a pre-
contractual agreement to negotiate (binding or non-binding) or a preliminary principle 
contract can either compel business professionals to comply or constitute a 
“punishment for breach”.246 Both Holten247 and Hwang248 agree that “reputational 
consequences” as an informal mechanism of enforcement has a limited scope of 
application, and only works in small industries where the aggrieved party and other 
parties within the market refuse to do business with the non-complying party.249 In 
larger sectors of the economy, there is often a diverse range of business professionals 
with whom to pursue transactions and the risk of reputational consequences is 
considerably lower.250 Hwang also highlights that many business professionals are not 
“repeat players” and do not fear future economic sanctions.251  
Moral or ethical obligations imposed by pre-contractual agreements may be the 
strongest force promoting compliance of such agreements.252 Hwang explains that 
moral pressure does not pose a threat of economic sanction, but rather encourages 
parties to comply out of the desire to appear to be an “integrity player”.253 Many parties 
involved in transactions attach great value to qualities such as integrity and morality 
in business, even if they are not involved in repetitive transactions.254  
Holten suggests that parties enter into pre-contractual agreements out of necessity 
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when there is no other appropriate “legal regime” that will achieve the parties’ intended 
outcome and they rely on extra-judicial mechanisms for compliance.255 As examples 
of such mechanisms Holten lists “reputational consequences, private arbitration, or 
economic retaliation and collateral, or hostage, exchanges.”256 This analysis reveals 
that even in the absence of legal sanctions, some extra-judicial factors could influence 
compliance with pre-contractual agreements.  
The existence of extra-judicial consequences, while relevant and useful do not 
entirely negate the necessity of carefully formulated legal rules that maintain legal 
certainty and promote the underlying values of good faith and ubuntu. Contract law 
performs a fundamental role in facilitating commercial transactions, but it is proposed 
that the South African law of contract should go a step further to promote fairness in 
contract and curb bad faith, and opportunistic, behaviour. Ultimately, only legal 
sanction and not extra-judicial functions alone can create a commercial framework 
that promotes both fairness and efficient contracting.  
4 6 Conclusion 
The investigation into the legal consequences and remedies for breach of the various 
types of pre-contractual agreements involved the exploration of a new and relatively 
undeveloped territory. This is particularly true in the South African context, where 
these agreements are only enforced to a limited extent. Foreign jurisdictions such as 
American law, in contrast, have been more receptive to attaching legal consequences 
to these types of agreements, but offer different and potentially incompatible solutions 
to the question of remedies. American law, for example, grants reliance damages as 
the primary remedy for breach of an obligation to negotiate, whereas South African 
law in contrast regards specific performance as the primary remedy for breach of 
contract. 
Remedies for breach of these agreements to negotiate (assuming that they are 
contractually enforceable) in South Africa raises difficult issues regarding the proper 
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role of the courts, the intended consequences of such agreements, and the most 
effective means of enforcing them. This chapter, while recognising these difficulties, 
sought to determine appropriate remedies, which vary according to the type of 
agreement at hand.  
We note that in all the legal systems under consideration, agreements to negotiate 
with deadlock-breaking mechanisms generally result in the principal contract coming 
into existence. The legal consequence of a breakdown in negotiations is that parties 
are compelled to negotiate in good faith and the deadlock-breaking mechanism 
operates as a forceful sanction and incentive to comply. In the event of breach of the 
afore-mentioned type of contract, a court is able to order specific performance of the 
contract by invoking the deadlock-breaking mechanism.  
In the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism, the legal consequences and 
remedies for breach of agreements to negotiate are more complex. It is firstly possible 
that one is dealing with an independent agreement to negotiate, entered into prior to 
any envisaged principal contract, and that this independent agreement outlines a few 
of the major terms, or solely records an arrangement to negotiate a second contract 
in the future. The materialisation of the final contract is not guaranteed. In terms of 
American law, contractual obligations to negotiate in good faith (distinct from any 
contractual obligations obliging conclusion of the principal contract itself) are enforced 
and appear to give rise to the remedies of specific performance in the form of an order 
compelling parties to negotiate in good faith, and reliance damages.257 This conclusion 
is justified by the fact that this type of obligation regulates the process rather than the 
outcome of negotiations.  
Remedies for breach of this type of agreement in America (the only jurisdiction 
under consideration where they are currently enforced) are therefore appropriately 
limited to specific performance in the form of an injunction compelling parties to 
negotiate, and reliance damages. The efficacy of the former remedy in the absence of 
a deadlock-breaking mechanism is questionable. Parties have little incentive to 
negotiate seriously towards consensus, and achieving the aggrieved party’s desired 
outcome is unlikely. Reliance damages therefore appear to be the most promising 
remedy for breach of this type of agreement. While South African law may theoretically 
 




be developed to recognise independent agreements to negotiate and award reliance 
damages for breach, the utility of such a development must be assessed in light of the 
availability of similar protection and remedies from non-contractual sources. This will 
be considered in chapter 5.258 
Secondly it is possible that the agreement to negotiate outlines most of the terms 
of the envisaged transaction, and is intended to be binding, but has some open terms 
that have been left to future negotiations. These agreements contain the “contractual 
bones” of the envisaged transaction. Academics such as Hutchison and McKerrow 
propose that specific performance by enforcement of the principal contract, with the 
court or an arbitrator determining outstanding terms, is a potential remedy for breach 
of this agreement. This is a drastic and arguably too invasive remedy. 
For courts to grant this remedy there must be some mechanism or means by which 
they can determine the outstanding terms. The court cannot substitute the party’s 
machinery or mechanisms for that of its own, even if the party’s own machinery, 
namely their agreement to agree or negotiate fails. It is argued that this type of specific 
performance will be an inappropriate remedy for breach if such a mechanism is not 
expressly provided by the parties or is incapable of being implied into the agreement 
in lieu of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. Furthermore, the contention that a party 
loses his right to finalise the outstanding terms of a contract for breach of an obligation 
to negotiate in good faith cannot be accepted in light of the fundamental importance 
of legal certainty and freedom of contract. 
Finally, it must be appreciated that in practice, duties to negotiate, retain 
confidentiality or exclusivity may in any event not depend on legal remedies for their 
effectiveness. Business professionals often accept that resorting to legal sanction or 
the threat thereof can have significant detrimental effect on their business and future 
commercial relationships. They may therefore be unconcerned with the enforceability 
or contractual consequences of pre-contractual agreements. It is expected that 
business persons will abide by their agreements irrespective of legal consequences. 
Failure to do so is punished by commercial sanction which is often more severe. 
Nevertheless, while it may commercially risky to pursue legal action, significant losses 
can often incentivise an aggrieved party to seek enforcement of a pre-contractual 
 




agreement. The legal sanctions for breach of these obligations as outlined above 




Chapter 5: Pre-contractual liability arising from sources 
other than contract 
5 1 Introduction 
Common-law systems such as England and America, and South Africa’s mixed legal 
system attach great importance to freedom of contract and draw a clear distinction 
between the contractual phase, which traditionally gives rise to liability, and the pre-
contractual phase which does not.1 In these systems, parties are generally free to 
break off negotiations at any time and for any reason without attracting liability.2 It is 
accepted that prior to contract formation any expenses incurred constitute a business 
risk assumed by a party in the course of negotiations.3 It will be observed in this 
chapter that this “risk-based reasoning”4 largely influences the imposition of pre-
contractual liability even from non-contractual sources of law. 
This conservative approach has attracted criticism.5 Negotiating parties often incur 
expenses that are necessary to ensure or increase the likelihood of contract 
conclusion or to place themselves in a position to perform the anticipated contract.6 
Potential injustices could arise when the expenditures end up being wasted, 
particularly where one party is encouraged to incur them by the other party who 
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misrepresents their intention to conclude the contract. The questions that arise, and 
are considered in this chapter, are whether liability should be imposed on a party 
breaking off negotiations, what types of pre-contractual expenditure can be recovered, 
and what the basis of such liability should be. 
There are certain preliminary observations that are pertinent to contextualising and 
answering these questions. Firstly, developing the law on pre-contractual liability is an 
extremely difficult task, because it entails balancing freedom of negotiation, which is 
essential to a growing market economy, with indemnifying parties against pre-
contractual losses, which encourages efficient investment in negotiations, potentially 
increasing the transaction’s profitability.7 
Secondly the nature and extent of pre-contractual liability is affected by whether the 
specific jurisdiction imposes an overarching obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
Unlike most common-law systems,8 civil-law systems commonly recognise an 
independent pre-contractual obligation that requires parties to consider each other’s 
interests during negotiations.9 In the former systems liability generally arises from a 
number of different sources, as opposed to an overarching source.10 English and 
American courts, for example, have become more willing to intervene in the pre-
contractual phase to prevent injustice or unfairness and have done so on the basis of 
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the law of unjust enrichment, estoppel,11 and tort.12 A number of common-law 
jurisdictions are moving in the direction, familiar to civil-law systems, of imposing 
greater liability in the pre-contractual phase.13 This chapter will analyse, with reference 
to comparative studies, whether South African law can and should follow suit. In this 
regard, South African law, like common-law systems generally, accepts that the pre-
contractual relationship does not warrant legal protection for losses suffered during 
negotiations.14 Furthermore, the duty to negotiate in good faith, at present, still allows 
parties to break off negotiations without incurring liability.15 This analysis shall consider 
whether pre-contractual liability can arise in terms of the application of existing legal 
rules or whether further reform is required, for example by developing constructs 
similar to the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo. The manner in which some legal 
instruments aimed at harmonisation regulate pre-contractual liability will also be 
evaluated insofar as it can shape national rules on pre-contractual liability.  
5 2 The law of delict or tort 
This section will explore the law of delict (which can be generally equated to the law 
of tort in common-law jurisdictions) as a potential source of liability for compensating 
losses arising from failed negotiations. While South African law recognises general 
principles of delict that are “modified” for different actions,16 common-law systems 
such as England and America have a closed system of nominate torts that are 
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intended to protect specific interests. 17 
It bears mentioning that if a delictual claim were to be recognised for losses suffered 
during the pre-contractual phase, the remedy would generally be reliance damages, 
which are aimed at placing the party in the position he would have been in had the 
delict not been committed.18 This is distinguishable from expectation damages, which 
in this context would place the aggrieved party in the position he would have been in 
had the contract been concluded.  
With this in mind, a jurisdiction-specific analysis of the law of delict as a source of 
pre-contractual liability will be conducted. This analysis shall focus on the extent to 
which the law of delict or tort can remedy a party’s wasted pre-contractual expenditure, 
particularly where the other party encourages expenditure and misrepresents his 
intention to conclude the contract.  
5 2 1 English law  
In English law, the mere breaking off of negotiations does not constitute a tort.19 For 
pre-contractual liability to arise the conduct must fit into one of the existing categories 
of torts.20 This is not the only difficulty; claims for pre-contractual expenses are 
generally for pure economic loss and English courts have been unwilling to grant 
claims for pure economic loss for fear of opening the floodgates of litigation in respect 
of an indeterminate class of claimants for an indeterminate amount.21 
Nevertheless, in Walford v Miles22 (“Walford”) the court opened the possibility for 
pre-contractual liability when it confirmed that parties are entitled to pursue their own 
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interests as long as they avoid making misrepresentations.23 In this case the court 
found that agreements to negotiate are unenforceable due to uncertainty, but 
nevertheless awarded damages for misrepresentation. The court concluded that Mr 
and Mrs Walford made a misrepresentation to Mr Miles that they were no longer 
negotiating with third parties for the sale of their business which was relied upon by 
Mr Miles to his detriment.24 The court therefore awarded Mr Miles his reliance 
damages.25 Pre-contractual liability will be imposed for a misrepresentation if it 
amounts to a tort of deceit or negligence.26 Misrepresentations may either induce 
contract conclusion, or give rise to reliance that a contract will materialise and it does 
not.27 Most pre-contractual losses arise from the former misrepresentation.28 
However, this chapter will focus on pre-contractual losses suffered by a party due to 
reliance on another party’s misrepresentation regarding the latter’s intention to 
conclude a contract.29 It will become apparent, as we now turn to the requirements for 
these torts, that they are not ideally suited to pre-contractual claims.30  
5 2 1 1 General requirements for misrepresentation to give rise to liability in tort  
Before proceeding to the requirements distinct to the tort of deceit and negligence 
respectively, we shall first consider the general requirements for an actionable 
misrepresentation, namely a false statement of fact that has been relied upon.31  
Misrepresentations regarding contract conclusion32 were traditionally not regarded 
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as statements of fact but rather as statements of future intent or opinion.33 However, 
this position is changing as courts opt for a more lenient test to establish whether a 
representation is a statement of fact. Under this more flexible test, a representation 
that a contract will be concluded can be interpreted as a statement of fact regarding a 
party’s present state of mind and intention to continue with negotiations.34  
In Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon35 (“Esso Petroleum”) the court further 
developed this test, when it confirmed that what would otherwise be a statement of 
opinion may be construed as one of fact where it is made by a party possessing 
“superior knowledge or skill”.36 Although this case concerned a misrepresentation 
inducing contract conclusion, it set a valuable precedent for future development of pre-
contractual liability.37 
The second requirement is that the aggrieved party must have relied upon the 
defendant’s statement to his detriment.38 This means that the misrepresentation must 
have had a “decisive influence” on the aggrieved party’s conduct.39 With this in mind, 
we will now consider the requirements for the tort of deceit and negligence 
respectively.  
5 2 1 2 Tort of deceit  
A person may be held liable in the tort of deceit for wasted expenditure incurred by 
another in reliance on the former’s fraudulent misrepresentation regarding his intention 
to conclude the anticipated contract.40 In Derry v Peek41 the court explained the 
requirements:  
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36 Giliker Pre-Contractual Liability 110. 
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or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false”.42  
The evidentiary burden on the claimant to prove the defendant’s fraudulent intention 
makes it difficult to succeed with this action.43 While an action theoretically lies, in 
practice the tort of deceit is not a realistic source of pre-contractual liability. 
5 2 1 3 Tort of negligence 
As previously mentioned, courts have been hesitant to grant claims for pure economic 
loss.44 Nevertheless, in the seminal case of Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners45 
the court recognised a claim for pure economic loss caused by a negligent 
misrepresentation.46 The requirements are as follows: there must be a duty of care 
between the claimant and defendant, which the latter failed to comply with, and as a 
result of which the former suffered loss.47  
In contrast with civil-law systems such as Germany, English law does not recognise 
a duty of care upon the commencement of negotiations.48 This presents difficulties to 
a party claiming pre-contractual losses.49 A duty of care will only arise when there is a 
special relationship of proximity.50 The court in Hedley51 explains that a duty of care 
exists if a person “takes it upon himself to give information or advice” to another and 
knew or ought to have known that the other party would rely upon it.52 There must be 
some form of assumption of responsibility on the part of the defendant.53  
In Box v Midland Bank54 a bank manager made a representation that the approval 
 
42 See also discussion in Cartwright Contract Law 85. 
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of the claimant’s application by the head office was a formality, but his application was 
subsequently rejected. Lloyd J, relying on Esso Petroleum, concluded that the bank 
manager’s representation was a statement of fact regarding the bank’s present 
applications policy.55 This case recognised liability for negligent misrepresentations 
regarding the likely outcome of negotiations.56 In theory, this decision extended liability 
for negligent misrepresentation into the pre-contractual phase,57 but this lone 
precedent has not been followed in subsequent case law. It is thus unlikely that a party 
will establish a duty of care in the course of contractual negotiations.58 
Giliker proposes that English tort should be developed in a similar manner to the 
French law of tort which allows claims for these types of pre-contractual losses. 59 She 
nevertheless concedes that there is little scope for development due to the extremely 
restrictive approach to claims for pure economic loss, the importance attributed to 
freedom of contract60 and the deeply entrenched notion that there is no liability prior 
to contract formation. For now, it is accepted that a claimant must resort to other 
potential sources of pre-contractual liability. 
5 2 1 4 Misappropriation of confidential information 
Various legal mechanisms are aimed at protecting a party who discloses confidential 
information during contractual negotiations.61 It can potentially be argued that 
misappropriation of confidential information constitutes a tort,62 if such information was 
recognised as property.63 This tort has yet to be recognised and the prevailing view 
seems to be that an obligation for breach of confidence arises either from contract or 
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some “‘equitable’ idea of ‘trust’”.64 Although there is currently no claim in tort,65 we will 
nevertheless consider the duty of confidence arising in equity.66  
This equitable duty developed to prevent parties from utilising confidential 
information for any other purpose than that for which it is disclosed.67 In the leading 
case of Seagar v Copydex68 (“Seagar”), the court confirmed that there is an equitable 
duty on a party who has received confidential information not to take “unfair advantage 
of it.” In Terrapin Ltd v Builders Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd69 (“Terrapin”) the court 
explained that a person is not allowed to use confidential information “as a springboard 
for activities detrimental to the person” disclosing such information. 
An aggrieved party will therefore have a claim for the misuse of confidential 
information disclosed in the course of negotiations if an equitable duty of confidentiality 
arises, bearing in mind that it is within the discretion of the court to determine whether 
a duty of confidentiality arises during negotiations.70 
5 2 2 American law 
Most American jurisdictions do not recognise liability, in tort, for negligent 
misrepresentations made during failed negotiations.71 Pre-contractual liability in tort 
may arise for the misappropriation of trade secrets, interference with a prospective 
contractual relationship72 or fraudulent misrepresentations. 73  
Section 530(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a “representation 
of the maker’s own intention to do or not to do a particular thing is fraudulent if he does 
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not have that intention”. A party may thus be liable if he continues negotiations without 
seriously intending to reach agreement or negotiates with a party solely to prevent him 
from contracting with a third party.74  
To succeed with a claim in tort, the aggrieved party must prove there was a false 
misrepresentation made with fraudulent intent, and knowledge of falsity, that was 
reasonably relied upon and caused damage.75 Proving fraudulent intent is particularly 
difficult, because it requires an assessment of the party’s state of mind.76 There is thus 
little case law on this type of claim.77 
Markov v ABC Transfer and Storage Co78 constitutes an exceptional case where a 
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was successful. The lessor made 
representations to the lessee regarding its intention to renew the lease while 
simultaneously negotiating and eventually selling the leased premises to third 
parties.79 The court found that the lessor’s true intent was clearly to keep its options 
open to its own benefit.80 The representations were fraudulent because they were 
made “without care or concern” as to whether they would be kept.81  
The court granted the aggrieved party his reliance damages, which in these specific 
circumstances included a claim for the lost opportunity to fulfil its services to its main 
client.82 This case remains highly exceptional and the tort of deceit is rarely applied by 
the courts in this context.83  
Farnsworth explains that the tort of deceit has not become a prominent source of 
pre-contractual liability, primarily because parties are rarely inclined to make the types 
of blatantly false misrepresentations dealt with in Markov,84 and it is thus difficult to 
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prove fraudulent intent.85 From this analysis it becomes clear that while American law 
does recognise a claim in tort for fraudulent misrepresentation, it is not regarded as a 
practical or promising source of liability. 
5 2 3 German law  
In Germany, pre-contractual liability is well developed. Scholars and courts recognised 
that the German law of delict was an unsuitable source of pre-contractual liability, 
because it excluded claims for negligently caused pure economic loss86 To address 
this they developed the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo,87 a unique form of liability 
with both delictual and contractual elements.88  
5 2 3 1 Culpa in contrahendo 
Culpa in contrahendo, as formulated in the pioneering nineteenth-century study of Von 
Jhering and Demelius,89 envisaged liability for blameworthy conduct during the pre-
contractual phase that renders the contract invalid or void.90 Over time case law and 
legal literature aided the further development of culpa in contrahendo to apply to failed 
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negotiations.91 The focus of the doctrine also shifted from merely protecting reliance 
to promoting good faith in contract formation.92 
Since the seminal “Linoleum Carpet Case”93 German courts have accepted that 
parties to contractual negotiations are in a relationship akin to a contractual one and 
therefore liability can arise if a party does not respect the legitimate interests and 
expectations of the other party.94 Case law confirms that the commencement of 
negotiations gives rise to a duty of care.95  
Culpa in contrahendo was incorporated in the more recent reforms of the German 
Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”).96 Section 241(2) BGB provides for 
“an obligation … to take account of the rights, legal interests and other interests of the 
other party”. Section 311(2) BGB provides that the duties set out in section 241(2) 
BGB can arise from the “commencement of contractual negotiations”, or if one party 
to a potential contractual relationship has given the other party the ability to affect his 
rights or legal interests.  
Markesinis and others describe this codification of culpa in contrahendo as “utterly 
vague” and argue that the legal position should be understood with reference to 
existing case law until the courts provide further clarification.97  
5 2 3 2 Practical application 
There are three elements to succeed with a claim for culpa in contrahendo where 
negotiations fail to result in contract conclusion.  
“First, one party must have led the other to believe that conclusion of the contract was 
certain. Secondly, that expense was incurred in view of the contract. Finally, that 
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subsequently the other party broke off the negotiations without good reason.”98 
Various cases during the 1950s confirmed that liability ensues if a party carelessly 
induced the other party to believe that a contract would be concluded.99 In one case100 
it was confirmed that even without prior carelessness a party can be held liable for 
inducing reliance that a contract will materialise if negotiations are broken off without 
a valid reason.101 This was confirmed in the “Newspaper”102 decision, where it was 
also added that the claimant must show the defendant “had induced the belief that the 
contract would, with certainty, be finalized.”103 Some authors suggest this sets a higher 
threshold for the imposition of liability than the common-law “legitimate expectation” 
requirement.104 The claimant must also prove he relied on the anticipated 
materialisation of the contract to his detriment.105  
We now turn to the third and problematic element: what constitutes a “good reason” 
to break off negotiations?106 Courts have yet to provide clarity on this issue.107 Dietrich 
suggests that the grounds justifying rescission of a contract will also constitute good 
reason for breaking off contractual negotiations.108 Good reason will also exist if the 
negotiations were terminated pursuant to an impediment such as inability to perform 
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on the claimant’s part.109  
From the above analysis it is clear that it is not the breaking off of negotiations that 
give rises to liability, but the blameworthy manner in which negotiations were 
conducted prior to termination.110 German courts do not positively enforce the duty to 
negotiate in good faith, but rather grant reliance damages to compensate the 
aggrieved party.111 Specific performance is thus unavailable during the pre-contractual 
phase.112  
Whether the German doctrine of culpa in contrahendo should be imported into 
South African law will depend on our analysis of the law of delict below.113 Zieff has 
strongly advocated the adoption of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo to address the 
shortcomings of the law of contract and delict relating to negligent 
misrepresentations.114 He argued that a remedy was needed “to cater for negligent 
misrepresentation” and to overcome the obstacles that arise in relation to 
wrongfulness, pure economic loss and indeterminate liability.115 This view will be 
considered when evaluating the law of delict as a source of pre-contractual liability.116 
5 2 3 3 Duty not to misappropriate confidential information  
The German doctrine of culpa in contrahendo also protects confidential information 
disclosed in the course of negotiations.117 Liability will depend on whether there was 
an “implied pre-contractual duty” on a negotiating party not to disclose confidential 
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information revealed during negotiations.118 This duty arises as part of the broader 
duty of care imposed upon parties at the commencement of negotiations.119 Liability 
thus flows from sections 311(2) and 280(1) BGB.120 If a party breaches such duty of 
confidentiality, the aggrieved party will be entitled to claim damages for the losses 
suffered,121 or the benefit or profits received by the other party.122 
5 2 4 South African law 
Comparative analysis reveals that in the foreign common-law systems under 
consideration the law of tort has a limited application in the pre-contractual phase. This 
mainly stems from the courts’ apprehension towards claims for pure economic loss, 
which risk opening the floodgates of litigation.123 Although the floodgates argument is 
well-known  in South African case law and literature, delictual claims for pure economic 
loss are nevertheless recognised.124 This allows a claim in delict to potentially lie for 
the misuse of information disclosed in the course of negotiations and 
misrepresentations regarding contract conclusion.125 Delictual liability for 
misrepresentations that induce contract conclusion is well developed. However, here 
the focus will be on situations where there is a misrepresentation regarding the 
conclusion of a contract in circumstances where no contract materialises.126  
5 2 4 1 Misrepresentations  
Before there can be delictual pre-contractual liability, a party must prove the five 
elements of a delict namely, conduct, harm, causation, fault and wrongfulness.127 It 
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will be less problematic to prove the aforementioned elements in respect of fraudulent 
misrepresentations, even in circumstances where no contract materialises.128 It is 
prima facie wrongful for one party to continue negotiations knowing that he does not 
intend to conclude a contract and a claim in delict will likely lie for the aggrieved 
party.129 However, proving fraud is exceedingly difficult; the true challenge in practice 
is to determine what the consequences of negligent behaviour would be. In this regard 
Murray v McLean NO130 (“Murray”) is the only case to consider the existence of an 
action for pure economic loss arising from a negligent misrepresentation made in the 
course of failed negotiations. Although it set the precedent that no such cause of action 
exists in the law of the former Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) or South Africa,131 some 
academics argue that this case no longer reflects the current legal position and 
requires reconsideration.132 To recognise such an action, liability for negligent 
misrepresentations would have to be extended to include the situation where the 
misrepresentation does not induce contract conclusion, but rather induces a 
detrimental reliance that a contract will be concluded.133 In order to evaluate the 
possibility of such a development it is necessary to analyse the merits of the Murray134 
case. 
(i) The precedent set by Murray v McLean NO 
Here the defendant, made various representations regarding the purchase of 
prefabricated houses from the claimant, and the availability of funds to do so.135 Both 
parties anticipated contract conclusion, and the claimant’s reliance expenditure was 
wasted when the defendant decided against the transaction.136  
The court confirmed that in limited circumstances our law is willing to impose 
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delictual liability for negligent misrepresentations.137 Lewis J proceeded to list the two 
essential requirements for this type of claim with reference to Herschel v Mrupe.138 
These requirements are first that the claimant must have had a right to rely on the 
representation, and secondly that he must have exercised ordinary care in protecting 
his own interests.139 Lewis J went on to find that the claimant did not have “the right to 
gamble on the fact that a contract might eventuate and then seek to hold the 
representor responsible when no contract eventuates”.140  
The court explained that an ordinary person in this situation would either have 
avoided incurring expenses until contract conclusion or would have sought to protect 
himself in the course of negotiations by concluding a separate agreement regulating 
the allocation of risk in the pre-contractual phase.141 The latter sentiment is supported 
with reference to the similar reasoning of Wessels JA in Hamman v Moolman.142  
The court further regarded the possibility of an action for negligent 
misrepresentation in the circumstances of the case as a “startling innovation in 
commercial affairs”.143 Parties to contractual negotiations are “deemed to know that 
there is a risk” that the contract will not materialise.144 In this regard, Lewis J, by way 
of illustration, gave the example of a lady who goes into a shoe shop to purchase a 
pair of shoes, despite lacking the funds to do so.145 By choosing to help the lady, the 
shopkeeper takes a commercial risk and will have no action against her if no sale is 
concluded.146 This despite the lady making an implied representation that she had 
funds to purchase the shoes, and the shopkeeper wasting time she could have spent 
securing a now lost sale from another customer. 147 
Lewis J ultimately concluded that the claimant had failed to disclose a cause of 
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action.148 Much of the reasoning in this judgement suggests that he considered the 
claimant’s reliance to be unreasonable.149 His reasoning was also strongly influenced 
by the fact that at that time, negligently-caused pure economic loss did not give rise to 
a delictual cause of action.150  
(ii) Potential development 
The Murray precedent must be rejected insofar as it was justified by the denial of 
claims for pure economic loss, since these claims are now recognised in South African 
law. 151 The question rather arises whether Lewis J raised other valid reasons to deny 
this action. This brings us to the lady in the shoe shop example.152 While it is indeed 
true that the shopkeeper should not have a claim against a customer, the extension of  
this reasoning to complex commercial transactions constitutes a sweeping 
generalisation and oversimplification of transactions that require a party to expend 
substantial resources in preparation for contract conclusion. Such transactions often 
see parties making relationship-specific investments in reliance on a representation at 
an advanced stage of negotiations where the contract is likely to materialise. Business 
professionals often conduct business informally under a mutual expectation that 
parties may rely upon representations and assurances made during contractual 
negotiations even in the absence of an agreement to that effect. This is clearly 
distinguishable from the former situation where the shopkeeper is well aware that their 
time may be wasted if a lady lacks the necessary funds, or does not find what she is 
looking for. 
Lewis J’s suggestion that parties should conclude an ancillary contract regulating 
the allocation of risk ignores the reality that commercial parties are unlikely to expend 
time and resources on negotiating such a contract, as a precaution to prepare for the 
worst case scenario, particularly when negotiations are going well. It does not follow 
that a party should be allowed to create a reasonable expectation that a contract will 
materialise, knowing that the other party is relying upon it, and then break off 
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negotiations in bad faith. In the absence of liability, parties will be wary of conducting 
negotiations. This  potentially stifles economic growth and the efficiency of business 
transactions. 
If the Murray case is no longer good in law, can and should this claim be 
recognised? The fact that our law has developed to recognise actions for negligent 
misrepresentation(s) inducing contract conclusion153 supports the possibility of 
developing a similar action where no contract materialises.154 Our discussion now 
turns to whether the latter claim meets the elements of a delict. In this regard, the 
primary focus will be on the most problematic element namely wrongfulness.155  
It is clear that intentional harm-causing is prima facie wrongful, but the same is not 
true of negligent conduct.156 To prove wrongfulness there must be “infringement of a 
right or breach of a duty”.157 In most cases the focus will be on whether there was a 
legal duty on the defendant to ensure that the claimant does not suffer economic 
losses.158 In Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board159 the court explained that 
whether a legal duty exists involves a value judgment “as to whether the claimant’s 
invaded interest is worthy of protection against the kind conduct perpetrated by the 
defendant”.160  
The wrongfulness test applies “a general criterion of reasonableness, based on 
considerations of morality and policy, and taking into account its assessment of the 
legal convictions of the community and now also taking into account the norms, values 
and principles contained in the Constitution”.161 As a result, the wrongfulness test has 
become more flexible and open-ended.162 
In this context the wrongfulness enquiry must take into account the fundamental 
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importance attached to freedom of contract and the right to break off negotiations 
without liability, making the action less likely to succeed.163 It is also relevant that the 
traditional allocation of risk prior to contract formation will be disrupted by the 
imposition of liability.164 Nevertheless, there are public policy considerations that 
favour the extension of delictual liability for pre-contractual conduct. Public policy has 
seen a shift towards greater fairness and reasonableness in contracting165 , and more 
specifically the need to promote the value of good faith.166 We observed above that 
German law recognises that specific duties arise upon the commencement of 
negotiations which requires parties to consider each other’s interests.167 Du Plessis 
explains that these pre-contractual duties exist in German law to give expression “to 
good faith as an underlying value”.168 By extension it can be argued that good faith as 
an underlying value would best be given effect to by developing the law of delict to 
make provision for blameworthy conduct in the course of contractual negotiations. The 
blanket denial of an action for pre-contractual misrepresentations where no contract 
materialises is inconsistent with this shift. The law must be developed to meet modern 
commercial needs.169 This action should be recognised, albeit in a carefully 
constructed and qualified way to avoid opening the floodgates of litigation.  
Actionable misrepresentations regarding future contract conclusion must be 
delineated from innocent, good faith representations. Wrongfulness will play a crucial 
role here. Hutchison correctly argues that breaking off negotiations will only be 
wrongful if the misrepresentation induces a legitimate expectation that a contract will 
be concluded.170 This in turn depends on the stage of negotiations reached.171 
McFarlane, writing in the context of English law, similarly suggests that this claim 
should only be available if there is a reasonable reliance and negotiations have 
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reached a stage where there is an “agreement in principle”.172 If negotiations are 
advanced it is more likely that a contract will be concluded, and thus the reliance is 
reasonable.173 In this regard a comparison can be drawn with the requirements for 
liability to arise on the basis of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo,174 where it is 
required that one party must have led the other party to believe that conclusion of the 
contract was certain. If all of the above requirements are met, a legal duty of care 
should arise to prevent harm to the other party.  
Public policy considerations dictate that the aggrieved party be compensated for 
his reliance expenditure. This way parties may claim their reliance losses in the 
appropriate circumstances and ensuring that freedom of contract is for the most part 
respected175 and the floodgates of litigation are not opened This proposed solution 
conforms to the position in the international instruments176 and in German law.177  
Finally, as indicated earlier, Zieff has argued that a single unified remedy, in the 
form of culpa in contrahendo, should be adopted into South African law.178 However, 
while there are merits to his argument, they have to be considered in the context of 
the time in which they were made. The law of delict has seen substantial development 
since then, and it is therefore proposed that pre-contractual liability for negligent 
misrepresentations can be provided  for, without having to import the doctrine of culpa 
in contrahendo. In any event, it will be very difficult for courts to introduce culpa in 
contrahendo into South African law given the doctrine of precedent and the absence 
of case law in favour of exporting the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo into South 
African law. 
5 2 4 2 Misappropriation of confidential information 
A delictual action also lies for the misuse of confidential information disclosed in 
negotiations if it constitutes unlawful competition.179 In Southern African Institute of 
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Chartered Secretaries and Administrators v Careers-in-Sync180 the applicant sought 
an interdict to prevent the respondent from misusing its confidential information. The 
court181 in reaching its decision to grant an interdict considered the case of Dun v 
Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau182 which affirmed the 
principles set out in the English cases of Seagar and Terrapin discussed above.183  
This action is essential to protect a party who discloses confidential information in the 
course of negotiations, particularly where no confidentiality agreement has been 
concluded. Confidential information is often disclosed out of necessity to increase the 
likelihood of contract conclusion and should not be exploited or unfairly used by the 
receiving party. In the absence of a delictual action for the misuse of confidential 
information there would be a substantial rise in opportunistic and malicious behaviour 
in the course of negotiations. Parties would be able to commence negotiations for the 
sole purpose of gaining access to confidential information which could then be used 
to compete with the party who disclosed that information in good faith, on the 
assumption that the parties were negotiating towards conclusion of a contract. The 
underlying value of good faith and public policy demand that such harm-causing 
behaviour be discouraged and sanctioned.  
5 3 The law of unjustified enrichment 
This section examines the application of the law of unjustified enrichment (or unjust 
enrichment, as common-law systems normally refer to it) in the pre-contractual phase, 
and especially the extent to which it can provide restitution where work has been done, 
services rendered, or goods delivered in circumstances where a contract fails to 
materialise. Naturally, if parties have concluded a contract allocating risk or a collateral 
agreement to pay for work done or services rendered, then the law of contract will 
apply.184 However, parties often anticipate contract conclusion, but fail to give thought 
to what the consequences should be if no contract materialises.185 The basis for 
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liability in these circumstances cannot be contractual.186 It could be argued that if one 
party is enriched because another party, in the course of negotiations, delivered goods 
or performed services in anticipation of a contract that fails to materialise, the 
enrichment is unjust or unjustified, and should be returned. 
In Germany the law of unjustified enrichment will rarely be applicable in this context 
because the requirements are unlikely to be met,187 and the doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo specifically caters for pre-contractual liability. This leaves English, 
American and South African law for further consideration. 
5 3 1 English Law 
Restitution or unjust enrichment constitutes one of the main potential sources of pre-
contractual liability in English law.188 A claim in unjust enrichment can be for the 
quantum meruit or quantum valebant189 – a reasonable sum for work done or services 
rendered, and goods delivered respectively. The case law dealing with these claims 
will now be examined.  
5 3 1 1 Relevant case law 
In the leading case of British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering 
Co Ltd190 (“British Steel”) the parties entered into negotiations for the manufacturing 
and supply of steel nodes, which were delivered at the request of the defendant. 
Negotiations subsequently broke down and the claimant claimed payment for unjust 
enrichment while the defendant made a counter-claim for breach of contract (defective 
or late performance).191 Goff J found that no contract had come into existence because 
there were still material terms requiring further negotiation.192 He proceeded to state 
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that if, contrary to the expectation of the parties, a contract fails to materialise then the 
law of unjust enrichment may impose an obligation upon the party who requested the 
work to pay a reasonable sum for such work.193 British Steel was awarded a 
reasonable sum, (in this case the market value) for the goods delivered.194 
A claim for unjust enrichment may also exist in respect of services rendered in the 
pre-contractual phase.195 In Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd196 the parties 
reached an agreement in terms of which the claimant would, at his own cost, submit 
a planning permission application.197 The parties agreed that if planning permission 
was granted the defendant would sell the property to the claimant.198 However when 
planning permission was granted the defendant sought to renegotiate the terms of 
sale. Negotiations broke down and the claimant instituted claims on various grounds, 
including unjust enrichment.199 
Scott LJ found that the services performed by the claimant increased the value of 
the defendant’s property.200 The defendant was unjustly enriched, at the expense of 
the claimant, in having received the planning permission without paying for it. The 
claimant was entitled to the quantum meruit, because he did not intend to render his 
services gratuitously.201 In Country Wide Communications Ltd v ICL Pathway202 the 
court also granted the quantum meruit for services rendered on the same basis but 
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In Brewer Street Investments Ltd v Barclays Woollen Co Ltd204 the court took this 
type of claim for unjust enrichment a step further. In this case the parties entered into 
negotiations for a lease and the prospective landlord undertook to make certain 
renovations to the premises. Negotiations subsequently failed, and the claimants 
instituted a claim for expenses incurred. The court concluded that the defendants by 
requesting the renovations had accepted responsibility for the costs thereof even if 
negotiations failed.205 The court in granting this claim conducted a fault-based enquiry 
– if the anticipated contract does not materialise due to the fault of the one party who 
for examples “simply changes his mind” or terminates negotiations for no reason at 
all, he should not be entitled to retain the benefit received.206 
It is difficult to see what benefit the defendants actually received.207 The court 
essentially appears to extend the law of unjust enrichment to provide a remedy where 
the claimant has incurred losses due to the anticipated contract failing to materialise. 
Various academics correctly express strong reservations regarding importing this 
requirement into the law of unjust enrichment.208 
The question arises whether the legal position changes if the services performed in 
anticipation of a contract are merely preparatory in nature or wasted because the 
project is abandoned209 and there is no provisional prior agreement as in Cobbe 
above. In Regalian Properties Plc v London Dockland Developments210 the parties 
conducted negotiations regarding a residential development, which were eventually 
abandoned due to fluctuations in the property market and deadlock in negotiations.211 
The claimants instituted a claim for various expenses incurred in preparation for entry 
into the building lease. These expenses were incurred in obtaining expert advice, site 
investigations and detailed designs of the proposed development which would have 
enriched the defendants had they proceeded with the development. The court refused 
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this claim on a number of grounds. Negotiations were expressly made “subject to 
contract”, parties thus knew that either of them were entitled to break off negotiations 
without liability.212 Unlike the Cobbe case, and more like the Brewer Street case the 
defendant received no benefit because the services performed were of no use to it as 
it decided not to proceed with the development.213 Furthermore, the defendant had not 
requested the work, which was merely of a preparatory nature to place the claimant in 
a position to perform the contract.214  
The following general principles may be formulated based on the case law 
discussed previously. Any expenses incurred in preparation for performance of the 
envisaged transaction fall within the ordinary business risk taken by a party conducting 
negotiations.215 Compensation will not be recoverable for work done to demonstrate 
skills in the hope of securing a contract.216 In William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis217 
the court explained that if a builder incurs expenditure in the hope of securing a 
contract “he undertakes that work as a gamble and its cost is part of the overhead 
expense of his business, which he hopes will be met out of the profits of such contract” 
if his tender is successful.218 Birks describes this as builders using “sprats to catch 
mackerel”.219 
Mitchell and others make an important observation – the mere fact that a party has 
transferred a benefit on the understanding that it will be compensated out of the 
proceeds of the anticipated contract does not mean that the conferring party is 




214 214, 231. 
215 Giliker Pre-Contractual Liability 85; C Mitchell, P Mitchell & S Watterson (eds) Goff and Jones: The 
Law of Unjust Enrichment (2016) 443-444, 529; MSM Consulting Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania 
[2009] EWHC 121 (QB) para 171(b); Regalian Properties Plc v London Dockland Developments [1995] 
1 WLR 212 (EWHC) 212; Cartwright & Hesselink Precontractual Liability 119; E McKendrick Contract 
Law 12 ed (2017) 55; Cartwright Contract Law 93; Pannebakker Letter of Intent 13. 
216 Mitchell et al (eds) Law of Unjust Enrichment 443,530; MSM Consulting Ltd v United Republic of 
Tanzania [2009] EWHC 121 (QB) para 174. 
217 [1957] 1 WLR 932 934. 
218 934. 




reason”.220 They do not go so far as to suggest that a fault-based inquiry should be 
applied to determine whether benefits conferred, in the course of failed negotiations, 
should be returned.  
If both parties are conducting negotiations on the basis that each is responsible for 
their own risks in the course of negotiations then the law should not intervene.221 
Cobbe was exceptional because in that case the parties had agreed that the defendant 
would carry out the work and the contract failed to materialise as a sole result of the 
defendant’s unilateral decision to demand a higher price and withdraw from 
negotiations222 after receiving the benefit of the defendant’s work. 
5 3 1 4 Evaluation of the law of unjust enrichment as a source of liability 
The requirements for an enrichment claim traditionally are that the defendant must 
have received a benefit, to the detriment of the claimant, and it must be unjust to allow 
the defendant to retain the benefit.223 The conceptual basis of these claims has been 
unclear and inconsistent particularly in the context of work done or services 
rendered.224 These conceptual difficulties are significant,225 but a comprehensive 
analysis of the complexities and accompanying academic debates fall beyond the 
scope of this thesis. For our purposes, the focus remains on whether there are 
circumstances where the English law of unjust enrichment or restitution should be 
applied to impose an obligation to return benefits received by a party during failed 
negotiations.  
English law clearly recognises specific cases where benefits transferred in 
anticipation of a contract which does not materialise should be returned by the 
receiving party. These cases reflect a carefully crafted balance between the 
“preliminary risk taking phase” and the next phase; where the benefit conferred is 
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clearly not intended to be gratuitous and goes beyond costs incurred in the hope of a 
contract materialising.226  
However cases like Brewer Street Investments are problematic because the court 
attempts to give the claimant a remedy he otherwise would not have had, by 
classifying his losses as a benefit conferred upon the defendant.227 This suggests that 
a “fictitious benefit”228 is sufficient to found a claim for unjust enrichment. Some courts 
have also made awards measured by the aggrieved party’s wasted expenditure.229 
Enrichment claims cannot cater for all pre-contractual losses and the availability of 
remedies arising from other sources of law should be investigated before making 
illogical developments to the law of unjust enrichment.230  
5 3 2 American law 
American law also recognises claims for restitution of benefits conferred in the pre-
contractual phase.231 Farnsworth describes this as a “compelling ground for 
precontractual liability.”232 The application of the laws of restitution or unjust 
enrichment is however limited by the aleatory view of negotiations233 and the high 
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threshold set to succeed with such a claim.234 It is generally accepted that a party 
incurs pre-contractual expenditure for his own benefit and not usually for the benefit 
of the other party;235 courts accordingly regard any benefits conferred or losses 
suffered as a justified risk of negotiations.236 For example, expenses incurred by a 
sub-contractor, assisting the contractor to secure a bid, are usually regarded as “the 
costs of doing business”.237 In Songbird Jet Ltd v Amax238 the court explained that the 
time and expenses incurred in the course of negotiations are the “common grist of 
negotiations aimed towards consummation of an agreement… the endeavours by 
either side, if they fail, do not warrant a claim that one party has been unjustly enriched 
at the expense of the other.”239 
Nevertheless claims for restitution or claims based on unjust enrichment may arise 
in the pre-contractual phase. Firstly, a claim may exist where one party has benefited 
from the use of a novel idea or information disclosed in the course of negotiations;240 
secondly, a claim may exist where a party has rendered services, during unsuccessful 
negotiations, and in anticipation of a contract that does not materialise.241 Few cases 
have entertained these types of enrichment claims.242 The limited case law will now 
be critically evaluated. 
In Hill v Waxberg,243 the respondent claimed the reasonable value of services 
rendered and expenses incurred in anticipation of a building contract. The court 
concluded that Waxberg’s services, which included consultations with architects, 
surveying the property, and being instrumental in collecting the necessary data to 
obtain financing from the Federal Housing authority, were “virtually irreplaceable” and 
could not have been substituted without “considerable additional expense” to the 
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defendant.244 It is significant that the court concluded that “it makes no difference 
whether the pay expected [by the performing party] is in the form of an immediate cash 
payment, or in the form of profits to be derived from a contract, the consummation of 
which would or should be anticipated by reasonable men…”245  
In Longo v Shore & Reicht Ltd246 the court found that the claimant, a prospective 
employee, was entitled to the quantum meruit for services rendered and equipment 
provided, even though the employment contract was not executed because the 
defendant had accepted those services and there was an expectation of 
compensation.247  
In Earhart v William Low Co248 the court explained that a claim for restitution will lie, 
and a benefit will be conferred, if the claimant does work at the request of the 
defendant.249 However, Farnsworth highly doubted that this definition of benefit would 
receive widespread support in case law.250 His doubts were well-founded – there are 
few subsequent cases entertaining claims for benefits conferred in anticipation of 
contract that does not materialise.251 The reason for this appears to be that pre-
contractual expenses for services rendered or work done, “typically result in no benefit 
being conferred on the other party”.252 Aggrieved parties are thus disinclined to bring 
these types of claims. 
Unjust enrichment is an inapposite source of pre-contractual liability if a party seeks 
to claim for pre-contractual losses in circumstances where no benefit in the true sense 
of the word has been conferred upon the parties. This sentiment is supported by the 
limited case law. That being said, the Waxberg case illustrates that if a true benefit 
has been conferred upon a party, American courts are willing to found a claim in unjust 
enrichment. A party will be entitled to restitution for the value of the services rendered, 
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if “something in the nature of an implied contract results” where one renders services 
at the request of another, and in the process confers a benefit on the other.253 
5 3 3 South African law 
It is not uncommon for parties to perform work, render services, or transfer assets  as 
a form of advance “performance” in anticipation of a contract being concluded.254 The 
question is whether an enrichment claim arises if such an advance “performance” 
takes place in the course of failed negotiations. South Africa does not currently 
recognise a general enrichment action.255 An enrichment claim must fit into one of the 
specific enrichment actions, or a claimant must argue for recognition of an action in 
new circumstances.256 The two forms of enrichment potentially applicable in this 
context are the enrichment actions for the transfer of property and for services 
rendered or work done. However, the distinction between property and services 
should not be overstated or distract from the main focus of our analysis, which is 
whether some value was given in anticipation of a contract being concluded. 
This analysis will engage with difficult questions regarding the proper allocation of 
risk in the pre-contractual phase, and whether as a matter of policy, a party should be 
able to claim back expenses or require the defendant to give up enrichment pursuant 
to unsuccessful negotiations.  
5 3 3 1 Property transferred 
If a party transfers money or property in the course of negotiations and it is clear that 
such party did so as a form of accelerated performance of the envisaged contract that 
is eventually not concluded, a claim may potentially lie for unjustified enrichment on 
the basis of the condictio causa data causa non secuta.257 This action is available 
where the claimant transferred something to another, not to fulfil an existing obligation, 
but in the expectation of a future outcome, which does not materialise.258 In Wepener 
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v Schraader259 for example, the claimant transferred possession of the premises to 
the defendant during sale negotiations, and the defendant paid part of the purchase 
price in advance. This payment was made in the expectation of a shared 
understanding that an agreement of sale would be concluded, but this never 
happened.260 This case indicates how the condictio causa data causa non secuta 
could apply where mutual understanding regarding the purpose of a transfer (the 
advance payment) was not realised.  
5 3 3 2 Services rendered 
The claim for services rendered in the pre-contractual phase is more problematic 
because it raises greater concerns regarding the proper allocation of pre-contractual 
risk than returnable property dealt with above. Claims must be cautiously scrutinised 
to avoid disrupting this allocation.261 Difficulties also arise because services rendered 
do not confer tangible or corporeal property upon the receiving party. Therefore the 
receiving party cannot return a tangible, easily identifiable enrichment. Whether there 
has been unjustified enrichment would need to be established with reference to the 
value derived by the defendant of the services rendered.  
We observed that English courts grant enrichment claims for services rendered 
during failed negotiations, particularly where it gives rise to an identifiable end-product 
or saves the defendant a necessary expense.262 Similarly in South African law, a 
receiving party’s estate may be enriched if there is an end-product of a distinct value, 
or the receiving party saves a necessary expense.263 In these circumstances a party 
may be entitled, under a South African enrichment action, to the reasonable costs of 
performing such service.264 However, conferring a benefit on the defendant in the 
course of negotiations is not in itself sufficient to justify a claim. We need to determine 
an appropriate action and the basis upon which the party did the work or rendered the 
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service is crucial to establishing whether the enrichment is without legal ground and 
should be returned pursuant to such an action. For example, the performance may 
have taken place under a contract that turns out to be void or is subsequently 
cancelled due to imperfect performance.265 
Here we are dealing with distinct and more problematic cases where a party does 
work or renders services in anticipation of a contract that does not materialise. Often 
parties do so in the hope of securing a contract266 or on the basis that costs will be 
recovered out of the profits of the contract. Hutchison confirms that these cases are 
excluded from the  action for services rendered or work done;267 that action 
traditionally applies in cases where the purpose of the transfer is fulfilment of a valid 
obligation, which then failed due to circumstances such as breach.268 The question 
arises whether another enrichment action can be raised in this context. We shall first 
consider the potential application of the condictio causa data causa non secuta. If 
there is a mutual understanding that services are rendered as a form of accelerated 
performance and the contract is eventually not concluded, it is not apparent, as a 
matter of principle, why a claim should not lie for unjustified enrichment on the basis 
of the aforementioned action, merely because the benefit did not assume the form of 
a transfer of money or property . 
In evaluating the possibility of this development, it may be useful to consider case 
law dealing with enrichment claims for additional work performed beyond the 
contractually agreed upon scope of work. In Skyword (Pvt) Ltd v Peter Scales (Pvt) 
Ltd269 the dispute related to additional repair work carried out by the claimant without 
the knowledge or consent of the defendant. The court found that although Roman-
Dutch law does not yet recognise a general enrichment action, the claimant 
nevertheless has a claim founded on the law of unjustified enrichment.270 The 
defendant accepted such liability, but unfortunately did not indicate under which 
specific action it may have been liable, thus absolving the court from having to make 
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such a determination. The court gave an award for the claimant’s additional work to 
the extent it enriched the defendant.271 
In MM Moloto Properties (Pty) Ltd v Municipality of Lephalale272 the claimant 
claimed the costs for additional work to complete a storeroom and ablution facilities. 
The parties raised two alternative arguments, but our focus will be on the second, 
namely that the defendant had been enriched at the expense of the claimant.273 The 
quantum and the fact that the enrichment was without legal ground was common 
cause.274 There was no doubt that the defendant had been enriched by the completed 
facilities. Furthermore, the claimant was impoverished “in that it provided services and 
materials without payment.”275 The claimants claimed the agreed upon quantum on 
the basis of the condictio indebiti. This assumes that it was mistaken as to liability 
under the existing contract. However, inasmuch as additional work was not done in 
purported fulfilment of an existing obligation, but rather in the expectation of an 
obligation to pay arising in future, this condictio would not have been applicable.276  
Both of the above mentioned cases  illustrate the possibility that one of the 
condictiones and more specifically a condictio causa data causa non secuta, can in 
appropriate circumstances be extended to form the basis of a claim for unjustified 
enrichment for work done or services rendered in anticipation of a contract that does 
not materialise.277 As far as other possible claims are concerned, Hutchison has 
argued that an action based on managing another’s affairs (negotiorum gestio) would 
be inapposite.278 The actio negotiorum gestio should indeed only be available in 
circumstances where services are rendered or work is done without any knowledge of 
the defendant and which, from the claimant’s perspective, is in the interests of the 
defendant.279 Negotiorum gestio is therefore inappropriate in the present context, 
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because neither of these circumstances may be present.  
Ultimately, however, the exact label or name attached to an enrichment claim may 
be less important than identifying the general principles that could apply when seeking 
restitution for transfers made in the failed expectation of future contracts.280 Whether 
the transfer is of property or takes the forms of services should not matter.281 In both 
cases the defendant accepts a benefit on the basis of some form of mutual or tacit 
understanding that it is a form of accelerated performance of the anticipated contract. 
In the absence of such a basis, conferring the benefit forms part of risks assumed by 
a party in the course of contractual negotiations in the hope of securing a contract, 
and the defendant’s enrichment would not be without legal ground. 282 Although a claim 
for services rendered in the pre-contractual phase does not easily fit into any of the 
existing actions, Glover283 and Scott284 both note that these actions have been 
developed to serve modern commercial needs.285 It is thus argued that if the 
appropriate case regarding work done or services rendered in anticipation of a contract 
was brought before the court, it may be willing to develop the existing actions to 
provide relief to a deserving claimant.  
5 4 International instruments 
Thus far we have discussed pre-contractual liability at a national level in specific civil-
law and common-law countries. Our focus will now be broadened to pre-contractual 
liability arising from supra-national rules or international instruments. While these 
international instruments are merely model rules and not legally binding 
conventions,286 they could potentially aid the development of national rules.  
The nature and source of the pre-contractual liability flowing from these instruments 
are uncertain and controversial because it could be regarded as contractual or 
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delictual; for present purposes it is accepted that it does not fall properly into either of 
these sources, but is a form of sui generis liability.287 This sui generis liability allows 
flexible rules to be established that need not accord with the principles of contract or 
delict.288 The relevant sections of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (“PICC)”and Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”) 
regulating the pre-contractual phase will now be critically evaluated. 
Article 2.1.15 of the PICC provide as follows: 
“(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement; 
(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is liable for the 
losses caused to the other party; and 
(3) It is bad faith, in particular for a party, to enter into or continue negotiations when 
intending not to reach an agreement with the other party.” 
Article 2:301 of the PECL contains a very similar provision, save that the wording 
provides that a party who breaks off negotiations “contrary to good faith” is liable for 
losses caused to the other party. Some commentators suggest that the reference to 
“bad faith” in article 2.1.15 of the PICC restricts the scope of liability. However, this 
contention has been rejected on the basis that “bad faith” conduct is synonymous with 
conduct “contrary to good faith and fair dealing”.289 
Both the PECL290 and the PICC share the point of departure that parties are free to 
break off negotiations.291 They nevertheless qualify this freedom by providing for 
liability for breaking off negotiations in bad faith or contrary to good faith.292 The PICC 
contain three illustrations of bad faith in negotiations.293 Firstly, entering into or 
continuing lengthy negotiations without intending to conclude the anticipated contract; 
secondly, failing to reveal knowledge of an impediment to contract conclusion during 
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negotiations, such as receiving a necessary license; lastly, entering into negotiations 
without the necessary authority. 
Babusiaux describes the first scenario above as an abuse of contractual 
freedom.294 The difficulty with imposing liability for this conduct lies in proving that the 
party misrepresented his intention to conclude the contract.295 However, it is 
suggested that article 2:102 of the PECL can assist with this determination.296 This 
provision reads as follows: “the intention of a party to be legally bound by contract is 
to be determined from the party’s statements or conduct as they were reasonably 
understood by the other party.” This process requires courts firstly to consider whether 
the conduct of the other party outwardly manifests an intention to conclude the contract 
and secondly whether such conduct would reasonably be perceived by third parties 
as a misrepresentation of the intention to conclude a contract.297  
According to the PICC, negotiations may reach a stage where they cannot be 
broken off “abruptly and without justification”.298 The circumstances of the particular 
case will ultimately determine whether this stage has been reached. Whether the 
conduct of the party during negotiations has reasonably induced the other party’s 
reliance that a contract would be concluded, and the consensus reached on 
outstanding terms, are of particular relevance.299 In her discussion of the PECL, 
Babusiaux suggests that the aggrieved party must legitimately believe that the other 
party intended to conclude a contract and the other party, to avoid liability, will need to 
show the existence of a legitimate reason for breaking off negotiations.300 Both the 
PICC301 and PECL302 limit an aggrieved party’s claim for breach of the obligations set 
out above to reliance damages, including all expenses incurred in the course of 
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negotiations and forgone opportunities. 
Rios argues that the provisions and illustrations of the PICC can inform the 
development of other international instruments and national rules on pre-contractual 
liability.303 The same sentiment is extended to the PECL here. The question then 
arises as to how the imposed obligation of good faith should be interpreted. It must be 
emphasised that these instruments entrench freedom of contract, therefore the 
qualification of good faith must be interpreted as a corrective mechanism that limits 
such freedom of contract.304 Good faith can be understood as an “objective standard 
of conduct” and requires, in the context of negotiations, that parties conduct 
themselves in a reasonable and consistent way.305  
These instruments and the related academic commentary could provide valuable 
insights and guidance for the development of South African law on pre-contractual 
liability. The proposed developments to the South African law of delict as a source of 
pre-contractual liability outlined above aligns with pre-contractual liability arising from 
international instruments. This is particularly illustrated in the proposed formulation of 
the wrongfulness test for liability in respect of negligent misrepresentations. To add to 
this, it is proposed that the wrongfulness test encapsulates the “good faith” standard 
and two-step test set out in the commentary and interpretation of the international 
instruments above. The principles derived from these instruments can be utilised to 
carefully extend delictual liability to negligent misrepresentations regarding the 
conclusion of a contract, while maintaining a threshold that protects freedom to break 
off negotiations without incurring liability. Furthermore, any liability for 
misrepresentation will be aimed at placing the party in the position he would have been 
in had the misrepresentation not been made and would therefore not include any gains 
that would have been made had the contract been concluded as this would be too 
speculative in nature.  
5 5 Conclusion 
Common-law systems are generally less inclined than civil systems to intervene in the 
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pre-contractual phase to allow recovery of pre-contractual losses suffered due to 
termination of negotiations. It is unlikely that a set of rules similar to culpa in 
contrahendo will be accepted into these systems.306 Nevertheless, common-law 
systems are becoming more receptive to imposing pre-contractual liability. Due to the 
deficiencies in their respective law of torts, English and American law have relied 
predominantly on the law of unjust enrichment and estoppel to provide recovery for 
losses incurred during the pre-contractual phase.  
Although this comparative analysis provides valuable insights into the imposition of 
pre-contractual liability, South African law ultimately needs to be developed in a 
manner that fits its own purposes. For example, South Africa does not face the same 
limitations that characterise the English, German and American law of tort or delict, 
because it is more receptive to claims for negligently-caused pure economic loss. 
There are clear grounds for the development of the South African law of delict as a 
source of pre-contractual liability.307 This would indirectly give effect to the obligation 
to negotiate in good faith, at least insofar as it recognises liability for negligent 
misrepresentations in the course of unsuccessful negotiations. Courts have already 
recognised that fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations inducing a contract give 
rise to delictual liability. It would therefore not be unimaginable to extend liability to 
recognise claims for misrepresentations that fraudulently or negligently induce the 
reliance that a contract will be concluded. The wrongfulness enquiry, as informed by 
the principles derived from the comparative analysis above, can be applied to limit the 
scope of claims and avoid opening of the floodgates of litigation. 
The focus on the law of delict as a promising source of liability does not exclude the 
potential operation of the law of unjustified enrichment in the pre-contractual phase.308 
It has been observed that in both South Africa and foreign jurisdictions, liability on the 
basis of unjustified enrichment for property transferred or work done and services 
rendered during the pre-contractual phase can be problematic. Despite the seemingly 
low prospects of this type of claim, it is argued here that given the right circumstances, 
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enrichment actions could be applied or extended to allow this type of claim. 
Proposing developments to non-contractual sources of law in South Africa, as 
discussed above, does not exclude the possibility of developments to the law of 
contract nor does it negate the need for such developments. We observed that by 
making incremental developments to the South African law of delict and the law of 
unjustified enrichment it is possible to create an ex lege duty not to break off 
negotiations in bad faith and in doing so indirectly give effect to the underlying value 
of good faith. Assuming that these developments do take place, it would be anomalous 
to recognise and enforce a legal or automatic duty to negotiate in good faith, but fail 
to enforce a contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith that has been voluntarily 
entered into with the requisite animus contrahendi. Some would argue that 
developments to non-contractual sources of law negates the need for developments 
to the law of contract which will be far-reaching and could potentially water down the 
validity requirements for a contract and undermine legal certainty. However, this 
contention must be rejected. Our analysis in chapter 3 and here clearly illustrates that 
there are grounds for development in both the law of contract and non-contractual 
sources of law, and the development of one source of law will necessarily require 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6 1 The key issues raised by pre-contractual agreements  
The demands of modern commerce are changing the manner in which business 
professionals conduct their business, and more specifically how they choose to 
regulate commercial negotiations and contract conclusion. We have seen a drastic 
rise in the use of a diverse range of pre-contractual instruments, which are intended 
to perform different functions including, but not limited to, the simplification of the 
negotiation process and the facilitation of contract conclusion. However, as indicated 
above, great uncertainty exists regarding the exact legal nature and consequences of 
these instruments. It has become clear that drawing definitive conclusions regarding 
the contractual validity and legal consequences of pre-contractual agreements is 
crucial to ensuring that their utility is not undermined and that they do not give rise to 
unintended legal consequences.  
It is acknowledged that pre-contractual agreements are inherently difficult to 
regulate, as they do not have any standardised legal content. Although different pre-
contractual agreements can display common features, their wording and content can 
vary greatly. This thesis sought to clarify the South African legal position on pre-
contractual agreements by classifying the different types of pre-contractual 
agreements in accordance with the function they perform. Once this was done, it was 
easier to identify and evaluate what legal consequences, if any, arise or should arise 
from these different agreements. However, it must be emphasised that no hard and 
fast rules determine these consequences.  
6 1 1 Functions of pre-contractual agreements 
As previously discussed,1 pre-contractual agreements can perform many different 
functions. A preliminary observation that constituted an important point of departure 
into our analysis of the legal character of pre-contractual agreements is that a pre-
contractual agreement need not necessarily give rise to legal consequences to 
perform a valuable function in commerce.  
We observed that a number of vital functions are served by non-binding pre-
 




contractual agreements.2 These agreements often merely record the consensus 
reached thus far between parties and establish the terms upon which they are willing 
to proceed with a transaction. In this way pre-contractual agreements can serve as a 
“road-map” towards the conclusion of a final contract.3 Non-binding pre-contractual 
agreements are often also a prerequisite for obtaining third party approval (for example 
obtaining approval for a loan necessary to finance the envisaged transaction). 
Notwithstanding their non-binding nature, pre-contractual agreements can convey a 
commitment to negotiations, build trust in the course of negotiations and even impose 
moral obligations on the parties to comply with their commitments. In fact, we observed 
that these moral obligations often prove to be a more persuasive force in encouraging 
or coercing parties to comply with their obligations than the threat of legal 
consequences flowing from a contract.4 
If non-binding pre-contractual agreements are so useful, the question naturally 
arises whether these types of agreements should ever be legally binding; can 
circumstances arise where it is necessary to attach legal consequences to them? Can 
pre-contractual agreements perform useful legal functions or are we, by attempting to 
attribute a legal character to them, risking their utility and attaching unintended legal 
consequences that will give rise to a whole host of difficulties for the parties involved? 
The far-reaching implications of adopting a view in favour of the legal validity of specific 
pre-contractual agreements strongly influenced the process of answering these 
difficult questions.  
Various legal obligations can potentially arise from pre-contractual agreements. In 
this regard we can distinguish between intermediate legal obligations regarding the 
negotiation process itself and legal obligations in respect of the principal contract. 
Intermediate legal obligations refer to legal obligations such as confidentiality and 
exclusivity in the course of negotiations. A pre-contractual agreement could also 
potentially constitute the principal contract or give rise to a binding obligation to 
conclude such principal contract. Falling in the grey area, is the obligation to negotiate 
in good faith, which can either impose an obligation regarding the process of 
negotiations or impose a more significant obligation regarding the conclusion of the 
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principal contract itself.5 
6 1 2 Conceptual difficulties raised by pre-contractual agreements in South Africa 
In South Africa, pre-contractual agreements are only enforced to an extremely limited 
extent because a clear distinction is drawn between the pre-contractual phase, which 
traditionally does not give rise to legal liability, and the contractual phase, which does.6 
This legal position reflects the great importance attached to the interrelated concepts 
of freedom of contract and freedom of negotiation, on the one hand, and the 
requirements for a valid contract to come into existence, on the other. Before one can 
speak of a pre-contractual agreement giving rise to contractual obligations, it must 
meet the requirements for a valid contract. Two validity requirements that are 
particularly relevant when analysing a pre-contractual agreement are certainty, and 
having the animus contrahendi (the intention to be bound).  
Often pre-contractual agreements are drafted by business professionals in a 
simplistic and incomplete form and it can be difficult to ascertain definitively whether 
these requirements are met. In this thesis we considered how conceptual difficulties 
could be addressed and overcome so as to determine which types of pre-contractual 
agreements can give rise to contractual obligations (if any) and what the nature of 
those obligations will be. In this regard, we specifically considered the enforceability 
of agreements to negotiate as a specific type of pre-contractual agreement. 
6 2 Comparative observations  
Before turning to the position in South African law, we considered the legal position in 
relation to pre-contractual agreements in common-law and civil-law legal systems to 
determine whether such an investigation yielded any insights that might assist in an 
analysis of the South African legal position and its potential development. 
As a point of departure, we saw that common-law systems in general have been much 
more conservative and cautious in their regulation of pre-contractual liability, and more 
specifically in their treatment of pre-contractual agreements.7 English law, for example, 
has remained steadfast in its non-recognition of pre-contractual agreements, which 
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aligns with the traditional position in South African law.8 
Although English courts have thus far refused to attribute any legal consequences 
to pre-contractual agreements, various English academics have called for this legal 
position to be reassessed. Trakman and Sharma, for example, argue that agreements 
to negotiate in good faith should not lightly be dismissed as unenforceable due to a 
lack of certainty or being contrary to public policy.9 There are significant commercial 
justifications supporting the enforcement of agreements to negotiate in good faith. 
Parties to commercial negotiations may rely on these agreements and consequently 
forgo offers from third parties or incur substantial costs in the course of negotiations.10 
If English courts are willing to enforce negotiation obligations forming part of pre-
existing contracts, then there is little reason, in principle, for courts to arbitrarily 
conclude that independent agreements to negotiate are without legal content.11 It may 
be more difficult in the absence of other contractual obligations to ascertain the parties’ 
intention to be bound, but it is not impossible to do so.12  
American law, in contrast, has experienced substantial development in relation to 
the enforceability and legal consequences of pre-contractual agreements. This 
jurisdiction provided useful insights into potential areas of development and identified 
key risks or difficulties that may arise in choosing to develop the law relating to pre-
contractual agreements.13 Although the approach to pre-contractual agreements 
differs between different American states, several states have chosen to enforce 
specific types of pre-contractual agreements. In the seminal American case of 
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v Tribune Co14 (“Tribune Co”), 
the court recognised two types of enforceable preliminary agreements. Type I 
preliminary agreements are complete agreements, but parties merely desire to 
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memorialise the agreement in a particular form.15 Type II preliminary agreements 
outline the major terms of the transaction but leave terms open that remain to be 
negotiated.16 Judge Leval explained that parties to the latter agreement “can bind 
themselves to a seemingly incomplete agreement in the sense that they accept a 
mutual commitment to negotiate in good faith in an effort to reach final agreement 
within the scope that has been settled in the preliminary agreement.”17  
Burton and Andersen, writing in the context of American law, explain that various 
contractual duties can be imposed by agreements to negotiate.18 Such agreements 
can impose “procedural duties” or a specific standard of behaviour in the course of 
negotiations.19 They can also commit parties to certain terms exclusively for purposes 
of negotiation (meaning that the terms are non-binding) or bind parties to the final 
contract, irrespective of the outcome of negotiations.20  
It became clear from the analysis of American law that pre-contractual agreements 
can indeed give rise to useful legal obligations that perform a valuable function in 
commerce. For example, we observed that agreements such as memoranda of 
understanding, letters of intent and term sheets are concluded at a time when parties 
have progressed in contractual negotiations and reached a stage that requires one or 
both of them to make substantial relationship-specific investments and potentially 
forgo other commercial opportunities without assurance regarding the materialisation 
of the final contract.21 It appears that American courts have moved towards the 
recognition of an intermediate stage of contracting. “Embedding” an intermediate 
contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith gives a contracting party the assurance 
that his pre-contractual investments are protected in the sense that the other party is 
no longer free to break off negotiations in bad faith at any time and for any reason 
without liability.22 American law also offered various suggestions regarding the issue 
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of appropriate remedies for the breach of various pre-contractual obligations and 
seemed to settle on a claim for reliance damages for breach of an obligation to 
negotiate.23  
Determining the enforceability of pre-contractual agreements in civil-law systems 
does not pose the same prominent conceptual challenges as in the common-law 
jurisdictions. We observed in particular that civil-law systems such as Germany 
recognise that the commencement of negotiations give rise to an ex lege or automatic 
pre-contractual duty to negotiate in good faith, and this obligation is only strengthened 
by the existence of a pre-contractual agreement.24 A negotiating party will have a claim 
on the basis of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo for reliance losses suffered as a 
result of the other party breaking off negotiations in circumstances where the 
reasonable impression was created that the contract would in all likelihood be 
concluded. 
American law and German law illustrate two different, but not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, courses of development. American law on the one hand chose to develop 
its contract law to recognize agreements imposing intermediate obligations (i.e. the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith), but not binding parties to conclude the final 
contract. German law on the other hand implemented the general doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo that renders the conceptual debates around the enforceability of 
agreements to negotiate, for the most part, moot. 
6 3 The enforceability of different types of agreements to negotiate in South 
Africa  
In setting out the legal position in relation to agreements to negotiate in South African 
law, we must draw a distinction agreements to negotiate in good faith that do contain 
deadlock-breaking mechanisms and those that do not. The type of agreement to 
negotiate will determine both the enforceability and the legal consequences (if any) of 
the agreement. With this in mind, we shall turn to consider the enforceability of 
agreements to negotiate in good faith. 
6 3 1 Agreements to negotiate that contain deadlock-breaking mechanisms 
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In the seminal case of Southernport Development (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd25 
(“Southernport”) the court recognised that agreements to negotiate in good faith that 
are intended to be binding and therefore contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism are 
enforceable. The court emphasised the importance of the obligation to negotiate in 
good faith being accompanied by a deadlock-breaking mechanism to prescribe what 
steps should be taken in the event that parties are unable to reach agreement.26 
Courts justify their line of reasoning in this regard as follows - the existence of the 
deadlock-breaking mechanism, which can be applied to determine outstanding terms, 
renders the contract sufficiently certain and thus capable of enforcement. As such, we 
are dealing with a specific type of agreement to negotiate that is intended to be binding 
and that outlines most of the terms of the final contract. This excludes the 
enforceability of preliminary agreements such as MOUs or term sheets that outline the 
terms of the final contract in a non-binding manner.  
The grey area in our law lies in the enforceability of agreements to negotiate in good 
faith that do not contain a deadlock-breaking mechanism. As it presently stands, it 
appears that these agreements are not enforceable. The core issue sought to be 
addressed in this thesis was whether the South African law of contract could and 
should be developed to recognise and enforce these agreements. 
6 3 2 Agreements to negotiate that do not contain deadlock-breaking mechanisms 
Prior to engaging with the analysis of the enforceability of these agreements to 
negotiate in South Africa, we observed that an important distinction must be made 
between agreements to agree and agreements to negotiate. Agreements to negotiate 
as opposed to unenforceable agreements to agree, do not necessarily guarantee 
conclusion of the principal contract, but increase the likelihood of the principal contract 
materialising.27 With this in mind, we proceed to consider whether an agreement to 
negotiate outstanding terms in good faith and an agreement solely recording an 
arrangement to negotiate a second contract in the future could be enforceable even 
in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism.28 
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As indicated above, most of the existing South African case law has utilised the 
presence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism to determine whether an agreement to 
negotiate is sufficiently certain to be enforceable. As a result, courts have avoided the 
need to deal comprehensively with the scope and content of an obligation to negotiate 
in good faith. Therefore, while courts recognise the validity of an obligation to negotiate 
in good faith when accompanied by a deadlock-breaking mechanism, they fail to 
comprehensively describe what it means to negotiate in good faith and what standard 
parties must comply with before they are entitled to defer to the deadlock-breaking 
mechanism.  
This legal position, as established by the courts, reflects a conservative and 
mechanical line of reasoning in relation to the requirement of certainty.29 Courts seek 
to identify a mechanism whereby the terms of the final contract can be rendered 
certain, without considering the potential functions sought to be achieved by agreeing 
to negotiate in good faith.30 It was argued in this thesis that the South African law of 
contract can and should be developed to recognise the enforceability of other types of 
agreements to negotiate even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. I 
set out below how agreements to negotiate in good faith can meet the requirements 
of certainty and having the animus contrahendi even in the absence of a deadlock-
breaking mechanism and how considerations of public policy, good faith and ubuntu 
support such a conclusion.  
6 4 Proposed developments for the South African law of contract 
Against the backdrop of the potential functions that pre-contractual agreements can 
fulfil,31 the benefit of comparative insights,32 and the unique nature of the South African 
legal system,33 some conclusions can now be drawn on the desirability and necessity 
of developing the law on pre-contractual agreements. An important goal in embarking 
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on a particular course of development would be to make pre-contractual instruments 
as useful as possible, without giving rise to illogical or problematic developments.  
As a basic point of departure, it is accepted that freedom of negotiation and freedom 
of contract are core principles of South African law. However, this is not as clear cut 
as it initially seems. The critical question is whether parties should be free to contract 
out of the so-called “aleatory view of negotiations”34 or impose a voluntary limitation 
on their freedom of contract. It has been suggested in other common-law systems that 
the traditional rules of contract formation should be developed to recognise an 
intermediate stage of contract formation prior to the conclusion of a principal contract. 
While this has received support in some courts in America, it has not been recognised 
in South Africa. 
The observations made in this thesis favour the conclusion that the South African 
law of contract has reached a stage of development where the approach to pre-
contractual agreements needs to be re-evaluated. As Mupangavanhu argues:35  
“Everfresh adds its voice to the growing call that a promise to negotiate in good faith needs 
to be developed beyond existing precedent, insofar as it relates to agreements to agree 
whose enforceability is not clear in South African law in the absence of a deadlock breaking 
clause”.36  
Mupangavanhu goes so far as to support the dissenting minority judgment of Yacoob 
J, who stated that the court had no choice and was bound by the duty to develop the 
common law on good faith in a manner that is consistent with the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Constitution.37 She argues that “if good faith is indeed the basis of 
contracts in South Africa, it is inconsistent with sections 8(3) and 39(2) of the 
Constitution that good faith still plays a peripheral role in resolving contractual 
disputes,”38 and she concludes that Everfresh was a missed opportunity to develop 
the common law regarding the doctrine of good faith and to clarify the grey area 
regarding agreements to negotiate.39 
 
34 EA Farnsworth Contracts 4 ed (2004) 199.  
35 See ch 3. 
36 2013 SJ 170; see 3 5 for further discussions on the views expressed by Mupangavanhu. 






Although Mupangavanhu’s argument cannot be accepted in its entirety, as the court 
was correct to dismiss the case on procedural grounds, it does draw attention to the 
fact that if a similar set of facts comes before the courts in the future, they should take 
the opportunity to consider the development of the common law as suggested in the 
Everfresh case. There it was clear that the parties entered into the agreement to 
negotiate in good faith with the requisite animus contrahendi, but that the common law 
rules in their current form not only frustrated that objective but were prejudicial to the 
aggrieved party. However, development of the common law is not without difficulty - 
how will this be practically executed, and how is one to avoid undermining legal 
certainty in the South African law of contract?  
It was proposed in this thesis that the underlying value of good faith should be 
utilised to inform the development of the rules relating to the requirement of certainty 
in order to recognise the enforceability of agreements to negotiate in good faith. This 
thesis did not seek to extensively analyse the proper role of the value of good faith in 
the South African law of contract generally, but this concept, as an underlying value of 
the law of contract, was considered to the extent that it influences the enforceability of 
agreements to negotiate.40  
If this sentiment regarding the role of good faith in the development of the legal rules 
in relation to the validity of agreements to negotiate is accepted and taken forward, it 
must be acknowledged that good faith is often described in “abstract”, “subjective” and 
“imprecise” terms which is problematic and unfortunately gives rise to legal 
uncertainty.41 The court in Combined Developers v Arun Holdings42 concluded, with 
reference to Everfresh, that even if the application of good faith undermines legal 
certainty, public policy still “embraces the concept of good faith and 
reasonableness”.43  
It is argued here that much of this legal uncertainty can be avoided, if good faith is 
understood as an objective value, implicating notions of reasonableness.44 It is 
 
40 See ch 3 (3 5). 
41 McKerrow 2017 Stell L Rev 328.  
42 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) paras 40-41. 
43 Paras 40-41.  
44 See ch 3 (3 2 2 3 (ii) (a) & 3 5); AM Louw “Yet Another Call for a Greater Role for Good Faith in the 
South African law of Contract: Can We Banish the Law of the Jungle, While Avoiding the Elephant in 




accepted here that good faith as an objective value is the most sensible source of 
inspiration for the development of legal rules in relation to agreements to negotiate. 
Louw explains that “boni mores and ubuntu require the recognition of an objectively 
verifiable ethical standard of conduct in contracting and the enforcement of contracts 
– ‘a minimum threshold of mutual respect’”.45 Good faith as an objective value 
establishes “an ethical standard of fair dealing between parties which encompasses 
notions of trust, a moral basis for the enforcement of promises, reciprocity, a duty to 
act fairly, having regard for the legitimate interests of the other party, and to refrain 
from conduct that is commercially unacceptable to reasonable and honest people.”46 
On this understanding, good faith as an underlying value can be applied to inform the 
certainty requirement in relation to agreements to negotiate in good faith. 
In light of the sentiments expressed above, it is argued that in future judicial 
deliberations of the contractual enforceability of an obligation to negotiate in good faith, 
expression can be given to the constitutional mandate to develop the common law in 
a manner that promotes the values underlying the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The 
underlying value of good faith, as informed by the value of ubuntu, in the context of 
agreements to negotiate, arguably requires a negotiating party to be cooperative and 
have regard for the interests of the other party in the course of negotations. The 
enforcement of an obligation to negotiate gives effect to the underlying value of good 
faith and ubuntu for the following reasons. Firstly, a party is forced to monitor his own 
conduct in the course of negotiations, and consider the interests of the other party 
insofar it relates to such party’s investment into negotiations, with knowledge of the 
risk that his failure to do so will render him liable for the aggrieved parties reliance 
expenditure. Importantly, this is distinct from having regard to the other party’s interest, 
in the broader sense of not pursuing the best deal at the expense of the other party or 
having to ensure that the terms upon which the principal contract is concluded is 
equally beneficial for the other party.  
Secondly, this type of obligation obliges parties to behave honestly and reasonably 
towards each other in the course of negotiations and in doing so indirectly contributes 
towards the facilitation of a more cooperative and fair approach to contractual dealings 
 





that is promoted by the underlying values of good faith and ubuntu. Lastly, a 
negotiating party will be prevented from disregarding the interests of the other party, 
by intentionally avoiding compliance with an agreement that was entered into with the 
intention to be bound and upon which the other party relied to his detriment and 
incurred reliance losses.  
In light of these observations, should agreements to negotiate that do not contain 
deadlock-mechanisms give rise to valid contracts, and if so, what should their legal 
obligations and consequences be. As explained above, South African courts have 
consistently applied the requirement of a deadlock-breaking mechanism as the test 
for certainty of agreements to negotiate. The main obstacle we are faced with when 
enforcing these types of agreements is to determine how we can impart certainty in 
the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. To assist us in overcoming this 
obstacle, we first looked to the potential solutions that can be provided by drawing an 
analogy between agreements to negotiate and (i) pre-emption contracts as well as (ii) 
contracts granting a unilateral discretion to one of the parties.47 Secondly we looked 
to the insight provided by recent case law supporting the enforceability of agreements 
to negotiate even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism.48 In Everfresh 
Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd49 (“Everfresh”) the court in an 
obiter statement recognised that the South African law of contract should be 
developed to recognise the enforceability of agreements to negotiate in good faith, 
even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. 
In Indwe Aviation (Pty) Ltd v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd50 the court also considered the enforceability of this type of agreement to 
negotiate. Blignault J explained that it is possible to imply standards of reasonableness 
and good faith into an agreement to negotiate. He went on to reference how courts 
have implied the standard of the arbitrium boni viri to validate contractual provisions 
 
47 See ch3 (3 2 2 3 (ii)). 
48 See ch 3; RD McKerrow “Agreements to Negotiate: A Contemporary Analysis” (2017) 28 Stell LR 
308; D Bhana & N Broeders “Agreements to Agree” (2014) 77 THRHR 174; B Mupangavanhu “Yet 
Another Missed Opportunity to Develop the Common Law of Contract? An Analysis of Everfresh Market 
Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZACC 30” (2013) 27 SJ 148. 
49 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 72. 




which would otherwise be too uncertain to enforce.51 What is of crucial significance in 
this case is that Blignault J recognised the possibility of implying such a standard into 
agreements to negotiate to render it sufficiently certain to be enforceable. 52 By 
implying this standard, the obligation to negotiate would oblige parties to act honestly 
and reasonably in the course of negotiations, and courts are capable of determining 
whether parties have complied with such a standard. Blignault J also did not regard 
the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism as being fatal to the validity of an 
agreement to negotiate, and explained that courts could perform a similar function to 
a deadlock-breaker and would essentially apply the same standards of 
reasonableness in determining the outstanding terms of the contract. 53  
It is my view that our law has reached a stage of development where it is possible 
to enforce agreements to negotiate, even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism. As indicated earlier, considerations of public policy, good faith and ubuntu 
also favour this development and arguably require the enforcement of pre-contractual 
understandings that foster mutual respect and regard for each other’s interests, or at 
the very least to abstain from bad faith conduct in the course of negotiations.  
Determining the most appropriate course of development for the law relating to 
agreements to negotiate requires us to strike a difficult balance between notions of 
freedom of contract (which includes freedom not to contract), party autonomy and legal 
certainty on the one hand, and the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the values of 
good faith and ubuntu on the other. With the benefit of academic contributions, it is 
possible to formulate a practical and sensible approach to the development of the 
South African law of contract to enforce different types of agreements to negotiate, 
even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism.54 
It is proposed here that the presence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism does not 
impact on the validity of the agreement to negotiate but rather can operate to influence 
the type of agreement to negotiate, the nature of the contractual obligations and the 
type of remedies available.55 Firstly, the presence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism 
 
51 See ch 3 (3 2 2 3 (ii)). 
52 Para 28. 
53 Para 30.  
54 See ch 3 (3 2 2 3 (ii)). 




can be used as an indicator of an intention to be bound by the principal contract 
notwithstanding outstanding terms. Secondly, the absence of a deadlock-breaking 
mechanism may indicate the absence of the intention to be bound to conclude the 
principal contract but parties may nevertheless be bound by an obligation to negotiate 
in good faith towards the possible conclusion of such a contract. The absence of a 
deadlock-breaking mechanism is not, however, determinative; there may still be other 
indicators that parties intend to be bound by an obligation to conclude the substantive 
agreement notwithstanding the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. In such 
a case, as discussed, the court may be able to perform the role of deadlock-breaker 
and in doing so render the agreement sufficiently certain to be capable of 
enforcement.56 
On this basis it is proposed that the South African law of contract can be developed 
to recognise two main types of preliminary agreements. The first type are agreements 
with open terms (i.e. agreements that record most of the terms of the envisaged 
contract), and with an express obligation to negotiate in good faith with a view to 
concluding a final contract, but without a deadlock-breaking mechanism.57 The 
enforcement of this type of agreement can be problematic, because it would 
essentially amount to the enforcement of an agreement to agree that requires the court 
to determine the outstanding terms on behalf of the parties, thereby undermining party 
autonomy and freedom of contract, while placing an additional burden on the court.  
Nevertheless, this thesis considered and cautiously accepted that the South African 
law of contract is capable of being developed to give content to, and enforce, this type 
of agreement to negotiate, even in the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism. 
However, in that event, it must be clear that the parties intended to be bound to 
conclude a principal agreement and not merely to impose an obligation to negotiate.58 
Most of the contractual terms must be present, and there must be some guidance 
regarding the intention of the parties in relation to the outstanding terms in the 
agreement itself, which places the court in a position to determine outstanding terms 
without displacing party autonomy.59 It is not however necessary that the parties 
 
56 For further discussion of this type of agreement, see ch 3 (3 2 2 3 (ii)) and 6 4 below.  
57 See ch 3 (3 2 2 3 (i) & (ii)). 
58 See ch 3 (3 2 2 3 (ii)) and ch 4 (4 2 1 2 (i)).  




expressly or tacitly agree to the court determining the outstanding terms. The 
requirements for this type of agreement to come into existence can therefore be 
expressed as follows, firstly the parties must clearly manifest an intention to be bound, 
secondly the court should merely be adding flesh to the bones of an contract that has 
already been agreed upon by the parties and lastly parties must have provided a 
guiding standard or framework for the court to determine the outstanding terms. 
Breach of this type of agreement to negotiate would give rise to specific performance 
in the form of the court determining outstanding terms.60  
If the requirements for the first type of agreement to negotiate cannot be met and 
the absence of a deadlock-breaking mechanism indicates an intention not to be bound 
by the final contract, then one would be dealing with the second type of agreement to 
negotiate.61 The second type of preliminary agreements to negotiate are those that do 
not bind parties to the conclusion of a final substantive contract, but rather oblige them 
to negotiate in good faith towards the conclusion of such a principal contract (often 
called independent agreements to negotiate in good faith).62 Once parties have 
complied with their obligation to negotiate in good faith, their contractual obligations 
will be discharged.63 Most pre-contractual agreements seeking to impose an obligation 
to negotiate in good faith will fall into the latter category.  
These independent agreements to negotiate must be clearly distinguished from the 
first type of agreement to negotiate and from agreements to agree.64 An obligation to 
negotiate requires of parties to take certain steps in good faith in the course of 
negotiations (i.e to act honestly and reasonably), but does not guarantee the 
conclusion of a principal contract. This type of agreement is distinct from an agreement 
to agree because it removes the inherent discretion that parties have to agree or 
disagree by imposing a standard of conduct that parties are required to comply with in 
the course of negotiations. An obligation to negotiate in good faith, will require 
negotiating parties to act honestly and transparently in the course of negotiations. 
 
60 See ch 4 (4 2 1 2 (i)). 
61 See ch 3 (3 2 2 3 (i) (a)).  
62 See ch 3 (3 2 2 3 (ii)).  
63 3 2 2 3 (ii).  
64 See discussion in 3 2 2 3(ii) (a) on the minority judgement of the Constitutional Court in Everfresh 




Although it is sometimes suggested that an agreement to negotiate imposes a positive 
obligation to act in good faith, it is argued here that such an obligation is too far 
reaching and would considerably hinder commercial transactions insofar as it prevents 
legitimate hard bargaining by requiring parties to consider the interests and rights of 
the other party.65 As such, it is proposed that agreements to negotiate which impose 
an obligation to negotiate in good faith require parties to abstain from bad faith 
conduct. This obligation specifically targets deliberate behaviour, such as (i) stringing 
the other party along in the course of negotiations with no intention of concluding the 
contract (ii) continuing negotiations merely to prevent a party from concluding the 
contract with a third party or (iii) proposing terms that are unreasonable or inconsistent 
with negotiations to force the other party to terminate negotiations. On this 
understanding, an obligation to negotiate in good faith does not merely require parties 
to go through the motions of negotiating in order to comply with the aforementioned 
obligation, on the contrary it requires honesty, reasonableness, and transparency on 
the part of the negotiating parties regarding the progress of negotiations, the likelihood 
of contract conclusion, and obliges them to negotiate seriously towards conclusion of 
the principal contract.66  
The recognition of an agreement to negotiate that gives rise to intermediate 
obligations regarding the conclusion of the principal contract, but which does not oblige 
parties to conclude the final contract, can go a long way in resolving the so-called 
“judicial hostility” towards pre-contractual agreements generally, and can reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding the legal consequences of various agreements falling short of 
a principal contract.  
Remedies for breach of this type of agreement can include specific performance 
and damages.67 It is acknowledged that the remedy of specific performance is the 
primary remedy for breach of contract in South African law. This is problematic in the 
context of independent agreements to negotiate that do not guarantee conclusion of 
the final contract. Specific performance for breach of an obligation to negotiate entails 
an order compelling parties to negotiate in good faith. Once parties have complied with 
this obligation, it will be discharged, even if negotiations fail to give rise to a contract. 
 
65 3 2 2 3 (ii) (b). 
66 3 2 2 3(ii) (b). 




This can give rise to the following problems. Firstly it can be difficult for courts to 
monitor and ensure compliance with an order compelling parties to negotiate towards 
conclusion of the contract under negotiation. Secondly, it is acknowledged that this 
remedy may have limited value for a party wanting negotiations to result in the principal 
contract, because in most situations where a deadlock has been reached in 
negotiations, the relationship between the parties has broken down and even good 
faith negotiations will fail to remedy the breakdown.  
Notwithstanding the imperfections associated with a remedy of specific 
performance in this context, the existence of a contractual obligation, that is capable 
of being specifically enforced by a court, will force parties to give thought to their 
conduct in negotiations and discourage opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, parties 
may still have a claim for damages at their disposal to remedy losses suffered as a 
result of their reliance on the fact that the other party would negotiate in good faith 
towards conclusion of the contract, and on that basis made relationship-specific 
investments in the negotiations. The damages available for breach of this type of 
agreement to negotiate should be limited to reliance damages, and expectation 
damages should specifically be excluded, because the agreement to negotiate did not 
guarantee conclusion of a contract and courts are not in a position to speculate 
regarding what the terms of the principal contract would have been. By awarding this 
type of claim, courts would be giving effect to the underlying value of good faith, 
because it encourages a negotiating party to have considered the interests of the other 
party insofar as that party’s investment into the negotiations are concerned. 
However, even if these two types of agreements to negotiate are recognised, it still 
does not eliminate the need for development in other areas of the law to provide 
remedies for conduct during the pre-contractual phase, particularly in circumstances 
where a pre-contractual agreement has been concluded (whether binding or not). This 
leads onto the next aspect which we considered, namely pre-contractual liability 
arising from sources other than contract.  
6 5 Pre-contractual liability arising from sources other than contract 
Even if we recognise that contractual obligations should arise from specific types of 
pre-contractual agreements, it is still necessary to consider whether pre-contractual 




With the benefit of comparative analysis, it is possible to conclude that both the 
South African law of unjustified enrichment and the law of delict can and should be 
developed to provide a remedy in specific circumstances for losses suffered or 
unjustified gains being obtained as a result of a party’s conduct during the pre-
contractual phase.68 Both international instruments and civil-law systems such as 
Germany make provision for liability for certain forms of conduct during the pre-
contractual phase.69 It is proposed that South African law should follow a similar 
course of development, but rather than importing an independent doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo it should develop the existing rules of the law of delict and the law of 
unjustified enrichment.  
The law of delict can be developed to recognise an action for misrepresentations 
regarding the conclusion of a future contract in circumstances where no contract 
ultimately materialises. Breaking off negotiations in circumstances where negotiations 
have reached an advanced stage and one party has made a fraudulent or even 
negligent misrepresentation regarding the conclusion of a contract which the other 
party has relied upon it to his detriment should give rise to a remedy for the aggrieved 
party aimed at placing the party in the position he would have been in had the negligent 
misrepresentation not been made. This type of remedy will be available regardless of 
whether a pre-contractual agreement has been concluded, but the existence of a pre-
contractual agreement can serve as evidence of the misrepresentation and render the 
reliance reasonable. While the remedy in both the contractual and delictual context 
may be reliance damages, in a contractual context an award of reliance damages will 
be based on breach of contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith, while in the 
delictual context, reliance damages will be awarded for breach of a legal duty to 
negotiate in good faith which is conceptually distinct.  
Public policy in South Africa has evolved to promoting greater fairness and 
reasonableness in contracting,70 and more specifically is applied to give greater 
expression to the value of good faith. We saw how the development of an action for 
negligent misrepresentation to include representations regarding the conclusion of a 
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contract in circumstances where no contract materialises can discourage blameworthy 
conduct in the course of negotiations.71 This in turn promotes greater fairness and 
reasonableness in negotiations and indirectly gives effect to the value of good faith by 
requiring parties to maintain a certain standard of conduct in negotiations and to have 
regard to the interests of the other party in circumstances where a legal duty arises.72 
Developing the law of delict in this manner will provide a remedy in circumstances 
where a person suffers losses in reliance on the blameworthy conduct of the other 
party in the course of negotiations.  
However, there can also be circumstances where the loss cannot be attributed to 
the blameworthy conduct of one of the parties, but rather one party is unjustifiably 
enriched and at the expense of another in the course of negotiations. It is the law of 
unjustified enrichment that must be developed to cater for these situations. We 
observed how the law of unjustified enrichment can and should be developed to 
provide for situations where one party performs in anticipation of a future obligation 
which subsequently fails to materialise.  
Developing the law of delict and the law of unjustified enrichment in this way 
provides a well-constructed legal framework for pre-contractual liability that will in 
appropriate but limited circumstances provide a remedy to a party who suffers loss or 
seeks restitution of unjustified gains made during the pre-contractual phase. The law 
in South Africa has reached such a stage of development, particularly since the advent 
of the Constitution, where it is no longer appropriate for parties to be able to conduct 
themselves in a manner that does not accord with the value of good faith in the course 
of negotiations and thereby cause harm to the other party without incurring liability. 
These developments may further promote efficient exchanges, since parties will be 
able to invest in negotiations freely, knowing that there are remedies at their disposal. 
This will also discourage opportunistic or overreaching behaviour by parties in the 
course of negotiations which will only increase the likelihood of commercial 
transactions being concluded.  
6 6 Concluding observations  
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It is clear that agreements to negotiate, much like pre-emption agreements and 
agreements granting a unilateral discretion, can perform a valuable commercial 
function and that the rules of the law of contract relating to agreements to negotiate 
are thus in need of development. This development is justified both by the needs of 
modern commerce as well as public policy, as influenced by good faith and ubuntu, 
which ultimately demands that parties that voluntarily conclude an agreement to 
negotiate comply with the obligation to act honestly and reasonably in the course of 
negotiations. We also saw how the South African law of delict and law of unjustified 
enrichment could benefit from development so as to provide for pre-contractual 
liability, particularly in circumstances where a pre-contractual agreement has been 
concluded. Hopefully South African courts will soon recognise the need for and utility 
of developing the law to provide a clearer legal framework in which negotiations take 
place. Such a legal framework will promote a certain level of conduct in the course of 
negotiations and may encourage investment in negotiations, which will in turn could 
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A jurisdiction-neutral standard form confidentiality agreement (also known as a non-disclosure 
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This document has been adapted from Standard document, Confidentiality agreement: corporate 
seller: acquisitions and Standard document, Confidentiality letter: corporate seller: acquisitions to 
provide a plain English, UK-style jurisdiction neutral starting point for local counsel to adapt in cross-
border transactions. 
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This agreement is dated [DATE] 
PARTIES 
(1)[FULL COMPANY NAME] incorporated and registered in [COUNTRY OF INCORPORATION] with company 
number [NUMBER] whose registered office is at [REGISTERED OFFICE ADDRESS] (Seller) 
(2)[FULL COMPANY NAME] incorporated and registered in [COUNTRY OF INCORPORATION] with company 
number [NUMBER] whose registered office is at [REGISTERED OFFICE ADDRESS] (Buyer) 
BACKGROUND 
   
  
(A)  The Buyer [is discussing OR intends to enter into discussions OR is negotiating] with the Seller in connection 
with the Proposed Transaction. 
(B)  The Seller [and its Group] wish to ensure that any Confidential Information disclosed to the Buyer in 
connection with the Proposed Transaction remains confidential and is not used by the Buyer for any purpose 
other than the Permitted Purpose. 
(C)  The parties have agreed to comply with this agreement in connection with the use and disclosure of the 
Confidential Information. 
AGREED TERMS 
1.  INTERPRETATION   
 
1.1  The definitions and rules of interpretation in this clause apply in this agreement. 
Authorised Contact: has the meaning given in:  Clause 6.1. 
Business Day: a day other than a [Saturday, Sunday or public holiday in [COUNTRY]] when banks in [CITY] are 
open for business.:   
Confidential Information:  has the meaning given in Clause 2.1. 
Copies:  copies of Confidential Information including any document, electronic file, note, extract, analysis, study, 
plan, compilation or any other way of representing or recording or recalling information which contains, reflects 
or is derived or generated from Confidential Information. 
Group:  in relation to a company (wherever incorporated), that company, any company of which it is a Subsidiary 
from time to time (its holding company) and any other Subsidiaries from time to time of that company or its 
holding company. Each company in a Group is a member of the Group. 
Indemnified Person: has the meaning ascribed to it in:  Clause 10.1. 
[Key Employee:  any individual who is, at any time during the negotiations relating to the Proposed Transaction, 
an employee holding an executive or managerial position with, or an officer of, the Seller or any other member 
of the Seller’s Group.] 
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Permitted Recipient:  any person referred to in Clause 4.1 to whom Confidential Information is disclosed by, or 
at the request of, the Buyer. 
Proposed Transaction:  the proposed acquisition by the Buyer of [[the [business and assets OR entire share 
capital] of the Target OR [DESCRIPTION OF THE TRANSACTION]]. 
Restricted Customer: has the meaning ascribed to it in:  Clause 9.1(d). 
Restricted Period: the period commencing on the date of this agreement and ending on the earlier of the:   
termination of the Buyer’s undertakings and obligations in this agreement in accordance with:  Clause 13; and 
date being [NUMBER] [days OR months] after the date of this agreement.:   
Subsidiary:  in relation to a company wherever incorporated (a holding company), any company in which the 
holding company (or persons acting on its or their behalf) directly or indirectly holds or controls either: 
a. [a majority of the voting rights exercisable at shareholder meetings of that company]; or 
b. [the right to appoint or remove a majority of its board of directors], 
and any company which is a Subsidiary of another company is also a Subsidiary of that company’s holding 
company. [Unless the context otherwise requires, the application of the definition of Subsidiary to any company 
at any time shall apply to the company as it is at that time.] 
  
Target: [FULL COMPANY NAME]. 
  
Usual Business Hours: has the meaning ascribed to it in Clause 19.5. 
  
1.2  Clause headings do not affect the interpretation of this agreement. 
1.3  A reference to this agreement is a reference to this agreement as varied or novated in accordance with its 
terms from time to time. 
1.4  Unless the context otherwise requires, words in the singular shall include the plural and the plural shall 
include the singular. 
1.5  [Unless the context otherwise requires, a reference to one gender shall include a reference to the other 
genders.] 
 
1.6  A person includes a natural person, corporate or unincorporated body (whether or not having separate legal 
personality) and that person’s successors and permitted assigns. 
1.7  A reference to a party shall include that party’s successors and permitted transferees. 
  
1.8  A reference to a company shall include any company, corporation or other body corporate, wherever and 
however incorporated or established. 









1.10  Any words following the terms including, include, in particular, for example, or any similar expression shall 
be construed as illustrative and shall not limit the sense of the words, description, definition, phrase or term 
preceding those terms. 
  
 
1.11  A reference to a law is a reference to it as [amended, extended or re-enacted from time to time OR it is in 
force at the date of this agreement] [provided that, as between the parties, no such amendment, extension or 
re-enactment made after the date of this agreement shall apply for the purposes of this agreement to the extent 
that it would impose any new or extended obligation, liability or restriction on, or otherwise adversely affect the 
rights of, any party]. 
  
1.12  A reference to a law shall include all subordinate legislation made [from time to time OR as at the date of 
this agreement] under that law. 
  
1.13  Any obligation on a party not to do something includes an obligation not to allow that thing to be done. 
2.  CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION   
 
2.1  In this agreement, Confidential Information means all confidential or proprietary information (however 
recorded or preserved) that is disclosed or made available (in any form or medium), directly or indirectly, by the 
Seller [or any member of its Group] (or any of [its OR their respective] employees, officers, agents or advisers) 
to the Buyer [or any member of its Group] (or any of [its OR their respective] employees, officers, agents or 
advisers) [whether before, on or after the date of this agreement,] in connection with the Proposed Transaction, 
including: 
(a)  the fact that the Seller is considering entering into the Proposed Transaction, or that discussions are taking 
(or have taken) place concerning the Proposed Transaction; 
(b)  the existence and contents of this agreement; 
(c)  all confidential or proprietary information relating to the Proposed Transaction, the Target[, the Seller] or 
any member of [its OR their respective] Group[s] and the affairs, financial or trading position, assets, intellectual 
property rights, customers, clients, suppliers, employees, plans, operations, processes, products, intentions or 
market opportunities of the Target[, the Seller] or any member of [its OR their respective] Group[s]; 
(d)  the know-how, designs, trade secrets, technical information or software of the Target[, the Seller] or any 
member of [its OR their respective] Group[s]; 
(e)  any other information that is identified as being of a confidential or proprietary nature; and 
(f)  any findings, data or analysis derived from such information, 








2.2  Information is not Confidential Information if: 
  
 
(a)  it is, or becomes, generally available to the public other than as a direct or indirect result of the information 
being disclosed by the Buyer or any other person in breach of this agreement [(except that any compilation of 
otherwise public information in a form not publicly known shall nevertheless be treated as Confidential 
Information)]; 
(b)  the Buyer can [prove OR establish to the reasonable satisfaction of the Seller] that it received the 
information from a source that is not connected with the Seller, the Target [or their respective Groups] and that 
such source was not under any obligation of confidence in respect of that information; 
(c)  the Buyer can [prove OR establish to the reasonable satisfaction of the Seller] that the information was 
lawfully in its possession before it was disclosed by the Seller or the Target (or on its or their behalf) and the 
Buyer was not under any obligation of confidence in respect of that information; or 
(d)  the parties agree in writing that the information is not confidential. 
3.  BUYER’S OBLIGATIONS   
3.1  In consideration for the Seller agreeing, conditional upon the entry into this agreement, to make 
Confidential Information available to the Buyer, the Buyer acknowledges that all Confidential Information is 
confidential and undertakes to the Seller [(and each member of its Group]) that it shall ([and will procure that 
each member of its Group shall]): 
(a)  keep the Confidential Information secret and confidential; 
 
(b)  not use or exploit the Confidential Information in any way, except for the Permitted Purpose; 
(c)  ensure that all Confidential Information is kept in a secure place and apply the same security measures and 
degree of care to the Confidential Information as it applies to its own confidential information; 
  
(d)  not directly or indirectly disclose or otherwise make available any Confidential Information in whole or in 
part to any person, except as expressly permitted by, and in accordance with, the terms of this agreement; 
(e)  not make any Copies, except as expressly permitted by, and in accordance with, the terms of this agreement; 
(f)  [not to use, reproduce, transform or store any of the Confidential Information in an externally accessible 
computer or electronic information retrieval system or transmit it in any form by any means outside its usual 
places of business;] 
(g)  keep confidential and not disclose to any person, except as expressly permitted by this agreement, the fact 
that Confidential Information has been made available to the Buyer or that any discussions may occur or have 
occurred between the Buyer and the Seller relating to Confidential Information or this agreement; 
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Information from the Buyer [or any member of its Group] or [its OR their respective] officers, employees or 
agents, except as expressly permitted by, and in accordance with, the terms of this agreement; and 
(i)  inform the Seller immediately on becoming aware, or suspecting, that Confidential Information has been 
disclosed to, or otherwise obtained by, an unauthorised third party. 
 
3.2  The Buyer may make only such Copies as are strictly necessary for the Permitted Purpose and shall: 
  
(a)  clearly mark all Copies as confidential; 
(b)  ensure that all Copies can be separately identified from its own information; and 
(c)  [use [its best OR all reasonable] endeavours to] ensure that all Copies within its control are protected against 
theft or unauthorised access. 
 
3.3  Upon receipt of a written request from the Seller, the Buyer shall (to the extent reasonably practicable), 
promptly provide the Seller with a written record of: 
  
(a)  the location of all Confidential Information that has been supplied to the Buyer or a Permitted Recipient; 
(b)  all Copies made by the Buyer or a Permitted Recipient (excluding any Copies which contain insignificant 
extracts from or references to Confidential Information) and where such Copies are held; and 
(c)  the names and addresses of every person to whom Confidential Information has been disclosed by (or at the 
request of) the Buyer [together with the confidentiality agreements signed by such persons complying with 
Clause 4.2(b)]. 
4.  PERMITTED DISCLOSURE   
 
4.1  Provided it complies with its obligations under Clause 4.2, the Buyer may disclose Confidential Information 
to: 
(a)  its officers or employees [(or those of its Group)] that need to know the relevant Confidential Information 
for the Permitted Purpose; 
(b)  the professional advisers or consultants engaged to advise the Buyer [(or any member of its Group)] in 
connection with the Proposed Transaction; 
(c)  its bankers, potential investors (and their respective professional advisers or consultants) for the purpose of 
securing finance for the Proposed Transaction; and 
(d)  any person whom the Seller agrees in writing may receive the relevant Confidential Information. 
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(a)  inform the Permitted Recipient[ in writing], before or at the same time the Confidential Information is 
disclosed, of the confidential nature of the Confidential Information[, except where the Permitted Recipient is 
subject to professional obligations to maintain the confidentiality of the Confidential Information];[ and] 
 
(b)  procure that the Permitted Recipient shall, in relation to any Confidential Information disclosed to it, comply 
with this agreement as if it were the Buyer [and, if the Seller so requests, procure that the Permitted Recipient 
enters into a confidentiality agreement with the Seller on terms equivalent to those contained in this 
agreement][; and 
(c)  at all times, be responsible for each Permitted Recipient’s compliance with the terms of this agreement as 
if the Permitted Recipient were the Buyer. 
  
 
5.  MANDATORY DISCLOSURE   
 
5.1  Subject to the provisions of this Clause 5, the Buyer may disclose Confidential Information to the minimum 
extent required by: 
(a)  an order of any court of competent jurisdiction or any regulatory, judicial, governmental or similar body, or 
any taxation authority of competent jurisdiction; 
(b)  the rules of any listing authority or securities exchange on which the shares of the Buyer [(or any member 
of its Group)] are listed or traded; or 
(c)  the laws or regulations of any country to which the affairs of the Buyer ([or any member of its Group)] are 
subject. 
 
5.2  Before the Buyer discloses any information under Clause 5.1, the Buyer shall (to the extent permitted by 
law) [use [its best OR all reasonable] endeavours to]: 
  
(a)  inform the Seller of the full circumstances of the required disclosure and the Confidential Information that 
must be disclosed; 
(b)  take all such steps as may be reasonable and practicable in the circumstances to agree the contents of the 
required disclosure with the Seller before it is made; 
(c)  consult with the Seller as to possible steps to avoid or limit the required disclosure and to take those steps 
where they would not result in significant adverse consequences to the Buyer; 
(d)  gain assurances as to confidentiality from the body or authority requiring the disclosure; and 
(e)  where the disclosure is by way of public announcement, agree the wording of such announcement with the 
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5.3  The Buyer shall co-operate with the Seller (at the Seller’s cost and expense) if the Seller decides to bring any 
legal or other proceedings to challenge the validity of the requirement to disclose Confidential Information 
pursuant to Clause 5.1. 
  
5.4  If the Buyer is unable to inform the Seller before Confidential Information is disclosed pursuant to Clause 
5.1, the Buyer shall (to the extent permitted by law) inform the Seller of the full circumstances of the disclosure 
and the information that has been disclosed immediately after such disclosure has been made. 
  
 
6.  AUTHORISED CONTACT   
 
6.1  All communications with the Seller concerning the Proposed Transaction shall be addressed to [NAME] at 
[CONTACT DETAILS] (Authorised Contact). 
 
6.2  Except with the prior written consent of the Seller, neither the Buyer nor anyone acting on its behalf, shall 
contact or communicate with any officers, employees, consultants, advisers, landlords, bankers, customers, 
clients or suppliers of the Seller or any other member of its Group in connection with the Proposed Transaction[, 
except for the Authorised Contact]. 
  
 
7.  RETURN OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION   
 
7.1  If discussions in relation to the Proposed Transaction cease, or the Seller so requests at any time by notice 
in writing to the Buyer, the Buyer shall immediately: 
 
(a)  return to the Seller, destroy or permanently erase (including to the extent legally and technically practicable, 
from its computer(s) and communications systems and devices or from systems and data storage services 
provided by third parties) all documents and materials containing, reflecting, incorporating or based on any 
Confidential Information that have been supplied to, or generated by, the Buyer or any Permitted Recipient, 
including all Copies[, other than any Copies that: 
  
(i)  contain insignificant extracts from, or references to, Confidential Information; 
(ii)  are only Copies because they refer to the Proposed Transaction; 
(iii)  are referred to under Clause 7.2; or 
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(b)  procure that each Permitted Recipient takes the steps referred to in Clause 7.1(a) in relation to all 
Confidential Information received by it; and 
 
(c)  confirm in writing to the Seller [(through a certificate signed for the Buyer by one of its directors or other 
senior officers)] that it has complied with its obligations under this Clause 7.1. 
 
7.2  Nothing in Clause 7.1 shall require the Buyer to return, destroy or permanently erase (or procure the return, 
destruction or permanent deletion of) any documents or materials containing, reflecting, incorporating, or 
based on Confidential Information, including any Copies, that the Buyer or any Permitted Recipient is required 
to retain by applicable law, or to satisfy the requirements of any regulatory authority or body of competent 
jurisdiction, or the rules of any listing authority or securities exchange to which the Buyer or the Permitted 
Recipient is subject [or to comply with any applicable internal policy of the Buyer or of its Group]. The provisions 
of this agreement shall continue to apply to any documents and materials retained by the Buyer or any 
Permitted Recipient pursuant to this Clause 7.2. 
  
8.  SELLER’S OBLIGATIONS   
 
8.1  Subject to Clause 8.2, the Seller undertakes that it shall [(and shall procure that each member of its Group 
shall)] keep secret and confidential the Buyer’s interest in the Proposed Transaction and shall take all reasonable 
precautions to ensure that such information remains confidential. 
 
8.2  The Seller may disclose the Buyer’s interest in the Proposed Transaction to: 
  
(a)  any officers or employees of the Seller[’s Group] to the extent necessary for the Permitted Purpose; 
(b)  its professional advisers or consultants engaged to advise in connection with the Proposed Transaction; 
(c)  any person whom the Buyer agrees in writing may receive the relevant information; 
(d)  its bankers, investors or funders (and their respective professional advisers or consultants) to the extent 
necessary for the Permitted Purpose; 
 
(e)  the [minimum] extent required [or requested] by an order of any court of competent jurisdiction or any 
regulatory, judicial, governmental or similar body or any taxation authority of competent jurisdiction, or the 
rules of any listing authority or securities exchange on which the shares of the Seller (or any member of its 
Group) are listed or traded; and 
 
(f)  the [minimum] extent required by the laws or regulations of any jurisdiction to which the affairs of the Seller 
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8.3  [The Seller shall use all reasonable endeavours to procure that any person to whom it has disclosed the 
Buyer’s interest in the Proposed Transaction keeps that information secret and confidential (save where the 
disclosure is made in accordance with Clause 8.2(e) or Clause 8.2(f)).]] 
 
9.  RESTRICTIONS ON THE BUYER   
 
9.1  The Buyer undertakes to the Seller [(and each member of the Seller’s Group)] that except with the prior 
written consent of the Seller, it shall not [(and shall procure that no member of its Group shall)] at any time 
during the Restricted Period: 
(a)  initiate or participate in any discussions, or have contact of any kind, with any officer or employee of the 
Seller [(or those of any member of its Group)] relating to the Proposed Transaction [except as permitted by 
Clause 6, or otherwise in the ordinary course of business between the Seller [(or any member of its Group)] and 
the Buyer]; 
 
(b)  employ or offer to employ, or enter into a contract for the services of, a Key Employee or procure or facilitate 
the making of any such offer by any other person; 
 
(c)  entice, solicit or procure any Key Employee to leave the employment of the Seller [(or any member of its 
Group)], or make any attempt to do so, whether or not the Key Employee would commit a breach of contract in 
leaving their employment; 
(d)  [canvass, solicit or otherwise seek the custom of, or have any dealings with any person who is or who has 
been at any time during the period of [NUMBER] months immediately preceding the date of this agreement, a 
client or customer of the Seller [(or any member of its Group)] (Restricted Customer), in relation to the supply 
of goods, products or services the same as or similar to those supplied by the Seller [(or any member of its 
Group)]; or] 
(e)  [induce or attempt to induce a Restricted Customer to cease conducting or to reduce the amount of business 
conducted with, or to vary adversely the terms upon which it conducts business with, the Seller [(or any member 
of its Group)], or do any other thing which is reasonably likely to have such an effect.] 
9.2  The undertakings in Clause 9.1 are intended for the benefit of, and shall be enforceable by the Seller [and 
each member of the Seller’s Group] [together with any future buyers of the [[business and assets OR entire 
share capital] of the Target] and apply to actions carried out by the Buyer [or any member of its Group] in any 
capacity (including as shareholder, partner, director, principal, consultant, officer, agent or otherwise) and 
whether directly or indirectly, on its own behalf or on behalf of, or jointly with, any other person. 
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(a)  is considered fair and reasonable by the parties; 
(b)  is a separate undertaking by the Buyer; and 
(c)  shall be enforceable separately and independently of any person’s right to enforce any one or more of the 
other undertakings contained in that clause. 
9.4  [The placing of an advertisement of a post available to members of the public generally and the recruitment 
of a person through an employment agency shall not constitute a breach of Clause 9.1 provided that neither the 
Buyer [nor any member of its Group,] nor any of [its OR their respective] officers or employees encourages or 
advises such agency to approach a Key Employee.] 
10.  INDEMNITY   
 
10.1  The Buyer shall (in addition to, and without affecting, any other rights or remedies the Seller may have) 
indemnify, keep indemnified and hold the Seller [and each member of its Group (each an Indemnified Person)] 
harmless from and against all actions, claims, demands, liabilities, damages, costs, losses or expenses [(including 
but not limited to any consequential losses, loss of profit, loss of reputation and all interest, penalties, legal and 
other professional costs and expenses), directly or indirectly OR (including any [reasonable] legal and other 
professional costs and expenses), provided that the Buyer shall not be liable to [the Seller OR an Indemnified 
Person] for any consequential or indirect damages such as, but not limited to, loss of profit, loss of reputation 
and all interest and penalties,] arising out of or in connection with any breach or non-performance by the Buyer 
or any Permitted Recipient, of any of the provisions under this agreement. 
10.2  If a payment due from the Buyer under Clause 10.1 is subject to tax (whether by way of direct assessment 
or withholding at its source), the [Seller OR Indemnified Person] shall be entitled to receive from the Buyer such 
amounts as shall ensure that the net receipt after tax of the [Seller OR the relevant Indemnified Person] in 
respect of the payment is the same as it would have been were the payment not subject to tax. 
  
11.  RESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND BUYER’S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT   
11.1  This agreement and the supply of Confidential Information shall not constitute an offer by, or a 
representation or warranty on the part of, the Seller [or any member of its Group] to enter into the Proposed 
Transaction or any further agreement with the Buyer [(or any other member of its Group)]. 
11.2  Nothing in this agreement or its operation shall constitute an obligation on either party to continue 
discussions or negotiations in connection with the Proposed Transaction, or an obligation on the Seller[ or any 
member of its Group] to disclose any information to the Buyer, whether Confidential Information or otherwise. 
11.3  All rights in the Confidential Information are reserved and none of the Confidential Information shall be 
the property of the Buyer. The disclosure of Confidential Information to the Buyer shall not give the Buyer or 
any other person any licence or other right whatsoever in respect of any Confidential Information beyond the 
rights expressly set out in this agreement. 
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the Seller[ nor any member of the Seller’s Group,] nor [its OR their respective] employees, agents or advisers 
make any warranty or representation (whether express or implied) concerning the Confidential Information, its 
accuracy or completeness or are under any obligation to update or correct any inaccuracy in the Confidential 
Information supplied to the Buyer or are otherwise liable to the Buyer for the Confidential Information. 
11.5  The Buyer shall be liable for the actions or omissions of the Permitted Recipients in relation to Confidential 
Information as if they were the actions or omissions of the Buyer. 
12.  [INSIDE INFORMATION  The Buyer acknowledges that some or all of the Confidential Information may be 
unpublished, price-sensitive information and that the Buyer is aware of its obligations relating to such 
information under the law and regulations applicable to it.] 
 
13.  DURATION   
 
13.1  This agreement shall terminate upon closing of the Proposed Transaction. 
13.2  Save as provided in Clause 13.1, this agreement shall continue in full force and effect for a period of 
[NUMBER] [years OR months] from the date of this agreement. The parties’ obligations under this agreement 
shall not be affected by any termination of the negotiations or discussions between the Buyer and the Seller in 
relation to the Proposed Transaction. 
13.3  Termination of the obligations and undertakings in this agreement will not affect any accrued rights or 
remedies to which a party is entitled. 
 
14.  ANNOUNCEMENTS   
  
    Any announcement or circular relating to the existence or the subject matter of this agreement shall (subject 
to Clause 5) first be approved by both parties as to its content, form and manner of publication. 
15.  ASSIGNMENT AND OTHER DEALINGS   
15.1  The Buyer confirms that it is: 
(a)  acting on its own behalf in relation to the Proposed Transaction and not as a broker or agent, or otherwise 
for the benefit, of any other person; and 
(b)  not seeking to enter into the Proposed Transaction the with a view to resale. 
15.2  [Subject to Clause 15.3, neither OR Neither] party shall assign, transfer or deal in any other manner with 
any or all of its rights and obligations under this agreement [or any document referred to in it]. 
15.3  [The Seller may assign its rights under this agreement to a purchaser of the [business and assets OR entire 
share capital] of the Target and such assignee shall be entitled to enforce this agreement as if it were the Seller.] 
 
16.  ENTIRE AGREEMENT   
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between the parties [in relation to the obligations of the Buyer regarding Confidential Information] and 
supersede[s] and extinguish[es] all previous discussions, correspondence, negotiations, drafts, agreements, 
promises, assurances, warranties, representations and understandings between them, whether written or oral, 
relating to [[its OR their] subject matter OR Confidential Information]. 
 
16.2  Each party acknowledges that in entering into this agreement it does not rely on[, and shall have no 
remedies in respect of,] any statement, representation, assurance or warranty (whether made innocently or 
negligently) that is not set out in this agreement. Each party agrees that it shall have no claim for innocent or 
negligent misrepresentation [or negligent misstatement] based on any statement in this agreement. 
16.3  If the Proposed Transaction proceeds, the Buyer shall enter into a sale and purchase agreement under 
which the Buyer acknowledges that it has not been induced to enter into that agreement by any warranty or 
representation other than as set out in that agreement and the Buyer shall have no rights or remedies in respect 
of any warranty or representation (whether made innocently or negligently) that is not set out in that 
agreement. 
16.4  [Nothing in this Clause 16 operates to limit or exclude any liability for fraud.] 
17.  VARIATION AND WAIVER   
17.1  No variation of this agreement shall be effective unless it is in writing and signed by all the parties (or their 
authorised representatives). 
17.2  No failure or delay by any party to exercise any right or remedy provided under this agreement or by law 
shall constitute a waiver of that or any other right or remedy nor shall it prevent or restrict the further exercise 
of that or any other right or remedy. No single or partial exercise of such right or remedy shall prevent or restrict 
the further exercise of that or any other right or remedy. 
  
17.3  A waiver of any right or remedy under this agreement or by law, or any consent given under this 
agreement, is only effective if it is given in writing by the person giving such waiver or consent. Any such waiver 
or consent shall apply only to the circumstances for which it is given. 
  
18.  COSTS   
  
    Except as expressly provided in this agreement [(or otherwise agreed in writing by the parties)], each party 
shall pay its own costs and expenses incurred in connection with the Proposed Transaction, including the 
negotiation, preparation, execution and performance of this agreement (and any document referred to in it), 
and the evaluation and review of the Confidential Information. 
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19.1  For the purposes of this Clause 19 [(but subject to Clause 19.6)], notice includes any other communication. 
19.2  A notice given to a party under or in connection with this agreement: 
  
 
(a)  shall be in writing and in [English OR [SPECIFY LANGUAGE(S)]] (or be accompanied by an accurate translation 
into [English OR [SPECIFY LANGUAGE(S)]]); 
(b)  [shall be signed by or on behalf of the party giving it;] 
(c)  shall be sent to the relevant party for the attention of the contact and to the address[, email address] [or] 
[fax number] specified in Clause 19.3, or to such other contact and address[, email address] [or] [fax number] as 
that party may notify to the other in accordance with Clause 19.4; and 
(d)  shall be: 
  
(i)  delivered by hand; 
(ii)  sent by [fax] [or] [email]; 
(iii)  sent by pre-paid first class post or another next working day delivery service [providing proof of [postage 
OR delivery]; or 
(iv)  sent by pre-paid airmail or by reputable international overnight courier (if the notice is to be served by post 
to an address outside the country from which it is sent) [providing proof of [postage OR delivery]; and 
(e)  [unless proved otherwise ]is deemed received as set out in Clause 19.5. 
 
19.3  The details for service of notices are: 
  
(a)  [SELLER] 
  
(i)  address: [ADDRESS] 
(ii)  for the attention of: [NAME] 
(iii)  [fax number: [FAX NUMBER]] 
(iv)  [email: [EMAIL ADDRESS]] 
(b)  [BUYER] 
  
(i)  address: [ADDRESS] 
(ii)  for the attention of: [NAME] 
(iii)  [fax number: [FAX NUMBER]] 
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19.4  A party may change its details for service of notices specified or referred to in Clause 19.3 by giving notice 
in writing to the other party[, provided that the address for service is an address in [SPECIFY COUNTRY] following 
any such change]. Any change notified pursuant to this clause shall take effect at [9.00 am in the place of receipt] 
on the later of: 
  
(a)  the date (if any) specified in the notice as the effective date for the change; and 
(b)  [five] Business Days after receipt of the notice of change. 
 
19.5  A notice is deemed to have been received (provided that all other requirements in this Clause 19 have 
been satisfied): 
  
(a)  if delivered by hand, on signature of a delivery receipt [or at the time the notice is left at the address]; or 
 
(b)  if sent by [fax] [or] [email], at the time of transmission; or 
(c)  if sent by pre-paid first class post or another next working day delivery service [providing proof of [postage 
OR delivery]] to an address in [SPECIFY LOCATION], at 9.00 am on the [second] Business Day after posting [or at 
the time recorded by the delivery service]; or 
(d)  if sent by pre-paid airmail [providing proof of [postage OR delivery]] to an address outside the country from 
which it is sent, at 9.00 am on the [fifth] Business Days after posting [or at the time recorded by the delivery 
service]; or 
(e)  if sent by reputable international overnight courier to an address outside the country from which it is sent, 
on signature of a delivery receipt [or at the time the notice is left at the address], 
PROVIDED that if deemed receipt under the previous paragraphs of this Clause 19.5 would occur outside the 
Usual Business Hours, the notice shall be deemed to have been received when Usual Business Hours next 
recommence. For the purposes of this clause, Usual Business Hours means 9.00 am to 5.30 pm local time on 
any day which is not a [Saturday,] [Sunday] [or] public holiday in the place of receipt of the notice [(which, in the 
case of service of a notice by [fax] [or] [email] shall be deemed to be the same place as is specified for service of 
notices on the relevant party by hand or post). For the purposes of this clause, all references to time are to local 
time in the place of deemed receipt. 
  
19.6  [This Clause 19 does not apply to the service of any proceedings or other documents in any legal action 
[or, where applicable, any arbitration or other method of dispute resolution].] 
19.7  [A notice given under or in connection with this agreement is not valid if sent by email.] 
20.  SEVERANCE   
20.1  If any provision or part-provision of this agreement is or becomes invalid, illegal or unenforceable, it shall 
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modification is not possible, the relevant provision or part-provision shall be deemed deleted. Any modification 
to or deletion of a provision or part-provision under this clause shall not affect the validity and enforceability of 
the rest of this agreement. 
20.2  [If [one party gives notice to the other of the possibility that] any provision or part of a provision of this 
agreement is invalid, illegal or unenforceable, the parties shall negotiate in good faith to amend such provision 
so that, as amended, it is valid, legal and enforceable and, to the greatest extent possible, achieves the intended 
commercial result of the original provision.] 
21.  THIRD PARTY RIGHTS   
 
21.1  [Except as expressly provided in Clause 21.2 or elsewhere in this agreement, this OR This] agreement is 
made for the benefit of the parties to it and their successors[ and permitted transferees] and is not intended to 
benefit, or be enforceable by, anyone else. 
21.2  [This agreement is made for the benefit of [each member of the Seller’s Group and] future buyers of the 
[entire issued share capital OR the business and assets] of the Target and the Buyer’s undertakings and 
obligations in this agreement shall be enforceable by each of them to the fullest extent permitted by law as if 
they were a party to this agreement.] 
 
21.3  The rights of the parties to terminate, rescind or agree any variation, waiver or settlement under this 
agreement are not subject to the consent of any other person. 
22.  COUNTERPARTS   
22.1  This agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which when executed shall 
constitute a duplicate original, but all the counterparts shall together constitute the one agreement. 
22.2  [No counterpart shall be effective until each party has signed and delivered to the other party at least one 
counterpart.] 
22.3  Transmission of [a signed counterpart of this agreement OR the signed signature page of a counterpart of 
this agreement] by: 
  
(a)  fax; or 
(b)  email (in PDF, JPEG or other agreed format), 
    shall take effect as delivery of a signed counterpart of this agreement. If either method of delivery 
is adopted, each party shall, without prejudice to the validity of the agreement thus made, provide 
the other with the original of such counterpart as soon as reasonably possible thereafter. 
  
23.  RIGHTS AND REMEDIES   
23.1  Except as expressly provided in this agreement, the rights and remedies provided under this agreement 
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23.2  [Without prejudice to any other rights or remedies that the Seller may have, the Buyer acknowledges and 
agrees that damages alone would not be an adequate remedy for any breach of the terms of this agreement by 
the Buyer. Accordingly, the Seller [or any member of its Group] shall be entitled to the remedies of injunction, 
specific performance or other equitable relief for any threatened or actual breach of the terms of this 
agreement.] 
24.  LANGUAGE   
24.1  If this agreement is additionally signed in, or is translated into, any language other than [English OR SPECIFY 
LANGUAGE], the [English OR SPECIFY LANGUAGE] language version shall prevail. 
24.2  Any other document provided in connection with this agreement shall be in [LANGUAGE], or there shall 
be a properly prepared translation into [LANGUAGE] and the [LANGUAGE] translation will prevail in the case of 
any conflict between them. 
25.  GOVERNING LAW AND JURISDICTION   
25.1  This agreement and any dispute or claim [(including non-contractual disputes or claims)] arising out of or 
in connection with it or its subject matter or formation shall be governed by and construed in accordance with 
the law of [JURISDICTION]. 
25.2  Each party irrevocably agrees that the courts of [JURISDICTION] shall have [exclusive OR non-exclusive] 
jurisdiction to settle any dispute or claim [(including non-contractual disputes or claims)] arising out of or in 
connection with this agreement or its subject matter or formation. 
This agreement has been entered into on the date stated at the beginning of it. 
Signed by [NAME OF DIRECTOR] for and 















Signed by [NAME OF DIRECTOR] for and 





















Exclusivity agreement: share purchases 
by Practical Law Corporate1 
Standard documents | Maintained | England, Wales 
  
An exclusivity agreement (also known as a lock-out agreement) for use in connection with the sale 
and purchase of the entire issued share capital of a private company incorporated in England and 
Wales, by a single corporate seller to a corporate buyer. 
   
This agreement is dated [DATE] 
PARTIES 
(1)[FULL COMPANY NAME], incorporated and registered in England and Wales with company number [NUMBER] 
whose registered office is at [REGISTERED OFFICE ADDRESS] (Seller) 
(2)[FULL COMPANY NAME], incorporated and registered in England and Wales with company number [NUMBER] 
whose registered office is at [REGISTERED OFFICE ADDRESS] (Buyer) 
BACKGROUND 
   
  
(A)  The Buyer and the Seller [have entered into preliminary discussions OR intend to enter into preliminary 
discussions] regarding the Proposed Transaction. 
(B)  The Seller has agreed to grant the Buyer a period of exclusivity in which to evaluate and negotiate the 
Proposed Transaction, on the terms set out in this agreement. 
AGREED TERMS 
1.  INTERPRETATION   
1.1  The definitions and rules of interpretation in this clause apply in this agreement. 
Exclusivity Period:  the period commencing on the date of this agreement and ending [at [TIME]] on [DATE]. 
Group:  in relation to a company, that company, any subsidiary or any holding company from time to time of 
that company, and any subsidiary from time to time of a holding company of that company. Each company in a 
Group is a member of the Group. 
Proposed Transaction:  the acquisition of the entire issued share capital of the Target by the Buyer. 
 
1 Practical Law Global “UK Standard Document W-004-7888” (2019) Thomson Reuters < 
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Restricted Transaction:  each and any of the following: 
a. [any investment in the Target [or any other member of its Group];] 
b. the disposal (whether by way of sale, offer, transfer or otherwise) of all or any part of, or any interest in, 
the issued share capital of the Target [or any other member of its Group]; 
c. the disposal (whether by way of sale, offer, transfer or otherwise) of all, or [any OR a material] part of, the 
business, assets or undertaking of the Target [or any other member of its Group], other than in the 
ordinary course of trading; or 
d. any other disposal, merger, business combination or similar transaction involving the Target [or any other 
member of its Group]. 
Target:  [INSERT NAME OF TARGET], incorporated and registered in England and Wales with company number 
[NUMBER], whose registered office is at [REGISTERED OFFICE ADDRESS]. 
Third Party:  any person other than the Buyer, a member of the Buyer’s Group or any of their respective officers, 
employees, agents or advisers. 
Third Party Negotiations:  any discussions or negotiations relating to or otherwise concerning a Restricted 
Transaction, between a Third Party and any of the Seller, the Target or another member of the Seller’s Group 
(or any of their respective officers, employees, agents or advisers). 
1.2  References to clauses are to the clauses of this agreement. 
1.3  A person includes a natural person, corporate or unincorporated body (whether or not having separate legal 
personality). 
1.4  This agreement shall be binding on, and enure to the benefit of, the parties to this agreement and their 
respective successors and permitted assigns, and references to any party shall include that party’s successors 
and permitted assigns. 
  
 
1.5  A reference to a holding company or a subsidiary means a holding company or a subsidiary (as the case 
may be) as defined in section 1159 of the Companies Act 2006 [and for the purposes only of the membership 
requirement contained in sections 1159(1)(b) and (c), a company shall be treated as a member of another 
company even if its shares in that other company are registered in the name of: 
  
(a)  another person (or its nominee) by way of security or in connection with the taking of security; or 
(b)  its nominee]. 
1.6  Unless expressly provided otherwise in this agreement, a reference to writing or written includes fax and 
email. 
  
1.7  Any words following the terms including, include, in particular, for example or any similar expression shall 
be construed as illustrative and shall not limit the sense of the words, description, definition, phrase or term 








1.8  Any obligation not to do something includes an obligation not to allow that thing to be done. 
  
2.  EXCLUSIVITY UNDERTAKINGS   
 
2.1  In consideration of the Buyer [paying to the Seller the sum of £[1.00], receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged and] incurring fees, expenses and other costs in connection with, and committing management 
time and resources to, its due diligence investigations in relation to the Target and negotiating the Proposed 
Transaction, the Seller undertakes to the Buyer that for the duration of the Exclusivity Period it will not (and will 
procure that no other member of its Group nor any of their respective officers, employees, agents or advisers 
will), directly or indirectly: 
(a)  continue, re-start, enter into, initiate or participate in any Third Party Negotiations; 
(b)  invite, induce, encourage, solicit or respond to any approach that might lead to Third Party Negotiations; 
(c)  invite, induce, encourage or solicit any offer or expression of interest from a Third Party in relation to a 
Restricted Transaction; 
(d)  enter into any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not legally binding) with a Third Party 
in connection with a Restricted Transaction; [or] 
(e)  [withdraw from negotiations with the Buyer in relation to the Proposed Transaction; or] 
(f)  supply, disclose or otherwise make available to a Third Party any information concerning the Target [or any 
other member of its Group] for the purpose of enabling it to evaluate, or decide whether to make an offer in 
connection with or otherwise pursue, a Restricted Transaction. 
 
2.2  Upon entering into this agreement, the Seller will immediately terminate, or procure the termination of, 
any Third Party Negotiations that are currently taking place. 
 
2.3  The Seller will [immediately OR promptly] notify the Buyer in writing if, at any time during the Exclusivity 
Period, it or any other member of its Group receives an offer (whether written or oral), indication of interest, 
proposal or enquiry from a Third Party concerning a Restricted Transaction. 
  
3.  BUYER’S REMEDIES   
 
3.1  If the Seller breaches any of the undertakings or obligations in Clause 2.1[, Clause 2.2 or Clause 2.3] of this 
agreement, it will (without prejudice to any other rights or remedies that the Buyer may have) indemnify the 
Buyer for an amount equal to all [reasonable] costs, fees, disbursements and expenses (including in each case 
any applicable VAT) which have been or will be incurred by the Buyer in connection with its investigation, 
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entering into this agreement). 
3.2  Without prejudice to any other rights or remedies that the Buyer may have, the Seller acknowledges and 
agrees that damages alone would not be an adequate remedy for any breach of the terms of this agreement. 
Accordingly, the Buyer shall be entitled to the remedies of injunction, specific performance or other equitable 
relief for any threatened or actual breach of the terms of this agreement. 
  
4.  ASSIGNMENT   
  
Neither party shall assign, transfer, mortgage, charge, subcontract, declare a trust over or deal in any other 
manner with any or all of its rights and obligations under this agreement. 
5.  CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANNOUNCEMENTS   
5.1  This agreement is confidential to the parties and their advisers and is subject to the confidentiality 
agreement already entered into between the Buyer and the Seller dated [DATE] which continues in full force 
and effect. 
5.2  No party shall make, or permit any person to make, any public announcement concerning the existence, 
subject matter or terms of this agreement, the wider transactions contemplated by it, or the relationship 
between the parties, without the prior written consent of the other party, except as required by law, any 
governmental or regulatory authority (including, without limitation, any relevant securities exchange), any court 
or other authority of competent jurisdiction. 
  
6.  ENTIRE AGREEMENT   
6.1  This agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and extinguishes all 
previous discussions, correspondence, negotiations, drafts, agreements, promises, assurances, warranties, 
representations and understandings between them, whether written or oral, relating to its subject matter. 
6.2  Each party acknowledges and agrees that in entering into this agreement it does not rely on, and shall have 
no remedies in respect of, any statement, representation, assurance or warranty (whether made innocently or 
negligently) that is not set out in this agreement. Each party agrees that it shall have no claim for innocent or 
negligent misrepresentation [or negligent misstatement] based on any statement in this agreement. 
  
7.  VARIATION AND WAIVER   
7.1  No variation of this agreement shall be effective unless it is in writing and signed by the parties (or their 
authorised representatives). 
7.2  No failure or delay by either party to exercise any right or remedy provided under this agreement or by law 
shall constitute a waiver of that or any other right or remedy, nor shall it prevent or restrict the further exercise 
of that or any other right or remedy. No single or partial exercise of such right or remedy shall prevent or restrict 








8.  SEVERANCE   
  
If any provision or part-provision of this agreement is or becomes invalid, illegal or unenforceable, it shall be 
deemed deleted, but that shall not affect the validity and enforceability of the rest of this agreement. 
9.  COSTS   
  
    Save as provided in Clause 3.1, each party shall pay its own costs and expenses incurred in connection with 
the Proposed Transaction, including the negotiation, preparation and execution of this agreement. 
10.  THIRD PARTY RIGHTS   
10.1  Unless it expressly states otherwise, this agreement does not give rise to any rights under the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 to enforce any term of this agreement. 
10.2  The rights of the parties to rescind or vary this agreement are not subject to the consent of any other 
person. 
  
11.  GOVERNING LAW AND JURISDICTION   
11.1  This agreement and any dispute or claim (including non-contractual disputes or claims) arising out of or in 
connection with it or its subject matter or formation shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the 
law of England and Wales. 
11.2  Each party irrevocably agrees that the courts of England and Wales shall have [exclusive OR non-exclusive] 
jurisdiction to settle any dispute or claim (including non-contractual disputes or claims) arising out of or in 
connection with this agreement or its subject matter or formation. 
  
This agreement has been entered into on the date stated at the beginning of it. 
Signed by [NAME OF DIRECTOR] for and 















Signed by [NAME OF DIRECTOR] for and 















Letter of intent (private company acquisitions): Cross-border 
by Practical Law Global1 
Standard documents | Maintained | Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong - 
PRC, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, The Netherlands, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States 
  
Standard form letter of intent (also known as heads of terms, term sheet or memorandum of 
understanding), by which the parties outline their intention to buy and sell all the shares (or equivalent 
equity interest) in a privately-owned company incorporated and registered outside the UK. This 
standard document includes legally binding provisions relating to the exclusivity of negotiations and 
costs and assumes that a confidentiality agreement has already been entered into. It has been drafted 
from the perspective of the buyer. 
  
This document has been adapted from Standard document, Heads of terms: share purchases to 
provide a plain English, UK-style jurisdiction neutral starting point for local counsel to adapt in cross-
border transactions. 
  
For a form of letter of intent to use in connection with cross-border asset and business acquisitions, 
see Standard document, Letter of intent (asset purchases): Cross-border. 
  
Jurisdiction-specific drafting notes (updated periodically) provide practical information for Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, The 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, the UK (England and Wales) and the United States. 
   
[On headed notepaper of Buyer] 
  
 
1 Practical Law Global “UK Standard Document 7-101-4187” (2019) Thomson Reuters < 
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[NAME[S] AND ADDRESS[ES] OF SELLER[S]] 
[DATE] 
Dear [SELLER[S]] 
Potential acquisition of the [entire issued share capital] of [TARGET COMPANY] (Target) 
  
This letter sets out the principal terms and conditions on and subject to which [FULL NAME OF BUYER] (Buyer) 
is willing to buy all the [issued shares] in the Target [(Shares)] from [[FULL NAME[S] OF SELLER[S]] ([each a 
]Seller[, together the Sellers]) OR the Sellers (as defined in Paragraph 1.2)], subject to the agreement and 
signature by the parties of a detailed legally binding acquisition agreement. 
  
This letter is not exhaustive and is not intended to be legally binding between the Buyer and the Seller except 
as specifically provided otherwise in this letter. 
  
1.  SHARES TO BE PURCHASED   
1.1  The Buyer proposes to buy [(either directly or through one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries)] [the legal and 
beneficial interest in] the Shares free from all claims, liens, equities, charges, encumbrances and adverse rights 
of any description (Proposed Transaction). 
 
1.2  The Shares are owned by the [Sellers OR persons set out below (each a Seller, together the Sellers)] in the 
following proportions: 
  
Name of Seller 
 
Number and class of shares 
 

























1.3  [The Target has the following wholly-owned subsidiaries (Subsidiaries): 


















In this letter, references to the Target Group means the Target and each of the Subsidiaries. 
  
OR 
 The Target has no subsidiaries.] 
2.  PRICE   
2.1  Subject to the completion of satisfactory due diligence [and the price adjustment set out in Paragraph 2.3], 
the Buyer will pay an aggregate price equal to [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT] for the Shares (Price). 
 




The Price will be satisfied by: 
  
(a)  the payment to the Seller of [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT] in cash on closing of the Proposed Transaction 
(Closing); [and] 
(b)  [the payment to the Seller of [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT] in cash on [each of] [DATE], [DATE] and [DATE]];] 
(c)  [the allotment and issue to the Seller[s] on Closing of [[NUMBER] OR the number of] [CLASS] shares of 
[CURRENCY] [NOMINAL AMOUNT] each in the capital of the Buyer [having an aggregate value of at least 
[CURRENCY] [AMOUNT]] (the Consideration Shares). [For this purpose, the value of each Consideration Share 
will be [[a sum equal to the average of the middle market quotations for a[n] [CLASS] share of the Buyer [as 
shown by [NAME OF LISTING INDEX] of [SECURITIES EXCHANGE] for each of the [NUMBER] working days 
immediately preceding Closing OR [SPECIFY BASIS FOR DETERMINING VALUE OF EACH CONSIDERATION SHARE];] 
(d)  [the issue to the Seller[s] on Closing of [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT] [floating rate OR [NUMBER]%] [guaranteed] 
[unsecured] loan notes [YEAR] of the Buyer constituted by a loan note instrument in terms to be agreed by the 
Buyer and the Seller[, including the matters specified in Paragraph 2.5].] 
OR 
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Transaction (Closing) and will deposit the remaining [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT] in an escrow account [to be opened 
in the [joint] name[s] of the Buyer’s lawyers [and the Seller[’]s[’] lawyers] OR with a mutually acceptable escrow 
agent,] where it will be held until [DATE] in order to secure the performance of Seller[’]s[’] post-Closing 
obligations under the Share Purchase Agreement. 
  
2.3  [The Price will be subject to the following adjustments: 
(a)  if the [net assets] of the Target [Group] at Closing are less than [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT], the Price will be 
reduced by an amount equal to the shortfall; or 
(b)  if the [net assets] of the Target [Group] at Closing are greater than [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT], the Price will be 
increased by an amount equal to the excess.] 
    [For this purpose, the [net assets] of the Target [Group] at Closing will be determined by reference 
to a [consolidated] balance sheet [and profit and loss account] for the Target [Group] for the period 
from [DATE] to Closing as prepared and agreed by the Buyer and the Seller[s] following Closing (the 
Closing Accounts). The principles governing the preparation and agreement of the Closing Accounts 
and the calculation of the [net assets] will be set out in the Share Purchase Agreement in terms to be 
agreed by the Buyer and the Seller[s], including: [SET OUT MATERIAL TERMS RELATING TO CLOSING 
ACCOUNTS ADJUSTMENT].] 
2.4  [The Consideration Shares will rank pari passu in all respects with the existing [CLASS] shares of [CURRENCY] 
[NOMINAL AMOUNT] each in the capital of the Buyer, including the right to receive all dividends declared, made 
or paid after Closing (save that they will not rank for any dividend or other distribution declared made, or paid 
by reference to a record date before Closing).] 
2.5  [[IF RELEVANT, SPECIFY MATERIAL TERMS OF LOAN NOTES].] 
2.6  [The Price will be paid to the Sellers in [proportion to their respective holdings of the Shares OR the following 
proportions: 
Name of Seller 
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3.  ASSUMPTIONS   
  
    The Buyer has calculated the Price on the basis of [the information contained in the information memorandum 
relating to the Target dated [DATE] [as provided to the Buyer on [DATE]] OR [DETAILS OF INFORMATION 
PROVIDED TO THE BUYER and based on] the following assumptions: 
  
(a)  [SET OUT RELEVANT ASSUMPTIONS]. 
(b)  [SET OUT RELEVANT ASSUMPTIONS]. 
4.  CONDITIONS   
  
    The Proposed Transaction is conditional on the following matters: 
  
(a)  the Buyer conducting and being satisfied with the results of legal, financial, taxation and commercial due 
diligence concerning the Target [Group] and its business, assets and liabilities[, including (but not limited to) 
[LIST SPECIFIC REPORTS AND INVESTIGATIONS REQUIRED] and any other matters the Buyer considers 
necessary]; 
(b)  the parties agreeing, signing and exchanging a share purchase agreement incorporating all the terms of the 
Proposed Transaction, including (without limitation) the matters set out in Paragraph 6 (Share Purchase 
Agreement); 
  
(c)  approval of the Proposed Transaction by [the board of directors OR [OTHER COMPETENT GOVERNING 
BODY]] [and shareholders] of [the Buyer OR [ULTIMATE PARENT OF THE BUYER]][ and the Seller[s]]; 
  
(d)  [the Seller[s] providing the Buyer with management accounts for the Target [Group] in respect of the period 
to [DATE], and such accounts being [satisfactory to the Buyer OR [SPECIFY WHAT BUYER EXPECTS SUCH 
ACCOUNTS TO SHOW]];] 
(e)  [any third party, regulatory or tax consents or approvals necessary [or desirable] for the Proposed 
Transaction being received on terms [reasonably] satisfactory to the Buyer [and the Seller[s]] including, in 
particular: 
(i)  [SPECIFY MATERIAL CONSENTS], 
and such consents and approvals remaining in full force and effect;] 
(f)  [the Seller’s warranties in the Share Purchase Agreement being true and accurate at Closing and the Seller[s] 
not otherwise being in [material] breach of [its OR their] obligations under such agreement;] 
(g)  [there being no material adverse change in the business, operations, assets, position (financial, trading or 
otherwise), profits or prospects of the Target [Group] [between the date of this letter and Closing];] 
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[Group] being terminated or amended [in any materially adverse respect] [between the date of this letter and 
Closing];] 
(i)  [each of [NAMES OF KEY EMPLOYEES] entering into new service agreements with the Target [for a minimum 
period of [NUMBER] years from Closing and otherwise] on terms acceptable to the Buyer;] 
(j)  [the resignation of [NAME OF DIRECTORS/EMPLOYEES] from their positions as [directors] [and] [employees] 
of the Target [Group] with effect from Closing, without compensation for loss of office or otherwise;] 
(k)  [the grant to the Target [Group] by [NAME OF AUTHORITY/PERSON] of new licences in respect of [SUBJECT 
MATTER OF LICENCES], on terms satisfactory to the Buyer;] 
(l)  [the Buyer having secured financing for the Proposed Transaction;] 
(m)  the delivery of a legal opinion from [the Seller[’]s[’] lawyers], in a form satisfactory to the Buyer, confirming 
(among other things) that the Seller[s] [has OR have] the requisite power, authority and capacity to enter into 
the Share Purchase Agreement [and that the Seller[’]s[’] obligations under the Share Purchase Agreement are 
legal, valid, binding and enforceable]; 
  
(n)  [any shareholder resolutions required for the allotment and issue of the Consideration Shares being duly 
passed by the Buyer’s shareholders;] 
(o)  [no government or other person having: 
(i)  commenced or threatened to commence any proceedings or investigation for the purpose of prohibiting or 
otherwise challenging or interfering with the Proposed Transaction; 
(ii)  taken or threatened to take any action as a result or in anticipation of the Proposed Transaction that would 
be inconsistent in any material respect with any of the warranties in the Share Purchase Agreement; or 
(iii)  enacted or proposed any legislation (including any subordinate legislation) or order or imposed any 
condition which would prohibit, materially restrict or materially delay the implementation of the Proposed 
Transaction;] 
(p)  [the approval of all relevant competition authorities having been obtained and no relevant competition 
authority having raised any objections; and] 
(q)  [[DETAILS OF ANY OTHER CONDITIONS].] 
 
5.  DUE DILIGENCE   
5.1  As soon as reasonably practicable after the signature of this letter, the Buyer will arrange for its advisers to 
carry out a [detailed] due diligence investigation of the Target [Group], including its legal, accounting, financial, 
commercial and taxation affairs. 
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(a)  provide the Buyer’s officers, employees, agents and professional advisers with full access to such records, 
key employees, advisers and operations of the Target [Group] as the Buyer may [reasonably] require to carry 
out its due diligence investigation; 
 
(b)  provide, or make available to the Buyer’s officers, employees, agents and professional advisers such 
information relating to the Target [Group] as the Buyer may [reasonably] require in order to evaluate and assess 
the Target [Group] and its business, assets and liabilities in connection with the Proposed Transaction; and 
 
(c)  respond to all due diligence enquiries raised by or on behalf of the Buyer for the purpose of the Proposed 
Transaction in a comprehensive, accurate and timely manner. 
  
5.3  [All requests for information or other enquiries made by or on behalf of the Buyer in connection with its due 
diligence investigation will be made via [the Seller[’]s[’] designated representative OR [NAME] at [CONTACT 
DETAILS]].] 
5.4  [Except with the prior written consent of the Seller[s], neither the Buyer nor anyone acting on its behalf will 
contact or communicate directly with any officers, employees, consultants, advisers, landlords, bankers, 
customers, clients or suppliers of the Target [Group] or disclose to any of them the purpose of the Buyer’s due 
diligence investigations.] 
 
6.  SHARE PURCHASE AGREEMENT   
6.1  As soon as reasonably practicable following the signature of this letter of intent by the parties to it, the 
Buyer and the Seller[s] will begin negotiating a Share Purchase Agreement, the initial draft of which will be 
prepared by [the Buyer’s lawyers]. 
6.2  The Share Purchase Agreement will include (without limitation) the terms summarised in this Paragraph 6, 
together with such other terms, conditions, warranties, covenants and indemnities as are [customary in OR 
appropriate to] a transaction of the nature of the Proposed Transaction. 
  
 
6.3  The Seller[s] will provide the Buyer with [customary] warranties [and representations] [appropriate to the 
Proposed Transaction] relating to the Target [Group] and its business, assets and liabilities, in terms to be agreed 
by the parties [(Transaction Warranties)]. [The Transaction Warranties will address (without limitation) the 
[Target [Group]’s legal, financial, commercial, accounting and taxation position[, including the following matters: 
  
(a)  [DETAILS OF SPECIFIC WARRANTIES]]. 
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by the parties, in respect of: 
  
(a)  the Target [Group]’s tax liabilities[, tax losses and reliefs and the adequacy of its provisions for taxation]; 
[and] 
(b)  [[DETAILS OF OTHER SPECIFIC INDEMNITIES REQUIRED]; and] 
(c)  any other actual or potential liabilities identified during the Buyer’s due diligence investigation in respect of 
which the Buyer requires indemnity cover. 
  
6.5  [The Seller[’]s[’] liability under the Transaction Warranties will be subject to [customary] limitations 
[appropriate to the Proposed Transaction], in terms to be agreed by the parties[, including the following: 
(a)  the Seller[’]s[’] aggregate liability will be capped at [the Price OR [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT]]; 
(b)  the period for notifying any claims under the Transaction Warranties will expire [NUMBER] [months OR 
years] following Closing; 
(c)  all individual claims under the Transaction Warranties with a value of less than [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT] will 
be excluded; 
(d)  the Seller[s] will have no liability under the Transaction Warranties unless the value of the claim (when 
aggregated with any other warranty claims [having a value in excess of [CURRENCY] [AMOUNT]]) exceeds 
[CURRENCY] [AMOUNT], in which case the Seller will be liable for the whole amount of the claim and not just 
the excess; and 
(e)  [SET OUT DETAILS OF ANY OTHER KEY LIMITATIONS REQUIRED].] 
6.6  The Share Purchase Agreement will include non-compete[, non-dealing] and non-solicitation undertakings 
given by the Seller [for itself and on behalf of each of its subsidiaries (but excluding [any members of] the Target 
[Group])], in a form acceptable to the Buyer[, including (without limitation) undertakings that it will not: 
  
(a)  at any time during the period of [NUMBER] years following Closing, compete or have any involvement in a 
business that competes with the business of the Target [Group]; 
(b)  at any time during the period of [NUMBER] years following Closing, offer employment to, enter into a 
contract for the services of, or solicit or otherwise attempt to entice away, any employee of the Target [Group]; 
(c)  at any time during the period of [NUMBER] years following Closing [deal with, or] seek the custom of[,] any 
customers of the Target [Group];[ or] 
(d)  at any time during the period of [NUMBER] years following Closing, [deal with, ]solicit or entice away[,] any 
suppliers of the Target [Group][; or 
(e)  at any time during the period of [NUMBER] years following Closing, induce or attempt to induce any 
customer or supplier to cease or refrain from conducting business with, or to reduce the amount of business 
conducted with, or to vary adversely the terms upon which it conducts business with the Target [Group], or do 








6.7  [The business and activities of the Target [Group] will be carried on in the ordinary course with a view to 
preserving the goodwill of the Target [Group]. In particular, the Seller[s] will give the Buyer such undertakings 
regarding the operation of the business and activities of the Target [Group] in the period between signing of the 
Share Purchase Agreement and Closing as the Buyer requires[, including (without limitation) an undertaking to 
procure that the Target [Group] does not take any of the following actions without the Buyer’s written 
consent:(a)  [[DETAILS OF KEY MATTERS SUBJECT TO THE BUYER’S CONSENT].]]] 
6.8  [[DETAILS OF ANY OTHER KEY ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN SPA].] 
 
7.  TIMETABLE AND NEGOTIATIONS   
7.1  The Buyer intends to proceed as quickly as possible with the Proposed Transaction. The Buyer and the 
Seller[s] will negotiate in good faith with a view to [signing the Share Purchase Agreement on [or before] [DATE] 
and] completing the Proposed Transaction no later than [DATE]. 
7.2  The remaining provisions of this Paragraph 7 are legally binding. 
 
7.3  The Buyer may terminate negotiations in relation to the Proposed Transaction at any time without giving a 
reason for doing so and without incurring any liability to the Seller[s] in relation to such termination. For the 
avoidance of doubt, the provisions of [Paragraph 8] (inclusive) of this letter will not be affected by any such 
termination and they will continue in full force and effect. 
  
7.4  The Buyer and the Seller[s] agree and acknowledge that this letter is not intended to, nor does it create, a 
legally binding obligation to proceed with the Proposed Transaction and no such obligation will arise unless and 
until a Share Purchase Agreement is agreed, signed and exchanged by the parties. 
 
8.  [EXCLUSIVITY   
 
8.1  This Paragraph 8 is legally binding. 
 
8.2  The definitions in this Paragraph 8.2 apply in this Paragraph 8: 
  
[Exclusivity Period:  the period commencing on the date of this letter and ending [at [TIME]] on [DATE][ or, if 
earlier, the date on which the Buyer notifies the Seller[s] in writing that it is withdrawing from negotiations in 
relation to the Proposed Transaction].] 
[Group:  in relation to a company (wherever incorporated), that company, any company of which it is a 
Subsidiary from time to time (its holding company) and any other Subsidiaries from time to time of that company 
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[Restricted Activity:  each and any of the following: 
a. any investment in the Target [Group]; 
b. the disposal (whether by way of sale, offer, transfer or otherwise) of all or any part of, or any interest in, 
the issued share capital of [any member of] the Target [Group]; or 
c. the disposal (whether by way of sale, offer, transfer or otherwise) of all, or [any OR a material] part of, the 
business or assets of [any member of] the Target [Group] (other than in the ordinary course of trading).] 
[Subsidiary:  in relation to a company wherever incorporated (a holding company), any company in which the 
holding company (or persons acting on its or their behalf) directly or indirectly holds or controls either:] 
a. a majority of the voting rights exercisable at shareholder meetings of that company; or 
b. the right to appoint or remove a majority of its board of directors 
and any company which is a Subsidiary of another company is also a Subsidiary of that company’s holding 
company. Unless the context otherwise requires, the application of the definition of Subsidiary to any company 
at any time shall apply to the company as it is at that time. 
[Third Party:  any person other than the Buyer or a member of the Buyer’s Group (or any of their respective 
officers, employees, agents or advisers).] 
[Third Party Negotiations:  any discussions or negotiations between a Third Party and [any OR the] Seller[s] or 
any other member of the Seller[’]s[’] Group [or the Target [Group]] (or any of their respective officers, 
employees, agents or advisers) relating to or otherwise concerning a Restricted Activity.] 
8.3  [The Seller[s] agree[s] that for the duration of the Exclusivity Period [it OR they] will discuss and negotiate 
the Proposed Transaction with the Buyer on an exclusive basis.] 
8.4  [The Seller[s] undertake[s] that for the duration of the Exclusivity Period [it OR they] will not (and will 
procure that no other member of [its OR their respective] Group nor any of their respective officers, employees, 
agents or advisers will), directly or indirectly: 
(a)  continue, enter into, re-start, solicit, initiate or participate in any Third Party Negotiations; 
(b)  induce, solicit, seek, encourage or respond to any approach that might lead to Third Party Negotiations; 
(c)  solicit or encourage any offer from a Third Party in relation to a Restricted Activity; 
(d)  [withdraw from negotiations with the Buyer in relation to the Proposed Transaction;] 
(e)  enter into any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not legally binding) with a Third Party 
in connection with a Restricted Activity; or 
(f)  supply, disclose or otherwise make available any information about the Target [Group], its business assets 
or liabilities to a Third Party for the purpose of evaluating or deciding whether to pursue or make an offer in 
connection with a Restricted Activity.] 
8.5  [On signing this letter, the Seller[s] will immediately terminate or procure the termination of any Third Party 
Negotiations currently taking place.] 
8.6  [The Seller[s] will [immediately OR promptly] notify [in writing] the Buyer if, at any time during the 
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an offer (whether written or oral), indication of interest, proposal or enquiry from a Third Party concerning a 
Restricted Activity.] 
8.7  [The Seller[s] acknowledge[s] that the Buyer will incur significant costs, fees and expenses in reliance on the 
undertakings in this Paragraph 8. Accordingly, if the Seller[s] [(or any of them)] breach[es] any of those 
undertakings the Seller[s] will (without prejudice to any other rights or remedies the Buyer may have) indemnify 
the Buyer for an amount equal to all [reasonable] costs, fees, disbursements and expenses (including in each 
case any applicable VAT) which have been or will be incurred by the Buyer in connection with its investigation, 
evaluation and negotiation of the Proposed Transaction (including any costs, fees, disbursements or expenses 
incurred prior to the signature of this letter).] 
8.8  [Without prejudice to any other rights or remedies that the Buyer may have, the Seller[s] acknowledge[s] 
and agree[s] that damages alone would not be an adequate remedy for any breach of the undertakings in this 
Paragraph 8 and the Buyer will be entitled to the remedies of injunction, specific performance or other equitable 
relief for any threatened or actual breach of such undertakings.] 
8.9  [The Sellers’ obligations in this Paragraph 8 are undertaken on a joint and several basis and any reference 
to the Sellers includes any one or more of them.]] 
 
9.  CONFIDENTIALITY   
9.1  This Paragraph 9 is legally binding. 
 
9.2  The content of this letter is confidential to the parties and is subject to the confidentiality agreement dated 
[INSERT DATE] and made between the Buyer and the Seller[s]. That agreement is not affected by this letter and 
continues in full force and effect. 
 
10.  COSTS   
10.1  This Paragraph 10 is legally binding. 
10.2  [Subject to Paragraph 8.7 and except OR Except] as expressly provided in this letter, the parties shall pay 
their own costs and expenses incurred in connection with the Proposed Transaction whether or not it proceeds, 
including (without limitation) all costs and expenses relating to the Buyer’s due diligence investigations and the 
negotiation, preparation and execution of this letter (and any other documents contemplated by it). 
11.  LANGUAGE   
  
    The negotiations in relation to the Proposed Transaction will be conducted in [English OR [SPECIFY 
LANGUAGE]] and all legal agreements (including the Share Purchase Agreement) will be prepared in [English OR 
[SPECIFY LANGUAGE]]. 
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12.1  This Paragraph 12 is legally binding. 
12.2  This letter and any dispute or claim (including non-contractual disputes or claims) arising out of or in 
connection with it or its subject matter or formation shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the 
law of [JURISDICTION]. 
12.3  The Buyer and the Seller[s] irrevocably agree that the courts of [JURISDICTION] shall have [exclusive OR 
non-exclusive] jurisdiction to settle any dispute or claim (including non-contractual disputes or claims) arising 




[NAME OF [Director]], duly authorised for and on behalf of [NAME OF BUYER] 
 











By [NAME OF SELLER] 
Signed:.................................... 
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